SKETCH

OF

DEMOCRACY.

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DEMOCRACY.

1400

BY

ROBERT BISSET, LL. D.

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω,
Εἷς βασιλεύς.

HOMER'S ILIAD, II. 204.

Bad is the Dominion of the Multitude—let there be one Sovereign, one King.

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REFLECTING on the various arts uſed by diſaffected perſons, to make the ignorant diſlike our preſent conſtitution, and admire democracy, I obſerved one of the moſt hurtful was miſrepreſentation of fact. It was not only contended in argument that people might be very happy, but aſſerted that they actually had been happieſt under democracies. I have long thought that a plain narrative ſtating the operation and effects of democracy might be uſeful, in removing erroneous notions from thoſe who had liſtened to modern lecturers and demagogues. I had frequently made this obſervation to literary acquaintances, and particularly to my ingenious neighbour and friend Mr. Budworth. In one of our converſations that gentleman ſuggeſted to me the idea of undertaking ſuch a narrative. As to detect falſe ſtatements concerning ſubjects of notoriety requires

only

only common knowledge and common ability, I was induced to attempt the taſk. I was farther ſtimulated by the hopes that ſome other perſon who could add philoſophy to narration, and generalize fact into principle might hereafter undertake a regular hiſtory of democracy. As my object is narration, all the intellectual merit I claim is authenticity. That merit I do claim. I appeal to every man acquainted with hiſtory for the fairneſs of my ſtatement, from which I draw the obvious concluſion that democracy is a pernicious government. As I have not in every inſtance cited my authorities, I beg leave here to mention them. From Plutarch, Thucydides, Xenophon, Barthelemi, Mitford, and Gillies I have chiefly taken my ſtatement of Grecian democracy: from Polybius, Salluſt, Cicero, Livy, Plutarch, Vertot, and Ferguſſon my narrative of Roman; my view of Engliſh from Hume. In reading thoſe hiſtorians I have conſidered the whole ſeries of narration, not detached paſſages. Two principles which I attempt to maintain, that a country ought to be governed by its joint ability and property,

and

and that identity of intereſt between the people and members of Parliament was the true criterion of right repreſentation, I learned from a gentleman of great eminence who long diſplayed in the ſenate, part of that ſound ability, extenſive knowledge, and manly eloquence which for two years has been devoted to the bar ſolely; and who, though when in Parliament, in certain points in oppoſition to adminiſtration, concurs in the expediency of preſerving unaltered the Britiſh conſtitution. Principles firſt adopted on ſo reſpectable an authority, ſubſequent experience, and reaſoning confirmed.

Intended only for a pamphlet this Eſſay has unavoidably ſwelled into a volume. If it ſhall be inſtrumental in giving thoſe of my fellow ſubjects who have been miſinformed and miſled, a juſt view of the badneſs of democracy and the goodneſs of the Britiſh conſtitution, it will fully anſwer the Author's purpoſe.

Sloane Street, Chelſea,
April 12th, 1796.

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INTRODUCTION.

Experience the only ſure guide to knowledge and to practice—Its effects compared to thoſe of hypotheſis, illuſtrated in natural, moral, and political philoſophy—Hypotheſis moſt dangerous concerning ſubjects which intereſt the paſſions—Prevalence of political hypotheſis in the preſent age—Object and plan of this work.

THE great and rapid advances which the moderns have made in the knowledge of nature, have proceeded neither from ſuperior powers, nor from more perſevering induſtry. In the poſſeſſion and in the vigorous exertion of intellect, they do not exceed the ancients. Their ſuperior ſucceſs they owe to the more ſkilful direction of their powers and labour. When the ancient philoſophers enquired into phyſical truth, they moſt frequently purſued a wrong track. Inſtead of patiently and carefully obſerving the phænomena of nature, and thence aſcertaining

her general laws, they followed their own conjectures, and from them they framed hypothefes. Purfuing a miftaken path, the force and quicknefs of their genius ferved only to make their deviations the greater from the right road. What they dignified with the name of difcoveries, were mere fictions of imagination, not legitimate conclufions of reafon.

The comprehenfive genius of the authors rendered their fyftems confiftent, and confequently to fuperficial examiners plaufible. Men of inferior ability followed where their fuperiors led. The refult was general error. Such was, and always muft be the cafe, if we examine either nature or man, by any other teft, than by hiftory and by induction. EXPERIENCE only fhews what nature is and what man is, by what means and to what ends natural and moral powers ought to be employed.

Lord

Lord Bacon diſcovered the tendency and value of the hypothetical theories, which had ſo long amuſed mankind. He ſaw they were "Anticipations of mind, not interpre-"tations of nature"—that they were not only individually erroneous, but that the cauſes which had produced them, if ſuffered to operate, muſt always produce error. To know either nature or man, as our great philoſopher perceived, we muſt inveſtigate, we muſt reſolutely reject hypotheſis, and adhere to facts. We muſt not expatiate into the regions of conceived poſſibility, but confine ourſelves to actual exiſtences, thence riſe to general laws, and to the application of thoſe laws. The foundations of ſcience and the guide to practice is EXPERIENCE. The efficacy of this organ depended, and muſt always depend on its ſteady and ſkilful direction. Whenever it has been properly employed, the conſequence has uniformly been great and rapid acceſſion

TANJORE MAHARAJA SERFOJI'S SARASWATI MAHAL

to the dominion of truth. In natural philoſophy, and in the arts of proceeding from that ſcience, by purſuing the path marked out by Lord Bacon, more improvement has been made in a century and a half, than before from the creation of the world. That we know ſo much of nature, both when uncontrouled and when modified by art, that we know, in ſuch a variety of inſtances, how to work on her, ſo as to render her ſubſervient to the purpoſes of life, is owing to the ſingle circumſtance, that we reject hypotheſis and follow experience. To this are juſtly to be aſcribed, the important advances in navigation, reſulting from a more extenſive ſurvey of the globe, from the obſervation of tides, currents, and periodical winds, from magnetiſm, and from the diſcoveries in aſtronomy. To this are owing the improvements in medicine from the diſcoveries in anatomy, botany, and chemiſtry. Advances in the ſame ſalutary art, from diſcoveries in pneumatics

and electricity: in short, numberless improvements in the most useful and elegant arts, proceed from the same cause.

In pneumatology, induction has been less constantly and less skilfully used. Hypothesis, though professedly rejected, has been still very frequently admitted. Mr. Locke has with the former mingled the latter, in his examination of the intellectual powers of man. With much profound observation in the works of this ingenious and wise man, there is no little of conjecture; and although from his writings we know the human understanding much better than it was known before, yet had he uniformly used induction, the accession to truth, from the labours so directed of so able a mind, would have been considerably greater. Some later writers on pneumatology, have proceeded less on experience and more on hypothesis than Locke. Adopt-

ing his theory of ideas, they have carried it much farther than he intended, and built a ſyſtem on it totally inconſiſtent with common ſenſe. Berkeley and Hume have denied the exiſtence of external objects, and profeſſed to believe them mere ideas in the human mind. Nothing indeed can ſhew more completely than Hume's writings on ſome philoſophical ſubjects, the abſurdities and extravagance to which the purſuit of hypotheſis may lead men of the moſt penetrating genius and moſt profound wiſdom. If we trace the hiſtory of pneumatology in the labours and reſearches of the moſt eminent men, from Ariſtotle to Reid, Ferguſſon and Stewart, we ſhall find that the advances in this ſcience, as well as in phyſics, have been preciſely in proportion to the ſkilful uſe of experience and of induction. We find that the three laſt mentioned philoſophers more generally reject hypotheſis, and follow facts, than their predeceſſors, and that the

conſequence

consequence has been a very great addition, from their writings, to the knowledge of the human mind.

In the most important of all sciences in ethics, comprehending politics, induction has been by no means uniformly employed. Hypothesis has too frequently been substituted in its stead.

In this of all branches of knowledge, right notions are of the highest moment. On our notions depends, in a great degree, our conduct, and on our conduct our happiness.

The knowledge of physics is, no doubt, a great source of pleasure and of utility. He who has investigated nature in her variety of forms and operations, who knows the principles and can account for the phænomena, has a source of exquisite pleasure unknown to the ignorant. He has moreover a source of util-

ity to himſelf and others, in the arts and improvement of arts, which he can educe from his knowledge. But though pleaſing and uſeful, acquaintance with theſe ſubjects is not abſolutely neceſſary.——A man may fill many departments of ſociety, without knowing the principles of natural philoſophy. He may be even dexterous in the practice of an art, without knowing the laws from which it reſults. A ſailor will ſkilfully take advantage of the monſoons, who never learned that wind is a current of air. A blackſmith can make ſufficient conductors, without ſtudying electricity. It is probable that neither the moſt ſkilful bell-makers are much verſed in the theory of ſound, nor the moſt expert glaſs-grinders in the principles of reflection and refraction. Their ignorance of ſcience does not prevent them from poſſeſſing practical ability.

In the various branches of ethics, juſt notions are not only uſeful but neceſſary. He

who

who materially errs in theſe, muſt be wrong in his moral conduct, and conſequently hurtful to himſelf and to ſociety.

It is equally true that the moon is leſs than the ſun, as that private individuals are inferior to laws and to governors. But he who ſhould believe the moon to be bigger than the ſun, would do no harm by that belief; he might ſtill perfectly diſcharge every duty of life. He who ſhould deny the duty of obedience to laws and governors, would naturally, wherever he could, either act according to his views, or impel others to do ſo, and in either caſe become a pernicious member of ſociety.

In this ſcience, as true notions are of the firſt conſequence, ſo are the cauſes often the moſt powerful to produce falſe. In other ſciences, error proceeds almoſt entirely from either wrong information or inconcluſive reaſoning.

ſoning. Here the intellect may not only be deceived by erroneous or falſe ſtatements, and miſled by inadequate proofs, or by plauſible ſophiſtry, but the will may be indiſpoſed to admit true narratives and juſt arguments. When the vortices of Des Cartes on the one hand, and the laws of motion and gravitation of Sir Iſaac Newton on the other, are propoſed as the cauſes of the planetary relations and revolutions, the demonſtration has an equal chance of a fair diſcuſſion, as the ſuppoſition. But when an hypotheſis is formed which affects the paſſions, then there is little probability that it will undergo an impartial examination. When the deiſt tells men of profligate lives, that there is no ſtate of rewards and puniſhments after death, the wiſhes of ſuch diſpoſe them to receive his doctrines. Not truth then is the object, but gratification. They eagerly embrace a ſyſtem which appears to give them indemnity for the paſt, and ſecurity for the future. Their paſſions plead

powerfully in favour of theſe notions. They do not readily liſten to impartial reaſoning. When a leveller tells the loweſt orders, that there ought to be no diſtinction of ranks in ſociety; when a John Ball tells a Wat Tyler and a Jack Straw, that they are equal to any in the land; when a Thomas Paine maintains to mechanics and peaſants, that they are as fit for governing the country as any man in parliament, the hypotheſis flatters their vanity, pride, and ambition. They fancy themſelves transferred from the tap-room to the council chamber, from the ſpouting club to the ſenate. They do not reflect, that were they for a time to be ſo placed, their ignorance and incapacity muſt ſoon drive them from ſituations, to which they were totally unfit, to thoſe for which, by education and habits, they were qualified. Indeed ſuch hypotheſes are moſt eagerly embraced by thoſe, who are, either by education or by habits, little qualified for any uſeful profeſſion.

ſion. Every induſtrious man is of real conſequence in a community, and thoſe who have no real conſequence, are the moſt readily captivated by ideal. Even among the lower orders, ſuch hypotheſes have fewer votaries among hard-working thriving men, than among idle diſſipated loungers. Elated with the viſionary importance to which theſe innovating ſyſtems would exalt them, ſuch men do not, without great reluctance, yield to ſound reaſoning. Experience may tell them, that every man's reſpectability and happineſs in ſociety, depends on his exertions and conduct in his own ſphere. The hypotheſis gratifies their inclination, which prevents them from liſtening to truth.

Although induction be *a new organ,* as Lord Bacon ſtyles it, when applied to the knowledge of nature, it is not a new organ applied to the knowledge of man. From the beginning of the world, common ſenſe taught

taught men to reafon in cafes within the compafs of their knowledge, from particular experience to general principles; to infer that the fame caufes would, in the fame circumftances, produce the fame effects; and that what they had uniformly or generally experienced concerning the paft, would uniformly or generally take place refpecting the future. They hunted in the forefts, in which they found the greateft quantity of game. They drove their cattle to thofe fields, in which, from experience, they knew there was the beft and fafeft pafture. They ploughed thofe lands, from which experience taught them to expect the moft plentiful crops. They traded to thofe countries, whence they, from experience, concluded that they would derive the largeft and fureft profits. They obferved that certain qualities and actions were permanently ufeful, and the contrary hurtful. They concluded that the former ought to be purfued, and the latter avoided. They ex-

perienced

perienced that obedience to parents, and others of ſuperior knowledge and judgment, tended to happineſs, diſobedience to miſery. They concluded, therefore, that the former was generally right, the latter generally wrong. They experienced that their ſecurity, both internal and external was much better taken care of, when entruſted to wiſe and righteous governors, than it could be by themſelves, who in general had neither the knowledge nor ability to make the neceſſary and proper proviſions. Hence they concluded, that it was prudent and uſeful to obey laws and governors. In ſhort in their domeſtic, their civil, and their political relations, men formed their principles from experience.

To this criterion of ſound reaſoning, the beſt and ableſt of writers, whoſe object was the exhibition of human actions, and the inculcation of moral duty, have conſtantly appealed. When Homer exhibits internal diſcord

as producing diſcomfiture and diſmay, wiſdom and courage as avoiding ſnares, removing obſtacles, and ſurmounting difficulties—when Shakeſpeare ſhews vice progreſſive in its nature, and riſing from faults, to crimes, from crimes, to enormities—when he manifeſts in an Othello the workings of jealouſy, in the Daniſh King the pungency of remorſe—when Thucydides, Xenophon, and Gillies narrate the misfortunes which reſult from the government of the mob—when Livy and Ferguſſon diſplay the artifices of demagogues, the evils of plebeian ſupremacy, and the advantage to the people from liſtening to their ſuperiors—when Hume ſtates the direful conſequences which proceed from the depreſſion of rank and dignity, and from the wild hypotheſes of levellers—when Socrates inſtructs the political novice, that no man ought to aſpire at the office of a ſtateſman, who does not poſſeſs great ability, extenſive information, confirmed

habits

habits of attention, and integrity of life—when Ariſtotle, Cicero, and Monteſquieu demonſtrate the tendency of a mixed government, to promote human happineſs—when Burke adviſes men to prefer the certain poſſeſſion of good to ideal contingency; Wiſdom, in the different garbs of poetry, hiſtory, and philoſophy, teaches the ſame leſſon; reaſon from experience, and by her light regulate your conduct.

That men have not always in their moral and political reaſonings, made a complete induction and a ſkilful application of rules to caſes, is certainly true. But their ſucceſs and their diſappointments in their various meaſures and engagements, their happineſs and their miſery in the reſult of their conduct, has been always, in proportion to their attention, to the leſſons of experience.

It

It may be ſaid that either authorities or arguments, adduced to prove experience, to be a ſure guide to practice, and hypotheſis a falſe one, are totally unneceſſary, that they tend merely to eſtabliſh this obvious propoſition, that it is wiſer both to reaſon and to act from what we know, than from what we conjecture.

The obviouſneſs of a propoſition, does not always prevent the propriety of inculcating and impreſſing it on men. *Who blames Hercules?* was a juſt rebuke to the panegyriſt of a perſonage, whom nobody cenſured. Had the character of that hero been attacked, high as it ſtood with men in general, its defence would not have been ſuperfluous.

Any man who knew the excellent tendency and the beneficial effects of the Chriſtian religion, but was ignorant of the attempts of

deiſtical writers againſt it, would think it unneceſſary to take pains to prove that ſyſtem to be good, which produced and ſecured happineſs to its votaries.—Whoever knew the admirable compoſition of the Britiſh conſtitution, who contemplated its effects in the protection and ſecurity of all ranks and deſcriptions of men, to whom its operation extended; but who was altogether unacquainted with the proceedings of its modern aſſailants, would think it unneceſſary to ſpend time in defending ſuch a ſyſtem of polity.—But as whenever deiſm and impiety attacks chriſtianity, it becomes neceſſary to defend our religion,—as when democracy attacks kingly government, it becomes neceſſary to defend our conſtitution; ſo when a fondneſs for hypotheſis, in morals and politics prevails, it is expedient and proper to admoniſh its votaries, that experience is the only ſure guide to truth, to practice, and to conduct.

Although

Although hypothesis is now expelled from natural philosophy, in politics, of all subjects the most interesting to men, it unfortunately prevails in this age more than it did in any other. Theories have been propounded which are totally inconsistent with the testimony of history, and the experience of human nature. These have been propagated with a very ardent and persevering industry, among descriptions of people, whose understandings are most likely to be deceived by fallacious reasoning, and wills influenced by improper motives. Hypotheses have been embraced, or at least maintained, by writers of very different abilities. Several democratical authors are men of talents and of knowledge. One, whose writings, if not altogether democratical, are favourable to that species of government, is in point of genius and erudition, probably inferior to none (except Burke) of the defenders of the established order of things. But the greater portion of democratical writ-

ers, are far from difplaying either much ability or literature in their works. They are not, however, on that account the more harmlefs. The performance of the man of genius and erudition cannot all be underftood, but by men of tafte, literature, and knowledge of abftract reafoning. The fame who can relifh the beauty of compofition, perceive the compafs of knowledge employed in illuftration and allufion, fee the comprehenfivenefs of intellect exhibited in luminous arrangement, the fertility of invention, and the correctnefs of judgement exercifed in framing a theory and giving it confiftency; will at the fame time be able to difcover the difference between fine compofition and juft argument, between the creation of genius and the deduction of reafon. Whoever can, from underftanding and conviction, beftow the juft tribute of applaufe, on the extraordinary powers of the writer's mind, muft fee the fallacy of of his doctrines; muft perceive that his forcible

ble intellect susceptible of whatever direction he pleases, is in his political performance exercised in invention, much more than in investigation, that he is more a Pythagoras than a Thales. To those who would most readily embrace the doctrines, much of the performance must be unintelligible.

But the vulgar declamation, the gross invective, the farrago of censure, which the man of taste despises for the poorness of the composition, and loaths for the coarseness of the sentiment, conception, and language, the gentleman disdains, for the inelegance of the manner and the scurrility of the abuse, the philosopher smiles at, for the impudence of the assertion and the weakness of the argument, is the most likely to procure converts, among the uninformed multitude. The demagogue who catches their temporary notions, who fills their minds with imaginary grievances, who flatters their vanity with

ideas of their importance, who calls them from induſtry, uſeful labour, and contentment, to idleneſs and diſcontent, is the moſt pernicious to the ſociety in general, and to thoſe, moſt of all, whom he profeſſes to ſerve.

As great abilities are not neceſſary to lead conſiderable numbers of the lower orders to erroneous notions and to hurtful conduct, ſo great talents are not neceſſary to ſtate intelligibly to them, that which is right in doctrine and uſeful in practice to themſelves. The facility of impoſition, in political matters on the common people, is owing not to their want of ſenſe, but to their want of knowledge. In point of ſound underſtanding, no common people ever ſurpaſſed, and few equalled, thoſe of Britain. The beſt proof of their ſenſe, is the juſtneſs of their views and the dexterity of their practice in ſubjects, with which they are completely acquainted. No mechanic ever equalled the Britiſh mechanic,

no manufacturer ever equalled the British manufacturer, no farmer ever equalled the British farmer. But whatever be the intellect of any individual, or of any set of men, it never can exceed their knowledge.

"We only reason can from what we know."

The ablest of men, if they go beyond experience, can never be sure of arriving at truth. Those of the lower orders, who are votaries of democracy, form an erroneous conclusion, not because they want the power of judging, but because they want information. They do not know the history of democracy. If they did, the same good sense which enables them to judge so justly concerning subjects with which they are acquainted, would make them detest a government which they would find so productive of evil.

The object of this Essay, is to exhibit from history, to those of my fellow-country-

 men,

MAHARAJA SERFOGI'S SARASWATI

men, whofe time and opportunities may not have admitted of extenfive reading, the real nature of democracy, and the real effects which have proceeded from that form of government. I flatter myfelf, that a plain ftatement of the actual fituation of the inhabitants of democratical countries, may, in fome degree, tend to remove the mifapprehenfions, to which the prefent opinions of fome of our countrymen are owing.

I fhall confider democracy in its various appearances, in the moft noted ftates of ancient and modern times. I fhall view it both fingly and in its combination with other principles. I fhall, from the particular experience of hiftory and the general knowledge of human nature, attempt to fhew, that when folely or even principally prevalent, it is not fitted to render man happy. I fhall contraft it with a mixed government, and try to prove that a conftitution in which the parts mutu-

ally ſupport and reciprocally check each other, is the beſt for men; and I ſhall endeavour to convince thoſe of my countrymen, who are deluded by democratic theories, or enamoured of fanciful innovations, that the happieſt of all lands IS THE LAND WE LIVE IN.

Many of thoſe who have embraced democratical opinions, are probably men not much accuſtomed to abſtract reaſoning. I ſhall, therefore, deal as little as poſſible in abſtraction. Should my humble attempt be viewed by men of learning and habits of generalization, they conſidering the object of this Eſſay, will not look on all thoſe details and obſervations as unneceſſary, which would be ſuperfluous, if intended ſolely for their peruſal. A ſpeaker would act very injudiciouſly who ſhould deliver to a common audience, a diſcourſe adapted to the learned ſocieties of Cambridge and of Oxford.

CHAP. I.

Principle of democratical writers, that the general will ought to be the rule of government, ſtated and diſcuſſed—Syſtem of political œconomiſts examined—Opinion of modern democrats, concerning the qualifications of governors conſidered.

DEMOCRATICAL writers, whatever be the difference of their abilities and knowledge, agree in the following poſitions. That a government is the beſt, which admits moſt fully of the operation of the general will. That a government either wholly or principally democratical, admits moſt fully of the operation of the general will, and is therefore the beſt.

Before we enter into the conſideration of the ſeveral democracies, it may be proper to examine the general poſition, on which the ſupporters

ſupporters of that ſpecies of government found their approbation. According to them,

That government is the beſt, which permits the moſt complete operation of the general will.

The profound and original author of the Elements of the Philoſophy of the Human Mind obſerves, that one great ſource of error in inveſtigation and reaſoning, was the not fixing preciſe ideas of the objects of enquiry. Neglecting to aſcertain the ends which they purſued, it was not wonderful that philoſophers miſtook both means and criteria. Whoever has vague indiſtinct notions of his purſuit, cannot know with certainty how he is to attain it, nor even when it is attained. From not conſidering the real ends, we often confound means with objects, acceſſaries with principals,

principals, accidental coincidence with caufe and effect, the practice of individuals with the propriety of a general rule. Thus a commercial politician, who fhould eftimate the advantage of any country trading with another, by the ballance of trade in favour of that country, would err, from not having a precife idea of the object of commerce. The end of commerce, either individual or national, is the attainment of actual advantage to that individual or nation. If I gain by a bargain, it is no diminution of my profit, that another gains more. When we eftimate the perfection of mufic, by the difficulty of execution more than by the finenefs of the effect, in the degree of melody, harmony, or expreffion produced, we err owing to the fame caufe, mifapprehenfion of the real object. When we eftimate plans of education, by any other teft than by their tendency to prepare young minds for becoming good and ufeful members of fociety, we err from mif-

taking

taking the end of inſtruction. From this miſconception of ends, reſult the frequent preference of frivolous accompliſhment, to ſolid and important attainment, the ſacrifice of ſubſtance, to ſhew; in ſhort, numberleſs erroneous notions and falſe eſtimates. In ſpeculation, we muſt aſcertain the objects of our enquiry, and in practice the ends of our purſuit, if we would think juſtly and act ſucceſsfully.

The end of government is the general good; all conſtitutions ought to be permanent means for the attainment and ſecurity of that good. If men generally purſued what was moſt conducive to their happineſs, certainly thoſe governments which admitted moſt fully of the operation of the general will, would be the beſt. Men do not generally will that which is beſt for themſelves, therefore it is not generally expedient for them, that their will ſhould operate. Want of education to give

give them habits of juſt thinking and rea-ſoning, want of knowledge concerning public affairs and the nature of exiſting cauſes, want of reſolution to forego preſent temporary en-joyment, for future permanent advantage, and various other diſqualifications, intellectual and moral, under which the common people muſt labour, render it totally inexpedient, that the general will ſhould be the rule of govern-ment.

Experience teaches us, that the wills of men moſt frequently become worſe, from having the power of complete gratification. Thoſe who have uniformly the power of do-ing as they pleaſe, more frequently pleaſe to do ill than to do good. The capriciouſneſs of their deſires increaſes with their power. Like ſpoilt children, they become troubleſome to all thoſe who are within the ſphere of their actions, and eventually hurtful to themſelves. Claſſes of men, as well as individuals, when

their will uniformly operates without reſtraint, become capricious and deſtructive to others and to themſelves. As the wills of individuals, require the oppoſing wills of other individuals to check and correct their caprice and extravagance, ſo do thoſe of claſſes. In political eſtabliſhments, as well as in private companies and ſocieties, the ſelfiſh paſſions of ſome, reſtrain the ſelfiſh paſſions of others; a reciprocal check becomes a general corrective and convenience. On this account, the wiſeſt men have always been friendly to a government of check, in oppoſition to the uncontrouled dominion of any individual, ſet of individuals, or the people at large. Hiſtory ſhews us, that unlimited power has been ſtill more pernicious, when held by numbers, than by a ſingle perſon. Few have there been among ſingle deſpots, who have generally purſued their own real good, by promoting that of their people. None among democrats, ever acted in ſuch a way, as ſteadily to promote the

the general good. Great wiſdom with great goodneſs, diſpoſe and enable a ſingle deſpotic governor, to promote the happineſs of his people. Such an union, indeed, has not very often exiſted in deſpotic princes, but in ſeveral inſtances it has. Nerva, Trajan, Adrian, and above all the two Antonini, though uncontrouled in their power, yet made it their uniform aim to promote the general good, and ſucceeded in that benevolent intention. Never was that extenſive portion of the world, which then conſtituted the Roman empire, ſo happy as under the five good emperors. Their deſpotic power tended to render their goodneſs more effectual in its operations. Inſtances have not been wanting, in times nearer to the preſent, of deſpotic princes, whoſe conduct has been wiſely and vigorouſly directed to the melioration of the country which they ruled.

The people at large never poſſeſſed that combination of qualities, which, inveſted with power, produces the advantage of all within the ſphere of its operation. There is not an inſtance recorded in hiſtory, of the people, with any degree of conſtancy and uniformity, promoting the general good. If they were ever ſo much diſpoſed to make the community proſperous and happy, they never were endued with knowledge and ability to deviſe the moſt effectual means.

If one ſingle deſpot purſued projects unuſually hurtful to his country, his ſucceſſor, ſince among individuals there is always a great chance of diverſity of character, frequently purſued more ſalutary meaſures. The profligate ſenſuality and horrid cruelty of Domitian, was ſucceeded by the temperance, mildneſs, and juſtice of Nerva. The extravagant folly and effeminate luxury of Heliogabalus,

were ſucceeded by the wiſdom and virtues of Alexander Severus. The people, when its power is uncontrouled, is always the ſame, always turbulent, capricious, and ſtimulated by the preſent impulſe, without thought of conſequences. When it has been proſperous, its proſperity has always ariſen from a temporary abandonment of its unlimited power, from a temporary ſubmiſſion to wiſe and able individuals. The advantages which it occaſionally gains by ſuffering others to act for it, it ſoon loſes by acting for itſelf. Beſides, the people not poſſeſſing in their joint capacity a great portion of diſcrimination, moſt frequently, as appears from hiſtory, have beſtowed their favour on undeſerving objects, and have conferred offices of the higheſt importance on men not fit to be truſted. Deſpotical princes and deſpotical multitudes, are both expoſed to the arts and ſeductions of flatterers; but the latter more uniformly than the former, becauſe the princes are not always

weak,

weak, the multitudes are. Did a multitude consist of men individually wise, which no multitude ever did, yet would it be collectively foolish? It is well observed, that were there to assemble a multitude of Sir Isaac Newtons, it would become a mob. The general operation of the peoples will, so far from being useful, would be hurtful and ruinous to themselves.

I speak of the people, as consisting of such men, as are found, and always have been found, actually to exist, not such as are supposed in the systems of utopian visionaries, and political œconomists. If men were arrived at the degree of perfection conceived by a Turgot, no doubt the general will would be the best rule of government. A government of reciprocal check, and indeed any government, would be totally superfluous. We know what men have been, and what men are. The past and present are our only

guides to ſure reaſoning, concerning the future. Judging from experience, we may be well aſſured, that men will never attain ſuch perfection, as to render it expedient, that the general will ſhould be the rule of government.

The œconomiſts themſelves deny, that their ſyſtem is meant to exhibit an order of ſociety really attainable in the preſent ſtate of things, but to be gradually attained from the progreſs of philoſophy. However great might be the progreſs of philoſophy, it would by no means follow as a conſequence, that its votaries would be proportionably fit to govern without controul. Such a government requires not intellectual perfection merely, but alſo moral. As to intellectual perfection, it muſt be practical as well as ſpeculative, for the conduct of affairs. It is poſſible for an underſtanding to be familiarly converſant with general truth,

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without being expert in the application of philoſophical principles to caſes of practice. A very conſiderable degree of intellectual perfection, both ſpeculative and practical, is altogether compatible with moral imperfection. It does not appear from hiſtory and from obſervation, that philoſophers either have been or are better than other men. Their tempers, their diſpoſitions, their habits, and their principles of action, require as much reſtraint, as thoſe of men who do not pretend to be philoſophers. "Philoſophers (ſays the very humorous and ſtill wiſer Fielding) "are compoſed of the ſame materials as "other human creatures; and however ſubli- "mated and refined the theory of theſe may be, "practical frailty is as incident to them as to "other mortals. It is indeed in theory only, "not in practice, that conſiſts the difference; "for though ſuch great beings think much "better and more wiſely, they always act ex- "actly like other men."

But

But ſuppoſing moral perfection were to be a certain conſequence of great progreſs in philoſophy, that could anſwer no purpoſe to men in general. All men can never be philoſophers. All men have not capacity for being verſed in philoſophy. Many more than thoſe who want capacity, want education and leiſure. The greater number of men is neceſſarily occupied with other purſuits. If mankind in general were to ſtudy philoſophy, where would be our farmers, our manufacturers, and our traders? We ſhould be in a ſimilar ſituation, as to uſeful productions, as was the iſland of Laputa, in which, whilſt the inhabitants were deeply engaged in philoſophical reſearches, their grounds were totally unproductive. Therefore, if philoſophers ſhould all be fit for governing without controul, ſtill all men would not be ſo, becauſe they cannot be philoſophers. It is evi-

dently not only premature but idle, to lay down rules for regulating conduct, in circumstances which do not exist, never have existed, and are never likely to exist. *A priori* reasoning, from its nature, is generally much less conclusive than *a posteriori*. The reasoning of the political œconomists, does not amount to *a priori* argument. It is not the deduction of an effect from a known cause, but the supposition both of a cause and of an effect, and consequently merely a production of the imagination. Such fictions may be amusing to men of fancy and speculation, but cannot be useful for the regulation of political conduct. It must be acknowledged, that the universal prevalence of wisdom and goodness in mankind, would render government a very simple and easy business, of which all men would be capable. Every one being good, would intend what was best for others and for himself; and being wise,

would

would know the means for attaining his end. There could be no difputes, as there could be no interference. Were the golden age to be realized, there certainly would be no occafion for a government of controul. Attempts to prove that fuch a government would be unneceffary if men were perfect, are equally ufelefs, as an attempt to prove that labour would not be neceffary for fubfiftence if all men poffeffed fo compendious an inftrument of gratification as Aladin's wonderful lamp. It is juft as probable in our phyfical ftate, that every man will have a genie to raife a palace inftantaneoufly, and fill it with all kinds of riches, and every fource of amufement and pleafure, as that, in our moral, every man will be fit for governing a nation.

It may be faid, that the fupporters of democracy do not all accede to the fyftem of œconomifts in its full extent; that arguments therefore againft that fyftem do not

affect

affect their positions. But unless men are as perfect as œconomists conceive, they will not be fit for the uncontrouled licence proposed by democrats.

Democrats go beyond œconomists; for whereas the latter exhibit an order which they conceive gradually attainable, but at present impracticable; the former propose it as actually reducible to immediate practice.

The œconomists reckon a very considerable degree of mental perfection necessary to the realization of their systems. The democrats, conscious that in such a requisite their followers are far from excelling, deny the necessity of its existence and governors. The art and science of government require, according to them, a small portion of ability and of knowledge. A lawyer must possess an extensive acquaintance with ethics, general jurisprudence, national decrees, institutions,

and

and ufages, logic, hiftory, and human nature. Without thefe qualifications, he is unfit both to maintain the rights of individuals, and to eftablifh the innocence or the guilt of actions. A phyfician requires a perfect knowledge of the human body, of the diforders to which it is fubject, of their caufes, phyfical and moral, of botany, of chemical proceffes, and of human paffions, in order to provide and apply proper remedies. A clergyman muft be fkilled in theology, in ethics, and in human nature, to be able to guide his flock in the purfuit of temporal and eternal happinefs. One cannot even be a tolerable mechanic, unlefs he has made fome one craft his principal ftudy. Yet, according to democrats, all may be legiflators and ftatefmen.

To know the ftate of a nation refpecting the various conftituents of profperity; to comprehend its agriculture, manufactures, and commerce;

commerce; to perceive what ſpecial direction has brought them to any particular ſtate; to deviſe means for improving it; to find out encouragements, reſtrictions, and regulations for increaſing the productive powers of labour, and the profits of trade; to know its ſituation as to internal ſecurity, whether any cauſes general or ſpecial are likely to diminiſh it; what application of old laws or adoption of new may remove dangers and render the ſecurity permanent, are all neceſſary to a legiſlator and a ſtateſman. He muſt alſo know the condition, ſentiments, and conduct of other nations which may interfere with that in queſtion, infer from thoſe particulars their deſigns of friendſhip or of enmity, deviſe means and firmly apply them for diſappointing inimical intentions, and repelling hoſtile actions, procuring redreſs for injuries ſuffered, and ſecurity againſt the repetition of aggreſſion. Theſe qualifications, indiſpenſably neceſſary to governors, require a degree of know-

ledge,

ledge, of ability, and of vigour, which not only all men do not poſſeſs, but which few men do. They need alſo a practical ſkill and an undeviating attention, which every man even of the requiſite knowledge, vigour, and ability, cannot without habit, poſſeſs and employ.

Reaſon may convince us that only minds of great capacity and great vigour united, can poſſeſs and exert theſe qualifications. Hiſtory informs us that none but ſuch men have been in fact uſeful lawgivers and ſtateſmen. Againſt the teſtimony of hiſtory and the inference of reaſon we have only the authority of democrats. Were we to reſt this point upon authority, we ſhould probably be able to quote opinions not leſs reſpectable than theirs. The wiſeſt and ableſt men of ancient and modern times, Socrates, Xenophon, Ariſtotle, Demoſthenes, Cicero, Hume, and many others concur in eſteeming very great talents neceſ-

ſary

ſary both to legiſlators and ſtateſmen. Perhaps if the knowledge and ability of any of theſe ſingly were weighed againſt the aggregate of the knowledge and ability of modern democrats, the former ſingly would weigh down the latter collectively. But it is not becauſe there is on our ſide an Ariſtotle, a Cicero, and a Hume, on the oppoſite a London Correſponding Society, and hireling lecturers, that we judge great ability and knowledge to be indiſpenſably neceſſary to the managers of a ſtate, but becauſe we learn it from the experience of hiſtory and obſervation of human nature. We thence conclude, that the qualifications for governing a nation are not thoſe of ordinary men, conſequently that a democracy is not a good government. That poſition we ſhall now proceed to illuſtrate, from the hiſtory of the ſeveral governments in which democracy either ſolely or principally prevailed.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Grecian governments at firſt mixed monarchies—Illuſtrated from Homer—In moſt ſtates changed into a democracy—Democracy of Athens—Draco.

THE governments of Greece were originally monarchical. The neceſſity of employing ſuperior talents and ſuperior qualities naturally called forth a leader. This leader was at the ſame time conſidered the miniſter and the repreſentative of the deity, and the accountable guardian of the people. The king naturally conſulted and employed thoſe whoſe intellectual and active qualities could moſt effectually aſſiſt him in council and in war. As a reward for his ſervices a greater portion of property was aſſigned to him. "Being accuſtomed (ſays Dr. Gillies) to com-"mand in the field, and to direct the mea-"ſures,

" ſures, as well as to decide the quarrels, of " his aſſociates, he naturally became the judge " of their civil differences; and, as the pecu- " liar favour of the gods always accompanied " ſuperior virtue, he was alſo inveſted with the " honourable office of preſiding in their reli- " gious ſolemnities. Theſe important functions " of prieſt, judge, and general, which had natu- " rally been conferred on the beſt and braveſt " character of each particular tribe, were, upon " the union of ſeveral tribes into one ſtate or " nation, conferred on the beſt and braveſt of " all the different leaders. Before the various " ſtates of Greece had united in a general " confederacy, the reſources derived from the " domains appropriated to the prince, (which, " unleſs there was ſome particular reaſon to " the contrary, were tranſmitted to his deſcen- " dants) had enabled the ſeveral kings and lead- " ers to extend their influence and authority. " Their comparative power and ſplendour de- " pended not entirely on the merit of perſonal

" abilities,

"abilities, but resulted in part from the extent "and value of their possessions: and Agamemnon was appointed to the command of combined Greece, as much on account of his "superior opulence, as of his many princely "qualities. But whether we examine the preeminence that Agamemnon enjoyed over the "other princes of the confederacy, which is "fully explained in the Iliad, or the authority "with which each prince was invested in his "own dominions, which is clearly illustrated "in the Odyssey, or the influence of a warlike "chief over the several members of his tribe, "we shall every where discover the limited "power of kings, and the mild moderation of "a mixed government."

The political reader of the Iliad and Odyssey may trace, in the operations and institutions of the heroic ages of Greece, the principal constituents of a government of King, Lords, and Commons. He may

perceive the reciprocal controul and mutual ſupport, which, combined, reſult from that government only.

The different orders temper each other. The intereſts and paſſions of the lords reſtrain the paſſions of the king and of the commons, and are in their turn reſtrained. Whichſoever of the three eſtates preponderates, the other two join as much of their weight as to form a balance. In Therſites, the chieftain Ulyſſes checks the licence of a ſeditious demagogue. The people though free, loyal, and attached to the king, from whom they experience protection, approve of the caſtigation of a perſon who attempted to excite their diſſatisfaction with their ſovereign. The king conſults in every caſe of importance with his lords; all that is proper of the reſult of their deliberations is laid before the commons. Reſpect is paid to individual diſtinction, as well as to diverſity of rank. Thoſe whoſe

talents and exertions rendered them eminently uſeful, are treated with proportionable deference, by the wiſeſt of the counſellors of the king. The opinion of thoſe is regarded with the deſerved neglect, who are of no account in council or in war. The government derives great advantages from the influence of religion. There is an union of civil and eccleſiaſtical authority. The king is at the head of the ordinances. He acknowledges his power to be delegated from the divinity, and to be held in truſt for the good of his ſubjects. He gives up an object of the tendereſt affection, when convinced that the ſacrifice is agreeable to the will of the divinity, and conducive to the advantage of his ſubjects. The grandees and the people revere the miniſter and adorer of the divinity whom they worſhip, and the watchful guardian of their good. In all mixt governments there naturally ariſes oppoſition. Different claſſes have difference of will, as well as different

 individuals.

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individuals. The bold impetuous ſpirit of Achilles, which can brook no contradiction, tranſports him into an unprovoked attack upon the ſovereign. The natural retaliation produces a quarrel. Reſiſtance to eſtabliſhed power frequently ariſes from the ſame motive as tyranny. The ſame cauſe often makes that ſubject a whig, who if a king would be a tyrant impatient of controul. Achilles was a whig of that deſcription. His reſiſtance ariſes not from a ſenſe of oppreſſion, for in fact he had not been oppreſſed. He has begun the attack, and muſt blame himſelf for the exceſs of paſſion which his aggreſſion excited in Agamemnon. He reſiſts, becauſe he will not undergo reſtraint. As mixed governments of all others leave to the individual the greateſt ſhare of civil liberty, an oppoſitioniſt may without danger of puniſhment withdraw his talents and virtues from the ſervice of his country. Achilles did this: he would not ſerve the ſtate, becauſe he was diſpleaſed with

its principal director. His conduct is a ſpecimen of the patriotiſm by which thoſe who oppoſe government in free countries (in which only any dare oppoſe it) are often actuated. His rage againſt the ſupreme manager makes him rejoice in the calamities of his country. He afterwards is induced to co-operate with the friends of the community, becauſe he thereby gratifies a private paſſion, and is received on his own terms.

Not perſonal talents and qualities alone govern, but in combination with property. In the Grecian ſtates, as in all good governments, theſe two qualifications were for a very obvious reaſon united. To govern well, power and diſpoſition muſt be joined. Talent impowers men to do that which is moſt conducive to the good of their ſociety. Men in general act with the moſt vigour when they are impelled by their intereſt. Property therefore diſpoſes them to purſue the advan-

tage of a community in which they themſelves have ſo valuable a ſtake. Birth, as well as talents and property, is a ſource of diſtinction. Illuſtrious deſcent, by ſtirring up the rivalry of anceſtors, and cheriſhing elevated ſentiments, is a powerful motive to great actions. Diomed is celebrated as the ſon of Tydeus, as well as the lord of Argos, and conqueror of the ſecond of the Trojans. The remembrance of his father's merit is an additional incentive to thoſe gallant actions, which his perſonal valour and prowеſs inclined him to perform. Achilles is celebrated as the ſon of Peleus, as well as lord of the Myrmidons, and the braveſt of the Greeks. Hereditary rank, diſtinguiſhed as it is, holds a leſs degree of eſtimation than extenſive property and perſonal character. The ſons even of Theſeus and of Hercules rank not ſo high as Idomeneus and Agamemnon the chief of Grecian proprietors, Achilles the braveſt, and Ulyſſes the wiſeſt of their country and age.

Thus

Thus the government consisted of King, Lords, and Commons. The sentiments which prevailed concerning the comparative value of objects, were such as are to be found only in a mixt government. The effects of such a constitution of state, and of character resulting from it, were seen in the efforts of the Greeks during the heroic ages. There was then an union and a combined energy, which never afterwards existed in the whole of Greece.

Various unfortunate events and unhappy circumstances changed this order of things. In the greater number of the communities, either democracy or single tyranny was established. Sparta only preserved any vestiges of the mixt government of the heroic ages.

The most distinguished of the Grecian democracies was

ATHENS.

From

From the ceſſation of limited monarchy and the ſubſtitution of democracy in its ſtead, Greece had become a ſcene of licentiouſneſs and wickedneſs. Athens was particularly notorious. It was entirely in that ſtate of anarchy, which follows the deſtruction of an old government, before there is virtue or ability enough to frame a new one of permanent force.

Under pretence of reſtraining this anarchy and licentiouſneſs, Draco eſtabliſhed his ſyſtem of terroriſm. His laws and government therefore only increaſed the evils. The people were in the greateſt confuſion and miſery.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Solon—Efficacy of laws depends on the nature of the political conſtitution—Laws of Solon excellent—Laws reſpecting perſons—Property—Private wrongs—Public wrongs—Conſtitution—Democratical—Power, legiſlative, judicative, and executive, veſted in the people—Effects of the Democracy—Uſurpation of Piſiſtratus.

IN the diſtreſſed ſituation of the Athenians, there aroſe among them the celebrated SOLON.

Solon was a man of very conſiderable wiſdom and of real patriotiſm. The general opinion of his genius and virtues, joined to the experience of his military talents, ſucceſs in wars, and political addreſs had procured him diſtinguiſhed influence over the people.

Athens was at this time ſuffering the united evils of anarchy and oppreſſion. The poor were deeply involved in debt to the rich.

"The

" The rapacity (ſays Dr. Gillies) of creditors
" knew no bounds. They compelled the inſol-
" vent debtors to cultivate their lands like
" cattle; to perform the ſervice of beaſts of
" burden; and to transfer to them their ſons
" and daughters, whom they expoſed as ſlaves to
" foreign countries. The wretched populace
" deriving courage from deſpair, had deter-
" mined no longer to ſubmit to ſuch multiplied
" rigours; and before the wiſdom of the law-
" giver interpoſed, they had taken the reſolu-
" tion to elect and follow ſome warlike leader,
" to attack and butcher their oppreſſors, to
" eſtabliſh an equal partition of lands, and to in-
" ſtitute a new form of government."

Solon found means to relieve the poor from their preſent embarraſſments without a general violation of property. He aboliſhed the debts of individuals, annulled all the acts which fettered the liberty of the citizen, but refuſed to equalize riches. Both parties were at firſt diſſatisfied. The rich, becauſe by the

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cancelment of the debts they were deprived of a part of their rights. The poor, becaufe they did not obtain that equalization of property which defperate levellers defire. In procefs of time however, both parties began to be reconciled to the meafures of Solon. The former, becaufe with a part they had purchafed the fecure poffeffion of the much more confiderable remainder of their property: the latter, becaufe they found themfelves for ever relieved from their debts and the confequent feverities. All concurred in encouraging Solon to proceed in framing a code of laws and a regular conftitution. Solon accordingly new modelled the ftate.

A fyftem of legiflation is to be eftimated by two tefts, the nature and tendency of the laws, and the means adopted for giving them effect. In other words, it is to be confidered as a fyftem of jurifprudence, and of politics.—The value of the firft in any ftate for which it is intended depends on the nature

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of the laſt. As a ſyſtem of juriſprudence the inſtitutions of Solon poſſeſs extraordinary excellence. They have the merit of eaſily coaleſcing with great variety and diſſimilarity of political ſyſtems, and are indeed well adapted to any limited government. Tranſfuſed into the Roman law, they have, in the forcible and eloquent language of Dr. Gillies, "ſerved, after an interval of above ſixteen hundred years, to aboliſh the barbarous practices of the Gothic nations, and to introduce juſtice, ſecurity, and refinement among the modern inhabitants of Europe."

The laws of Solon conſider the citizen in the various relations of domeſtic, civil, and political ſociety. They accurately mark the duties belonging to theſe relations, preſcribe the rules for directing and enforcing the performance of them, and for preventing the violation.

To form the citizen early to the habits moſt beneficial to the community, the laws of Solon deſcribe the plan of his education. They recommend the exerciſes corporeal, intellectual and moral, which tend moſt powerfully to invigorate the bodily conſtitution; to enlarge, refine, and direct the underſtanding; to form, ſtrengthen, and liberalize the heart. They ſtrongly reprobate idleneſs, and recommend induſtry, pointing out the objects, private and national, in which it would be moſt uſefully and honourably exerted. They forcibly inculcate temperance, and cenſure the contrary as a principal ſource of miſconduct.

Although the Athenian law was transfuſed into the Roman on many ſubjects, yet in ſeveral there is a very conſiderable difference. In Athens, the inſtitutions regarding women, and the relations in which they are concerned, were much more liberal than thoſe of Rome,

although they fall greatly ſhort of thoſe in modern times, when men reſpect the natural equality of the ſex. Solon conſiders marriage as an engagement of mutual love and affection, the ends of which are to give happineſs to the family and uſeful citizens to the ſtate. He does not conſider the wife, as the Romans afterwards did, as only part of the family property, which the huſband, the proprietor, was to uſe as he pleaſed. He regards her as the domeſtic companion of her huſband, nearly equal to him in the care of the children. "Ie rigorouſly puniſhes thoſe who violate the obligations of the married ſtate. He permits divorces, not according to the caprice of the huſband, but after a diſcuſſion before a magiſtrate. He permits women to ſeparate from their huſbands on the ſame grounds as men from their wives. His law for the protection of unmarried women was highly equitable. Whoever ſeduced a woman of before unimpeached conduct, was, if unmarried, obliged to

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atone to her by marriage for the injury he had done her. The married deſtroyer of virgin innocence was puniſhed with a moſt ſalutary rigour.

The reciprocal duties of parent and child he did not leave to the mere operation of natural affection, but adds poſitive laws. Theſe enjoined parents to beſtow ſuch pains on the education of their children as may enable them to perform their various duties as men and citizens. They obliged children to maintain their parents in declining years, two caſes excepted, if the children had been born of a courtezan, or had been educated to no profeſſion. In the firſt caſe they ſuppoſed that children owe nothing to parents who have begotten them to diſgrace, in the ſecond who have deſtined them to uſeleſſneſs and dependance. Domeſtic tribunals were not permitted by Solon's laws. A citizen could only be judged by his peers, and by them only

deprived

deprived of property, liberty, or life. The magiſtrates civil, military, and eccleſiaſtical were, by Solon's laws, entitled to reſpect and obedience, whilſt they acted agreeably to the end of their office. Theſe are a few of the outlines of the proviſion made by Solon's laws, for maintaining what judge Blackſtone ſtyles *the rights of perſons.*

The laws of Solon reſpecting property we find in a variety of inſtances more agreeable to the Engliſh than to the civil law. Both the Athenian and Engliſh laws are founded upon principles of the pureſt ethics. Moral conduct in both is the object, as well as the preſervation of property and political expedience. Private virtue is conſidered as well as private right and public tranquillity. They do not only provide that one man ſhould not injure another, but endeavour to prevent ſuch motives from exiſting as tend to produce injury. Thus by the civil law the heir of a

minor is his guardian. That regulation has evidently, for its ſole object, the preſervation of property. By the Athenian law, the next heir was incapable of being guardian. In fact it might be apprehended, that ſuch a guardian might be more deſirous of appropriating the inheritance, than of promoting the good of the ward. That regulation therefore, conſiders moral motives, and withholds temptations. All the inſtitutions of Solon, reſpecting ſucceſſions and teſtaments, unite the two conſiderations, of regard to property, and to moral principle. Solon allows the citizen to diſpoſe of his property at pleaſure; at the ſame time, by his regulations he guards againſt the arts of legacy-hunters, and thus while he reſpects property, withholds motives to injuſtice.

In that part of his code, which treats of what the Civilians termed *actions*, and Judge Blackſtone *private wrongs*, Solon's deſcription of injuries, and meaſures of redreſs, is nearly

the ſame as in the Roman and Engliſh law. They all proceed upon a plain and obvious principle in Ethics, that every injury done muſt be redreſſed. The injuries which may be done to an individual, affect either his liberty, property, character, or perſon, and are in general nearly the ſame in all countries. "On this principle (ſays Gibbons, ſpeaking of that branch of law) "the Civi-"lians of every country have erected a ſimilar "juriſprudence, the fair concluſion of uni-"verſal reaſon and juſtice."

In that part which the Civilians ſtyle penal law, and Blackſtone *public wrongs*, Solon differs very conſiderably from the Roman law, and agrees with the Engliſh. This difference is partly in the deſcription of crimes, and partly in the mode of cognizance. Public wrongs, are either ſuch actions or omiſſions as tend to affect the tranquillity and happineſs of a ſtate. The ſame actions therefore muſt be wrong in

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very different degrees, in different ſtates and circumſtances. The perfection of a penal code depends on the connection in the deſcription of laws, between crimes and public injuries in the firſt place, and in the ſecond, between crimes and puniſhment. If every action which generally hurts the public, is by the laws a crime, and if the puniſhment be exactly in proportion to the crime, and be not inflicted without certain proof of the commiſſion, that muſt be a good penal code.

A wiſe lawgiver apportions puniſhment to crime, but does not conſider *puniſhing juſtice*, only, he alſo takes *preventive* into his conſideration. One of the many great excellencies of our Engliſh law, is that it has adopted efficacious means for preventing crimes. To this branch of legiſlation, Solon alſo had paid conſiderable attention. The prevention of crimes depends chiefly on two things. Firſt, vigilance in obſerving the conduct of thoſe,

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who, either from their general character, or from particular circumſtances, may be ſuppoſed moſt likely to commit them; ſecondly, on the previous care beſtowed on the morals of the people. This laſt is undoubtedly the ſureſt way of preventing crimes from being general. As a great ſource of criminal conduct is idleneſs, Solon enacted a law which obliged every citizen to exerciſe ſome trade, or profeſſion. " None (ſays the learned and ingenious Mr. Drummond) " among the various inſtitutions of Solon, has been more " deſervedly celebrated, than that which " obliged every citizen to exerciſe ſome trade, " or profeſſion. In countries where the climate " naturally diſpoſes men to ſloth and inactivity, " every law which incites the mind to exertion, or which rouſes the lateſt energy of " its faculties, muſt neceſſarily be attended " with the moſt ſalutary effects." This law had a tendency not only to prevent the negative evil of ſloth, but the poſitive evil of ac-

tive criminalty. By the inſtitutions of Solon, extravagance, intemperance, and debauchery, underwent a ſevere animadverſion. Magiſtrates were empowered to watch the buddings of noxious practices which might, if not cruſhed, ripen into crimes.

Solon's deſcription of the various kinds and meaſures of crimes is very accurate, and the annexed puniſhment is generally proportionate. No action of pernicious tendency is by the Athenian laws, exempted from penal animadverſion. By the Roman law ſuicide (according to the juſt and ſtriking deſcription of Blackſtone. "The pretended heroiſm, but "real cowardice of the ſtoic philoſophers, "who deſtroyed themſelves, to avoid thoſe ills "which they had not the fortitude to endure.") was not only not puniſhed, but was encouraged. By Solon's laws, the ſelf murderer was branded with public infamy, and expoſed to what, according to the religi-

ous notions of his countrymen, conftituted public punifhment. Solon defcribes the various fpecies of fraud, theft, robbery, and homicide, with the greateft accuracy. Of the laft in particular, the different fhades from what our law calls chance medley to parricide, are delineated with a moft difcriminating precifion. It is not only the defcription of crime, and the annexation of punifhment that is of importance in penal codes, but alfo the tribunal which is to take cognizance of the cafe. By Solon's laws, every Athenian citizen had a right to be tried by his peers; the Athenian law was in this fuperior to the Roman, which, in many cafes admitted domeftic tribunals. The father took cognizance of the crimes of his own family. Thus at Rome the accufed frequently was not tried by a tribunal of his peers, bound to act according to a fixed law, but by an arbitrary judge, whofe own will was his only rule.

Solon, like every wife lawgiver, endeavoured to extend the influence of religion over the minds of his countrymen. He enjoined a profound veneration for divinities, and defcribed actions as pleafing or difpleafing to them, according to the intention of the agent, combined with the known tendency of the act: knowing that the internal fentiments of religion are ftrengthened and confirmed by external rites, he ftrictly enjoined the regular performance of rites and ceremonies.

Such are the outlines of Solon's laws: laws which if the fyftem of polity had been equal to them, would have been productive of the moft beneficial effects. Thofe Englifh readers who wifh to examine them in detail, will find them in Plutarch, and more fully in Potter's Antiquities. Thofe who wifh for detail, interfperfed with agreeable illuftration and ingenious remark, may confult Anacharfis. Thofe who wifh to have the fpirit of

Athenian laws ſublimated into moral and political philoſophy, may peruſe Gillies.

Whoever conſiders the Athenian laws in detail and generalization, muſt ſee that they were admirably calculated to promote the happineſs of the citizen, if the political conſtitution had admitted of their full operation. Any one who knew Athenian juriſprudence without knowing Athenian politics, muſt ſuppoſe that the framer of ſuch laws, would alſo frame an excellent ſyſtem of government. It is, indeed, the political conſtitution, which aſcertains the value of laws in a ſtate. It availed little to the ſubjects of the eaſtern empire, that Juſtinian had collected the laws and uſages of the Romans, and digeſted them into a code, with ſome exceptions, very good, when a deſpot and his minions were to be the executors and judges. Laws may occaſionally temper the violence of a deſpotic government,

government, but however in themſelves good, can never make it good. The equity of eſtabliſhed uſages, made the caliphs of Bagdad determine juſtly, where no circumſtance occurred to intereſt their paſſions. But wherever paſſion interfered, there being no controuling power, the paſſion, right or wrong, was gratified. Haroun Araſchid adjudged the olives to the true proprietor, but doomed to death a number of innocent perſons, becauſe he ſuppoſed them, accidentally, the cauſes of the death of his favorite jeſter. Had Solon been lawgiver for the country whilſt a caliph ruled without controul, his laws would have been uſeleſs; their general excellence would have only ſhewn the badneſs of that government, which could render ſuch excellence ineffectual. The uncontrouled ſway of a mob is at leaſt as bad, if not worſe, than that of a ſultan. " While (ſays Gillies) human na-
" ture remains unchanged, and the paſſions
" of men run in their ordinary channel, the
" right

"right to exercife power will commonly be "attended with a ftrong inclination to abufe "it. Unlefs power, therefore, be coun- "teracted by liberty; unlefs an impervious "line of feparation be drawn between pre- "rogative and privilege, and that part of the "conftitution which fuftains its political life, "be kept feparate and diftinct from that "which tends to corruption, it is of little "confequence whether a country be governed "by one tyrant or a thoufand; in both cafes "alike, the condition of man is precarious, "and force prevails over law." This truth is ftrikingly illuftrated in the hiftory of the Athenians.

Solon was the framer of the Athenian democracy. It appears very evident, that his wife mind by no means judged a democracy without controul, to be the beft form of government. He gave the Athenians (as he himfelf fays), not the conftitution which he thought

thought beſt, but which he thought them moſt diſpoſed to bear. His genius, though great, was inferior to that of Lycurgus. Solon only adapted his government, to the inclinations and character of the citizens. Lycurgus new moulded the character of the citizens, to fit them for the reception of his government.

Solon, though he had not vigour of intellect, or at leaſt fortitude of heart, to give the Athenians the form of government of which he himſelf approved, yet attempted to render it leſs democratical than it really was, and eventually ſhewed itſelf. He eſtabliſhed checks to reſtrain the people, but to little purpoſe. His embankments, however well deſigned, were too feeble to ſtem the torrent of popular violence.

He divided the people into claſſes, according to their property. A plain proof that he wiſhed

wiſhed to form an ariſtocracy, which might limit and moderate the power of the populace. The claſſes were four. The firſt conſiſted of thoſe whoſe lands yielded five hundred meaſures of wet and dry commodities, viz. of oil, wine, the various ſorts of fruits and corns, and the produce of their mines. That, according to the very accurate calculation of Dr. Gillies, eſtimating the value of money by the price of labour, would in the preſent age be about ſix hundred pounds ſterling. The ſecond conſiſted of thoſe whoſe eſtates produced three hundred meaſures, that is about three hundred and ſixty pounds ſterling. The third, of thoſe whoſe eſtates produced two hundred meaſures. The fourth, of all the citizens, whoſe annual income was leſs than two hundred meaſures. Beſides the citizens, that is the free born natives of Athens, there were the ſtrangers and the ſlaves. The ſtrangers held an intermediate place between the citizens and the ſlaves.

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They had no votes like the firſt, nor were the articles of property like the laſt. The ſlaves were more numerous than the ſtrangers and citizens together. Every citizen was admitted to vote in the public aſſembly, ſo that citizens poſſeſſed that which modern democrats contend for, *univerſal ſuffrage*. The people poſſeſſed the ſupreme legiſlative power. They confirmed or abrogated laws, they impoſed taxes, granted the privileges of a citizen to foreigners, and decreed rewards to the benefactors of their country. The people poſſeſſed the ſupreme judicative power. Of them were the civil and criminal courts compoſed. Of theſe there were ten principal tribunals. Four of them were for different ſpecies of homicide, accidental, involuntary, neceſſary, and malicious. Six for other criminal and all civil caſes. Theſe tribunals were annually eligible from the maſs of citizens, and indeed were committees of the general aſſembly. The people poſſeſſed alſo the

the executive power. They nominated, annually, the magiſtrates, civil, military, and religious. The principal magiſtrates were nine in number, called Archons. The firſt was for the year, the ſupreme civil magiſtrate; the ſecond religious; the third military. The other ſix preſided in ſix of the judicial tribunals. Theſe archons, and alſo the inferior magiſtrates, were, at the expiration of their office, accountable to the people. The people received foreign ambaſſadors, decided on alliances, on peace, and war. Thus the ſupreme legiſlative, judicative, and executive power was veſted in the people; conſequently the conſtitution was a democracy.

Solon, to controul the great power of the people, inſtituted two councils, the ſenate conſiſting of four hundred (after his time the number increaſed to five hundred) eligible from the three higher claſſes; and the Areopagus. There was, indeed, a tradition, that

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the Areopagus was inſtituted before his time, and that Oreſtes was tried before it for killing his mother and her paramour, the murderers of his father. The chronology of an inſtitution is of leſs conſequence than its nature and effects. Solon, if he did not inſtitute it, gave it the form which it afterwards wore, and the powers it poſſeſſed.

The ſenate was annually elected. Thus in one ſenſe, the Athenians had another object which modern democrats ſo eagerly deſire; an *annual parliament*. In the juſt ſenſe, however, the ſenate was by no means a parliament. Its decrees required the confirmation of the people to give them permanent force. It poſſeſſed the power of convoking the general aſſembly. A principal buſineſs of the ſenate was to prepare ſubjects for the diſcuſſion of the national meeting, and to prevent improper queſtions from being agitated before them. This part of their office reſembled

bled that of the *Lords of Articles* in the Scottish parliament.

The intention of Solon, in forming the ſenate, was manifeſtly to prevent the republic from ſuffering by hurtful ſubjects coming before the people, and hurtful decrees being made. But though nominally the ſenate had the choice of ſubjects of popular debate, it really ſeldom could venture to exerciſe its power. This body changing every year, had neither time nor intereſt ſufficient to retain any portion of authority. At the expiration of its annual functions, its ſeveral members had to look for honours and favours from the people. Them they were obliged to conſider as their benefactors and maſters. They were really under the neceſſity of flattering and cajoling the people, by bringing forward decrees, not from a conviction of utility, but to gratify the aſſembly. Perpetually dependent on the people, the ſenate in its proceedings

evinced

evinced the impoſſibility of repreſentatives diſcharging the duties of their commiſſion, if annually accountable to their conſtituents. Annual delegates become ſervants of the mob of electors. The ſenate inſtead of being a controuling council, was a mere organ of popular will.

The court of the Areopagus was unlimited in its numbers. The members held the office for life. It conſiſted of the magiſtrates, who had diſcharged with approbation the duties of their reſpective offices. To aſcertain the purity of their conduct, they underwent a very ſtrict examination. Should any of them be found artful enough to elude this rigorous ſcrutiny, when they became Areopagites, they were forced to appear virtuous, and to act juſtly. The court kept a ſtrict eye over the conduct of its own members, as well as of other citizens. Solon, if he did not inſtitute this court, at leaſt extended its authority.

As modelled by him, it poſſeſſed a power in almoſt all matters, equivalent to that aſſumed formerly by the Engliſh court of high commiſſion, in religious concerns, and of the ſtar chamber, in civil, and political; and to that now poſſeſſed by the eſtabliſhed criminal courts in judicial, with the addition of cenſorian inſpection. "It took (ſays Anacharſis) cognizance of almoſt all crimes, all vices, and abuſes. Murder, poiſoning, robbery, conflagrations, libertiniſm, and innovations, either in the ſyſtem of religion, or the form of government, by turns excited its vigilance. It was empowered, by entering and examining private houſes, to condemn every uſeleſs citizen as dangerous, and every expence not proportioned to the means of the citizen as criminal. As it exhibited the greateſt firmneſs in puniſhing crimes, and the niceſt circumſpection in reforming manners; as it never employed chaſtiſement, till advice and menaces were

"ſlighted;

" ſlighted; it acquired the eſteem and love " of the people, even while it exerciſed the " moſt abſolute power."

With all this power, the Areopagus, as a council of controul, proved totally inſufficient to reſtrain popular licence. No inſtitution, however good in itſelf, can avail much or long to check the abuſe of boundleſs power. When the democracy became entirely prepollent, the people and their demagogues enfeebled an authority which interfered with their own. The Areopagus fell into diſuſe.

Notwithſtanding the proviſions made by Solon, the democratical part of the conſtitution was even in his time greatly preponderant, and had a tendency to become more and more prevalent. The power of the people was ſo much ſuperior to that of the other orders, intended by Solon to limit it, that in the nature of things it might be expected to

increaſe. In fact it did increaſe ſo as to become altogether abſolute. The people, either immediately, or through the medium of their temporary delegates, did every thing which they choſe. Their will was the rule of government. As in the courts of deſpotic princes, every one who wiſhes to riſe in the ſtate, muſt ſtrain every nerve to gratify the deſpotical monarch; ſo in Athens, every man who wiſhed to riſe, was obliged to flatter the deſpotical populace. The vizier and the demagogue muſt uſe the ſame arts; as the people were, on the whole, more extravagantly capricious than ſingle deſpots generally are, their flatterers were obliged to uſe a ſtill greater quantity of corrupting adulation, than even mufties and baſhaws.

As under ſingle deſpotiſm the favorite often enſlaved the prince, his maſter; ſo in democracies, the favorite often enſlaved the people, his maſters. Thus it happened in Athens,

Athens, ſoon after Solon's eſtabliſhment of the conſtitution. Piſiſtratus, by the variety and verſatility of his talents, had acquired great influence with the populace of Athens. He thence formed the project of acquiring the ſupreme power. He ſaw the men of ſenſe and property perceived the tendency of his proceedings to be inimical to the public good. He ſtirred up the populace againſt their repreſentatives in the ſenate, perſuaded the mob that the ſenators were averſe to him, on account of his attachment to the popular cauſe. So natural is it in all countries for any one who wiſhes to exalt himſelf on the ruin of the ſtate, to depreſs the higher ranks and court the mob. Piſiſtratus procured a convention of the populace, to overawe the deliberations of the ſenate. He appeared in it covered with wounds, which he had himſelf inflicted. Imputed them to the wicked machinations of the ſenate. He compelled the ſenators to fly. He procured from the

people, a ſtrong guard for his own perſon. Solon in vain endeavoured to repreſs the frantic infatuation of the deluded mob. Piſiſtratus employed his guard in enſlaving his country. Such were the firſt effects of the eſtabliſhment of democracy. Piſiſtratus when once firmly eſtabliſhed in the tyranny, made uſe of his power to good purpoſes. He ſuffered the laws of Solon to operate in every caſe, which did not interfere with his own ſovereignty. He was an accompliſhed man, and in private life amiable. In his public life he was moderate and merciful, if a perſon can be called merciful for not exerciſing in every caſe, a power which he had no right in any to poſſeſs.

His ſons, Hippias and Hipparchus, after his death, ſucceeded to the ſovereignty, and in their general conduct imitated their father. But in one inſtance, they inſulted two young Athenians, Harmodius and Ariſtogiton. Theſe entered

entered into a confpiracy againft both the princes, fucceeded in killing Hipparchus. Hippias efcaped, and becoming the perpetrator of every injuftice when he reigned alone, fo provoked the Athenians, that they compelled him to abdicate his tyranny. The Athenians re-eftablifhed their democracy.

CHAP. IV.

Effects of the democracy illuſtrated from the tranſactions of the Athenians — Perſian war — Miltiades — Ariſtides — Themiſtocles — Cymon — Pericles.

SOME time elapſed after this eſtabliſhment, before the effects of the Athenian conſtitution rendered themſelves generally manifeſt. In particular inſtances they, indeed, ſoon ſhewed themſelves. It would be exceeding the plan of this eſſay, to enter into a detail of the Athenian tranſactions; we ſhall only mention thoſe which either illuſtrated or affected their conſtitution. Soon after the expulſion of Hippias, enſued the firſt war with the Perſians. Hippias had taken refuge at the court of Darius; that monarch, whoſe mandates were implicitly obeyed

obeyed in thoſe countries that border upon Greece, expected the ſame obſequiouſneſs from the Greeks. He ordered the Athenians to reinſtate Hippias. The Athenians refuſed, and in reſentment of the order burned Sardis. There was an energy of corporeal, intellectual, and moral qualities in the Greeks, and eſpecially in the Athenians, that no nation ever ſurpaſſed. Happy would it have been for them, if the conſtitution of their government had ſuffered thoſe energies to be generally directed to the beſt purpoſes. Againſt the Perſians they were.

Darius enraged at what he preſumptuouſly ſtiled the inſolence of the Athenians, ſent a numerous army and fleet to invade their country. Datis and Artaphernes headed the expedition, and entered into Attica. The Athenians ſolicited the aſſiſtance of the Spartans. The Spartans were prevented by ſuperſtition, from taking the field before the

full of the moon. The Athenians, therefore, with the aſſiſtance of only a thouſand Platæans, making in conjunction with their own forces, ten thouſand, were obliged to face two hundred thouſand of the Perſian hoſt. Miltiades, a general of tried abilities, commanded the Greeks, encouraged them to go forth to battle, and at Marathon, by a ſignal victory, ſhewed the ſuperiority of Grecian proweſs to Perſian effeminacy.

The defeat of his troops, and their compelled retreat into their own territories, only incenſed Darius, without convincing him of the inefficacy of feeble number. He made preparations for invading Greece with a much more numerous armament, but died before the equipment was compleated. His ſon and ſucceſſor, Xerxes, continued the preparations with the ſame deſign. Two millions of land and ſea forces croſſed from Aſia into Europe, to ſubjugate the ſmall ſtates of Sparta and

Athens.

Athens. Miltiades being now dead, Themiſtocles was inveſted with the ſupreme command of the Athenians. Ariſtides, ſacrificing private enmity, exerted his great talents and qualities in ſeconding Themiſtocles. Themiſtocles poſſeſſing every advantage that a wiſe head and brave heart could give, employed his wiſdom in deviſing thoſe means, which would render the courage and ſkill of himſelf and countrymen moſt effectual. He prevailed upon his fellow-citizens to leave their city, and betake themſelves to wooden walls. The Athenians, he knew, were ſtill more ſuperior to the Perſians by ſea than by land. They were, beſides, perfectly acquainted with the ſtraits, harbours, creeks, currents, and periodical winds in thoſe parts, whereas the Perſians were totally ignorant. The effect of the wiſdom of his plan, executed with ſkill, policy, and courage, was the total diſcomfiture of the Perſian fleet. The arrogant prince, who had covered the whole ſea with

his

his fleets, and affected to chain the elements, was obliged to fly to his own dominions in a ſmall bark. Thus did Themiſtocles ſave his country.

By land, Spartan energy, ariſing from the combination of corporeal, intellectual, and moral qualities, like the Athenian, and generally better directed, becauſe Sparta was a mixt government, was oppoſed to Perſian number. Leonidas and his heroic band ſhewed what virtuouſly brave men can do and will do, fighting for their country which they love, and its laws which they revere.

The following year Ariſtides the Athenian, and Pauſanias the Spartan, defeated Mardonius and the Perſian army at Platæa, and cleared their country of its invaders. Cymon carried the Grecian arms into Aſia, and made the feeble deſpot tremble on his throne. Mean while Themiſtocles rebuilt and forti-

fied

fied Athens; and his talents being equally fitted for policy as war, made extraordinary improvement in the internal ſtate of his country. This was really the epoch of Athenian glory; one ſad ingredient in their polity, prevented their glory from being conſummate. In a democracy, ſuperiority even of talents and qualities is dangerous, both to the poſſeſſor and to the ſtate. The very wiſdom, courage, and conduct, which enable the ſtateſman and ſoldier to exalt his country, where there is no controul of orders, to check their improper exertion, may enſlave it. It is not merely the capriciouſneſs of the mob, which in democracies produces the expulſion or the death of its ableſt citizens. It is the real principle of the conſtitution, which admits not of ſuperiority in any of its members. Miltiades, by his conduct at Marathon, by preſerving his country, gained, as might naturally be expected, a very great aſcendency over thoſe whom he had preſerved. The people be-

came apprehenſive, that he would employ his influence, as Piſiſtratus had done, to attain the ſupreme power. They ſuſpected that he correſponded with the Perſian king, to facilitate his own tyrannical views. There was not the ſmalleſt veſtige or proof to juſtify their ſuſpicions. That did not impede their proceedings againſt their preſerver. They compelled him to ſtand trial. In vain had Solon's laws provided, that no man ſhould be condemned without certain evidence of his guilt. In a deſpotiſm, whether of one or of many, accuſation at the inſtance of the ruling power, is equivalent to conviction. Impriſonment, baniſhment, the bow-ſtring, or lamp-poſt is the certain conſequence of arraignment. So it fared with Miltiades, although the charge againſt him was unſupported by teſtimony and contrary to probability, he was doomed to pay an exorbitant fine. Unable to diſcharge it, the ſaviour of his country ended his days in a priſon.

Ariſtides,

Ariſtides, by his many valuable qualities, and particularly by his juſtice, had obtained a very high character at Athens. Two reaſons render deſpots inimical to perſonal eminence, fear and envy. The vizier, who has diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the cabinet, and in the field, is envied by his maſter for the talents which he diſplays, and feared for the influence which they muſt procure him. This is more certainly the caſe with a mob, than a ſingle tyrant. Ariſtides was baniſhed, becauſe he had the univerſal character of being JUST. In a democracy, even virtue is dangerous to the poſſeſſor.

Themiſtocles, by his maſterly policy, increaſed the populouſneſs, wealth, and power of his country. He raiſed Athens to be the firſt ſtate in Greece. His very great and ſucceſsful exertions, military, and civil, in the ſervice of his country, procured him the firſt

eminence

eminence in the ſtate. The eminence attained in a democracy by doing good, fails not to excite the envy of the multitude. Knowing themſelves by the conſtitution to be ſovereigns, they cannot bear great individual diſtinction. "Arbitrary princes, ſays Salluſt, "diſlike the great and worthy much more than "the inſignificant and worthleſs." This is the caſe with deſpotic multitudes, fully as much as with ſingle deſpots. The Athenians as they had hated Ariſtides for being juſt, hated Themiſtocles for being wiſe and ſucceſsful, in exalting themſelves. Their lecturing demagogues, the paraſites of the people, inflamed their jealouſy againſt the ableſt miniſters their country had ever ſeen.

Their diſlike was encreaſed by the Spartan emiſſaries. The Spartans were very much diſpleaſed with Themiſtocles, becauſe by aggrandizing his country, he had made them ceaſe to be the firſt ſtate in Greece. They

pretended

pretended that Themiſtocles was concerned in a plot which Pauſanias had contrived, for betraying Greece to the Perſians. Their charge was eagerly ſupported by the Athenian demagogues. Themiſtocles was tried, and although there was no evidence to juſtify the accuſation, he was condemned to perpetual baniſhment. Such is the gratitude to the higheſt benefactors, ſuch is the adminiſtration of juſtice in a democracy. Had Themiſtocles been a member of a mixt government, he would have continued to render the ſtate important ſervices, and would have ended with glory in his own country, a life which had been devoted to the promotion of its advantage. Even under the beſt of governments, he might have been expoſed to the attacks of envious demagogues, but the controul of eſtates would have rendered their efforts powerleſs. Who that really knows hiſtory, can approve of a government which baniſhed an Ariſtides for being ſupremely vir-

tuous; doomed a Miltiades, the ſaviour of his country, to die in a goal; compelled a Themiſtocles, the preſerver and aggrandizer of his country, without any evidence of guilt, to ſeek refuge with thoſe enemies, whoſe formidable efforts his talents had rendered ineffectual—a government which obliged thoſe men to ceaſe to be members of the ſtate, which, but for them, would have ceaſed to exiſt? Theſe were not inſulated caſes; if they had been ſo, it would be very unfair to draw from them an inference againſt the government under which they happened. Every one acquainted with the hiſtory of Athens knows, that it was a general practice of thoſe democrats, to baniſh all who obtained eminence, either by their talents or virtues. This will be ſeen more clearly as we proceed in the narration. The Athenian treatment of illuſtrious men, did not ariſe from any thing peculiarly bad in their national character—compared with moſt democrats, they were

mild

mild and humane. If they had been inſpired with the ferocity of modern democrats, the lamp poſt, or guillotine, would have prevented the baniſhment of their great men.

The friends of democracy, in celebrating the efforts of the Athenians, during the Perſian war, affect to impute their gallant conduct to the conſtitution of their government. A very ſlight recollection of hiſtory may convince us, that efforts equally wiſe and vigorous, have often, where the ſtate of things required them, been made in countries not democratical. Where men have great intereſts at ſtake, whatever be their form of government, they fight ſtrenuouſly. The government of Scotland was certainly far from democratical, when Sir William Wallace, with his ſmall band, long ſucceſsfully oppoſed the invaders of his country. Theſe were not Aſiatics, relaxed by climate, and enfeebled by luxury, but from a country

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which has always produced ſoldiers, to whom the world never ſaw ſuperiors: they were Engliſhmen. They were headed not by a ſilly oſtentatious eaſtern deſpot, but by one of the braveſt, and wiſeſt of Engliſh kings. The efforts of England, againſt the Spaniſh Armada, containing infinitely better troops than the Perſian fleet, were not leſs wiſe nor leſs vigorous, than thoſe of the Athenians. A general ſpirit prevailed of fitting out ſhips, and going to combat the enemy. Our admirals availed themſelves no leſs of ſuperior ſeamanſhip, and ſuperior knowledge of the ſeas adjoining our coaſts, than did Themiſtocles. In Holland, when the Dutch government was not democratical, the efforts of William the third and his countrymen, againſt the invading power of Lewis the fourteenth, were equally energetic, with thoſe of the Athenians; and againſt troops to which the Perſians were as much inferior as their commanders, Mardonius and Xerxes,

were

were to Turenne and Condé. Soldiers have generally fought beſt when attached to their ſuperiors. The German retainer, we are told by Tacitus, exerted himſelf with the moſt uncommon vigour, when fighting under the eye of his chief. Never did the Scotch highlanders, eminent as they have been, at all times for their proweſs, fight with more energy, than under the chiefs of their reſpective clans. The gallant mountaineers were always eager,

To follow to the field ſome warlike lord.

In fact European ſoldiers generally fight bravely, whatever be their cauſe. Never did the Athenians exert themſelves more forcibly than the Macedonians, when fighting under their king. Never did the efforts of any democracy exceed thoſe of the Spaniards, under the Prince of Parma, of the Turks under Solyman, of the Ruſſians under Romanzow, of the Auſtrians under Prince

 Eugene,

Eugene, of the Pruſſians, under Frederick the great, and of the Britiſh, under all commanders. Thus we ſee the opinion that democracy produces greater military exertions than any other government, is totally unfounded in fact. In reality, the exertions of the Athenians, ſo far from ariſing from their democracy, was owing to a temporary departure from its ſpirit. By the Athenian conſtitution there were ten generals. Conſiſtently with their loved equality, each of theſe commanded in turn. At the battle of Marathon, the command was conferred on Miltiades alone. The democracy of inſtitution, in the time of danger, gave way to the ariſtocracy of nature. Ariſtides and Themiſtocles, during the ſecond Perſian war, were really princes: eſpecially the laſt. The Athenians acted according to the will of Themiſtocles, not Themiſtocles according to the will of the Athenians. Themiſtocles led the people from Athens to the ſhips. Themiſtocles forced

forced them to remain in the ſtraits of Salamis, and fight. Themiſtocles drove Xerxes from Greece. Themiſtocles fortified the Pyræns. Themiſtocles increaſed the population, riches, and power of Athens. Themiſtocles raiſed his country to the firſt ſtation in Greece. Had the Athenians, inſtead of ranging themſelves round the ſtandard of a leader, following his counſel, and obeying his orders, thought and acted for themſelves; had they uniformly continued democratical, they would have become a province of Perſia. Acting for a time, as ſubjects to a wiſe prince, they were eminently ſucceſsful. Returned to their uſual democracy, they doomed their benefactor to ruin.

After the death of Ariſtides, and baniſhment of Themiſtocles, Cymon greatly extended the territories, and increaſed the riches of Athens. Proſperity tries the nature of a government and diſpoſitions of a people, more

 than

than adverſity; in times of difficulty and danger, nature points out to all men, the neceſſity of ſeeking out the moſt efficacious means of extrication. The people naturally ſeek for a leader, whoſe wiſdom and courage may remove the evils which they ſuffer. The leader ſeeks the advice and aſſiſtance of thoſe whom he thinks able to meliorate his plans, or facilitate the execution. The leader and his counſellors deſire the approbation of the people, as a ſanction to their meaſures, and an earneſt of ready cooperations. The ſultan conſults the divan, and both require the concurrence of the people. Imminent danger produces while it laſts, a government of king, lords, and commons. In proſperity, whoever poſſeſſes the ſupreme power, uncontrouled from exultation at ſucceſs, and deſire of unlimited enjoyment; the deſire increaſing with the hopes of gratification, abuſes the ſovereign authority. So it fared with the Athenians.

Their victories over the Perſians, the plunder of the camps, and the ſpoils of the cities in Aſia, enriched many of the lower orders; this was the *occaſion* of the extenſion of that democracy, of which its nature was the cauſe. "The ſudden wealth (ſays Dr. Gillies) which "the rich ſpoils of the barbarians, had diffuſed among all ranks of men, increaſed "the cenſus of individuals, and deſtroyed the "ballance of the conſtitution. Ariſtides, "who perceived it to be impoſſible to reſiſt "the natural progreſs of democracy, ſeaſon-"ably yielded to men who had arms in their "hands, and firmneſs in their hearts: and "propoſed with apparent ſatisfaction, but "much ſecret reluctance; a law, by which "the Athenian magiſtrates ſhould be thence-"forth promiſcuouſly elected, from the four "claſſes of citizens. This innovation paved "the way for the ſtill greater changes begun "twenty years afterwards, and gradually

"com-

" completed by Pericles, a reſolution of which " the conſequences were not immediately " felt, but which continually became more " ſenſible, and finally terminated in the ruin " of Athens, and of Greece."

In a democratical government, it generally happens, that ſome one ambitious perſon courts the favour of the people, in order to obtain the principal direction of affairs. The multitude, like weak princes, is almoſt univerſally led by favourites; on the talents and diſpoſitions of thoſe favourites, depends in a great meaſure, the good and evil of the ſtate; unfortunately as the favourite riſes through the people, and as they beſtow their favour fully as much on thoſe who promote their pleaſure, as their intereſt; he ſtudies their inclinations more than their good. Men of real patriotiſm, who purſue the advantage, not the gratification of the people, oppoſe the favourite's adulatory and cajoling meaſures.

There were, as we have ſaid in the conſtitution of Solon, ſome veſtiges of ariſtocracy. To this the beſt and moſt patriotic of the Athenians adhered, optimatibus omnes boni favemus, held in Athens as well as in Rome, and in popular conteſts ſtimulated by demagogues, will hold always in all countries. Whilſt Cymon was extending the Athenian power, glory, and influence abroad, a man of very great talents, was ſeeking the direction of affairs at home.

Pericles excelled all men of his age in eloquence. His eloquence united plenitude of information, force of genius, and nervouſneſs of ſtile. It was either convincing or perſuaſive, according to the object he had in view; at one time, its majeſty commanded the hearers, at another, its ſoftneſs and delicacy inſinuated themſelves into their hearts. Eloquence, we may obſerve, is of much greater efficacy, with men not very far advanced in knowledge

knowledge or in reaſoning. Men of real learning and ſound diſcernment, however they may be pleaſed with the eloquence as an object of taſte, will not miſtake brilliant fancy for luminous information, nor vehement aſſertion for juſt reaſoning. They will ſtrip it of every appendage of oratorial dreſs, and view the naked nerves and ſinews of truth. The Athenian people were far from being arrived at that degree of exerciſed intellect, which prevents impoſition from eloquence. Pericles ſoon became a much greater favorite, than their champion, Cymon. This great general, on his return from Aſia, put himſelf at the head of the nobles. Pericles put himſelf at the head of the mob. Cymon employed his private fortune, lawfully acquired, in benefiting individuals and the public. Pericles diſpoſed of the national finances, in flattering the vanity, indulging the rapacity, and miniſtering to the pleaſures of the multitude. He ſupported the pretenſions of the people,

right

right or wrong. He uſed the influence he had thus acquired, in extending and confirming his own perſon. He rendered them his accomplices and inſtruments, in repeated acts of injuſtice. By a falſe accuſation, he procured the trial of Cymon. Where the mob reigns paramount, trials at the inſtance of their favourites, are the certain preludes to condemnation. Proof is diſregarded, amidſt prejudice and paſſion. The forms of juſtice may be obſerved, the ſubſtance is neglected. Even the forms are often ſlighted. The clamorous invective of the demagogue, is the tocſin ſummoning the mob to violence. The victorious, the virtuous, the patriotic Cymon was baniſhed. Pericles had now attained the ſummit of power. Every thing was governed by his will, though every thing was apparently tranſacted according to the eſtabliſhed laws. In vain the Areopagus interpoſed its conſtitutional authority, to controul his influence. He ſoon deviſed expedients to deſtroy its power.

power. No inſtitution, however well intended, and however uſeful, can, in a democracy, long withſtand the attacks of the people, ſtimulated by deſigning and ambitious favourites.

Having obtained the ſupreme direction of Athens, the character of Pericles now completely diſplayed itſelf. His mind, naturally of the firſt capacity and vigour, was enriched by extenſive and uſeful knowledge, adorned by elegant literature, and fortified by the ſoundeſt philoſophy. Damon, profeſſedly a teacher of rhetoric, but really maſter of hiſtory, politics, and all the learning of the times, was his tutor. Anaxagoras inſtructed him in philoſophy. That wiſe man had made it his chief ſtudy, to confirm the moſt important and pleaſing doctrine, that a being of ſupreme intelligence and benevolence governs the world, rewards the virtuous, puniſhes the vicious. " From him (ſays Dr. Gillies)

Gillies) " Pericles early learned to controul " the tempeſts of youthful paſſions, which " ſo often blaſt the promiſing hopes of man- " hood; to preſerve an unſhaken conſtancy " in all the viciſſitudes of fortune, ſince all " are the varied diſpenſations of the ſame " wiſe providence."

Fertile in means, for the attainment of his objects; ſkilful in the varied application of them, according to the variation of circum- ſtances, having the ready and complete com- mand of his own great intellects and exten- ſive information, both in forming and exe- cuting plans; courageous, temperate, verſa- tile, yet ſteady; deciſive yet cautious, bold yet prudent, enterpriſing yet circumſpect. He excelled in politics, in war, and in every purſuit which required combined genius and conduct. He was not a great man becauſe an orator, but an orator becauſe a great man. He was eminently endowed with that ſelf- poſſeſſion,

poſſeſſion, from which a wiſe and ſtrong mind purſues its objects, by the means which it judges moſt effectual, unmoved by the clamorous cenſures of an uninformed undiſcerning vulgar. He did, indeed, from ambition, profeſs a reſpect for the opinion of the mob, where that opinion was neceſſary to ſecure his power; but on other occaſions, felt that contempt for them, as legiſlators or politicians, which every man of parts and knowledge muſt entertain for thoſe, who in matters of ſuch importance, expatiate ſo far beyond their ſphere. He was moreover diſtinguiſhed for integrity, in the management of the public money. For when the envious and malignant accuſed him of defalcation of the revenue, and his adminiſtration underwent a trial, the charge was proved to be falſe and ſlanderous. He alſo poſſeſſed exactneſs, œconomy, and thoſe leſſer qualifications, which regulate and aſſiſt the operation of great qualities.—Such a man was formed by

nature

nature and by habit, for procuring and maintaining aſcendency among his fellow men. The chief alloy of this great character, was ambition; that was the maſter-key which opened his defects. Power was his darling object; like one of the dramatic perſonages of his countryman Euripides, he thought juſtice might be violated for the ſake of reigning. Whatever tended to continue to him the ſupreme authority, he uniformly did, without regarding the conſequences to his country. Though no one could more thoroughly deſpiſe the multitude, yet he gratified them in various ways, hurtful to themſelves, in order to ſecure their acquieſcence in his adminiſtration.

In a mixt government, the talents and qualities of Pericles would have rendered him a bleſſing to his country. He would have been ſeconded and ſupported in the exertion of his wiſdom and virtues, for the purpoſes

of national utility. In a government of check, the ſelfiſh paſſions undergoing reſtraint and direction, are made to produce good to ſociety. He would not have had a mob to cajole, but men of ſenſe and information to ſatisfy, that his conduct tended to the public good. The controuling orders, being able to judge of the real merit and tendency of his meaſures, would have deprived him of power, if he perſiſted in noxious conduct. He would not have had motives to impel him to hurtful counſels; his very ambition would have ſtimulated him to ſeek the real good of his country, becauſe that purſuit would have been neceſſary to the preſervation of his own power.

At Athens, although Pericles did many very uſeful things, yet from the nature of a democratical government, his adminiſtration on the whole, was productive of infinitely more evil than good. His great talents, certainly for the time, very much increaſed the

proſperity

profperity of the country. He promoted agriculture and manufactures, and greatly extended the commerce and maritime power of his country. Riches flowed in from all quarters to Athens, and were, in a confiderable degree, employed in ftrengthening and adorning the city. He encouraged the fine arts, literature, and philofophy. Under him flourifhed Polygnotus, Parrhafius, and Phidias; thofe ingenious men, who fo happily made painting, fculpture, and ftatuary the vehicles of fentiment, and character, as well as of external feature and figure. Refpected by him, lived Anaxagoras, the father of moral theology; Socrates, the father of moral philofophy; and Euripides, who, in the garb of fiction, exhibits the juft and elevated reafoning, the pious and virtuous fentiments of both. Tafte, genius, and philofophy were never more prevalent than at Athens, in the age of Pericles. The political exaltation of the Athenians, of which Pericles was fo great an inftrument,

might have been as laſting as is the fame of their intellect, had their government been placed in ſteadier hands, than thoſe of the multitude. Obliged often to gratify their inclination, inſtead of following his own judgement, Pericles, with all his wonderful abilities, contributed to the permanent depreſſion of his country.

The Athenians were inſpired by two principles, which often exiſt in union in democracies, the deſire of conqueſt, and the deſire of fraternization. Pericles conquered and fraternized various ſtates in the Archipelago, and the adjacent continent. He diſplayed great military and naval ſkill, and alſo political addreſs in the ſubjugation of Samos. After his victory, he entered nominally into an alliance with that ſtate, ſubverted the eſtabliſhed government, ſubſtituted in its ſtead, a democracy depending upon Athens. The mob of Samos were friendly to the Athenians, but

but finding themſelves really ſubjects, regretted having received the fraternal embrace of democracy.

The comprehenſive mind of Pericles readily perceived the hurtful tendency of extenſive dominion to ſuch a ſtate as Athens, but the multitude thought otherwiſe. To them, as they were lords paramount, he was compelled to yield. The uſurping encroachments of thoſe democrats excited the Peloponneſian war, which afterwards ruined their country. The inſolence of the Athenians, which Pericles's ambition encouraged, and abilities gratified, by ſucceſsful injuſtice, muſt have forced the neighbouring ſtates, ſooner or later, to combine for their mutual ſafety. Pericles, it appears evident from Plutarch and Thucydides, was the immediate incendiary, as well as the remote cauſe of the fatal conteſt. The people had begun to complain of his adminiſtration, and he promoted war to divert their

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attention. When the Spartans made reaſonable remonſtrances on the injuries done their allies, by the Athenians, Pericles told them, "model your government according to our de-"mocracy, and we ſhall ceaſe to diſturb your "allies." When the alternative is propoſed by a democratical to a limited government, fight or fraternize, war is the ſafeſt choice. So the Spartans thought. The event juſtified their judgement. After many viciſſitudes, the ſteady well-directed valour and conduct of a regular government, finally triumphed over the violent efforts of a turbulent democracy. The Spartans proved victorious, the Athenians were cruſhed. A worſe evil than even the Peloponneſian war, aroſe from the adminiſtration of Pericles. Luxury and corruption, of every ſort, began during that apparently ſplendid æra. The love of pleaſure is one of the moſt predominant principles of the human mind. Carried to exceſs, it is productive of the relaxation and abatement of the

intellectual

intellectual and moral character; its destructive effects are greater and more expeditious on the lower ranks, who have neither taste to modify its grossness, nor wisdom to prevent its becoming compleatly habitual. Every real lover of society, who possesses influence, will endeavour to check and restrain its extravagance among the people. Those, however, who depend on the people for greatness, are too often led to encourage them in vicious indulgence. The minions of the people in a democracy, as the minions of the prince in a single tyranny, must generally be panders to the vices of the supreme rulers. Such was the case with Pericles. He was under the necessity of gratifying the people, or losing his ascendency. To an ambitious man, that was no alternative. He was farther stimulated by the opposition of Thucydides, head of the party of the nobles, who was active in endeavouring to expose the pernicious effects of his compliance with the multitude. To prevent

the people from being affected by their attempts, he found the moſt effectual means were to engage them in a perpetual round of amuſement and diſſipation. Although never guilty of alienating the public money for his own uſe, yet did he laviſh it for the pleaſures of the people. Sums earned in honourable conteſts with the Perſians, and ſums extorted from dependent allies, were expended in multiplying theatres, in giving gratuitous admiſſion to the poorer citizens to theſe, and to feaſts and revellings, in procuring paraſites, dancers, and buffoons, to flatter and gratify the coarſe taſte of the carouſing populace, in importing the delicacies of diſtant countries, in preparing them with all the refinements of cookery to gratify their palates, in encouraging the reception of beautiful courtezans, in coſtly perfumes, and ſplendid dreſſes, in delighting the ears and fancy with the charms of muſic, in ſhort, in gratifying the ſenſes and the vanity of the mob, without the exertion of

their own labour. He did the moſt noxious thing that can be done for the lower orders, he made them eat, drink, and revel, without working; and thus by deſtroying their induſtry, and promoting their pleaſure, incapacitated them for being uſeful members of ſociety. The multitude was abetted in its licentiouſneſs, by a ſet of pretended philoſophers, ſtiled the ſophiſts, who correſponded both in their modes of reaſoning, and in their tenets, with the Atheiſtical metaphyſicians of latter days. Their chief aim was to deride the religion of their country, and to call in queſtion thoſe maxims of conduct, by which good men have been uſually guided. They denied, if not the exiſtence, at leaſt the providence of a Supreme Being, and made temporary expediency, the rule of moral conduct. Next to impiety and immorality, vanity ſeems the leading feature of their character. That ſhewed itſelf in a diſplay of their metaphyſical ingenuity, in controverting eſtabliſhed truths,

truths, and ſupporting innovations. Maintaining the lawfulneſs of ſenſual indulgences, arguing in favour of the diſſipation of the Athenian populace, they became great favourites. There is indeed a natural connection between extreme democracy and irreligion. Thoſe who will ſubmit to no human authority, however ſalutary, come by no very difficult tranſition to diſavow divine.

In the conduct of the Peloponneſian war, Pericles diſplayed conſummate abilities, and magnanimity. His power being then fixed ſo firmly, as to be unſhaken by oppoſition, it was unneceſſary for him to court the populace. He then purſued their real intereſts. When the Peloponneſians were laying Attica waſte with a ſuperior army, and endeavouring to provoke the Athenians to battle, the populace, courageous by nature, arrogant by indulgence, and preſumptuous by ſucceſs, longed to face their opponents in the open field. Pericles, knowing the ſuperiority of the hoſtile army,

wiſely

wiſely repreſſed the ardour of his country-men. The Athenians, unaccuſtomed to be controuled even for their own good, clamoured againſt the tardineſs of Pericles. Seditious harangues are never wanting to inflame the paſſions of a mob. Demagogues endeavoured to incenſe them againſt Pericles. Then Pericles ſhewed himſelf really a great man. Inſtead of courting and cajoling the multitude, as he had too often done; inſtead of doing them evil to attain their favour, he encountered their ſlanderous abuſe to do them good. " Amidſt (ſays Dr. Gillies) the po-
" pular commotion, the accompliſhed ge-
" neral and ſtateſman remained unmoved,
" bravely reſiſting the ſtorm, or dextrouſly
" eluding its force. Though determined not
" to riſk an engagement with the confede-
" rates, he ſeaſonably employed the Athenian
" and Theſſalian cavalry to beat up their
" quarters, to intercept their convoys, to ha-
" raſs, ſurpriſe, or cut off their advanced

"parties. While theſe enterpriſes tended to "divert or appeaſe the tumult, a fleet of an "hundred and fifty ſail ravaged the defence-"leſs coaſt of Peloponneſus." Propoſing the real good of his countrymen as the end, and juſtly conſidering himſelf as infinitely better qualified for deviſing and applying the moſt efficacious means than Athenian ſhopkeepers and mechanics; regardleſs of the remonſtrances of ignorance and folly, he ſteadily purſued his own plan. Pericles, in this part of his conduct, is a ſtriking leſſon to ſtateſmen, to be guided by their own wiſdom, and not to deviate from its directions, becauſe its operations may be miſunderſtood or diſliked by a mob. Pericles was ſucceſsful in compelling the enemy to evacuate Attica, without expoſing his countrymen to danger. It muſt be obvious to the moſt ſuperficial reader of the hiſtory of Pericles, that in doing the good to his country which he then did, he deviated from the ſpirit of democracy.

By the conſtitution of Athens the people were the maſters, he only a ſervant. In fact at that time Pericles was a monarch—as a monarch, he ſaved his country; as the ſervant of a democracy, he would have been obliged to have obeyed the orders of the people, ſuch as they were. To ſum up the deſcription of Pericles's conduct in a few words, he did much good, and he did more evil. The good he did, acting for himſelf as a ſingle governor, he encouraged the arts, literature and philoſophy. He aggrandized and defended his country. Acting in compliance with the people, he deſtroyed the authority of their beſt court of juſtice; he encouraged them to encroachments, productive of a war, that ruined their power; he gratified them in luxury, idleneſs, and profligacy that ruined their minds. As a ſingle governor, he was the able and well-diſpoſed promoter of national advantage; but the producer of national deſtruction, as the agent of a democracy.

CHAP. V.

Peloponnefian war—Nicias—Cleon—tendency of democracy to war, conqueft, and cruelty—Athenian treatment of Lefbos—Scione—Melos—Alcibiades—Expedition into Sicily—banifhment of Alcibiades—calamity at Syracufe.

THE age of Solon formed the firft great epoch in the political hiftory of the Athenian republic. His conftitution was a democracy, with an intended mixture of ariftocracy, but that was fo feeble as to render it likely to be ineffectual for controuling the people. The age of Pericles formed the fecond epoch in the political hiftory of the Athenian republic—When the feeblenefs of Solon's barriers was experimentally afcertained, when democracy was completely eftablifhed, and fully manifefted its effects.

The remaining part of the Athenian hiftory, now that democracy was quite uncontrouled, is

is a ſtriking and awful monument of the direful conſequences, neceſſarily reſulting from that government.

The Peloponneſian war, which democratic exceſſes produced, was only in its beginning when Pericles finiſhed a diſtinguiſhed life, by a moſt magnanimous death. The Athenians for ſome time after were overwhelmed with the accumulated evils of war and peſtilence. Nicias, a prudent, cautious man, of ſolid ability, and of virtue, acquired influence with the ſuperior ranks, and getting the command, was ſucceſsful againſt the Peloponneſians. Meanwhile a new minion had riſen among the people named Cleon. This perſon was devoid of talents, or of any moral qualities, which entitled him to pre-eminence, a loud, turbulent, impudent demagogue; however, by abuſing his ſuperiors in rank, talents, and character, he fell in with the malignancy of the vulgar, who, conſcious of their own inability

ability to riſe, endeavoured to degrade others to their low level. The mob ſaw and deſpiſed the character of Cleon, but were gratified with his flatteries. To this fellow they gave the ſupreme command in preference to the prudent and virtuous Nicias. Ariſtophanes, with his ſtrength of ſatire, expoſed the ignorance and preſumption of Cleon. The populace was highly delighted with a ridicule, of which even they perceived the juſtneſs; but though they ſaw that he was a contemptible worthleſs fellow, they were eager to confer on him offices of the higheſt truſt and importance. So well qualified is the multitude for chooſing miniſters and generals. Unfortunately for his countrymen, Cleon was in one inſtance, by accident, ſucceſsful. This ſucceſs increaſed his authority, folly, and inſolence. The idol of a licentious multitude, he plundered his country with impunity, prevented the ſalutary meaſures of Nicias from taking place, was the cauſe of ſeveral defeats

to

to the army which he led: in the laſt of them, at Amphipolis, the flower of the Athenian youth was cut to pieces: the death of the demagogue himſelf was however an advantage, which not a little compenſated the loſs. In many countries, indeed in almoſt every country, a Pericles would have been eminent. Under few governments beſide a democracy would that eminence have been hurtful; but under no government, except that of the multitude, would men have ſtooped to exalt a Cleon. The populace truſted its deareſt, and moſt important intereſts to the management of a perſon, whom every man of common underſtanding and knowledge deſpiſed. Such is the infatuation of a governing rabble. Soon after the death of Cleon a temporary peace took place; a peace on the whole impolitical, becauſe it had been concluded before the cauſes of the war had ceaſed.

Striking features in democrats, we may fee from hiftory, have been the defire of conqueft, and oppreffive cruelty to the conquered. This is peculiarly remarkable in the Athenians, though the moft polifhed nation of Greece. Accuftomed to rule at home, they naturally wifhed to rule abroad. Eubœa, Samos, Lefbos, and the other Greek iflands near the coaft of Ionia, under pretences fimilar to the fraternization of modern democrats, they reduced to fubjection. They made exorbitant exactions, or in other words, put the effects of the fraternized communities into a ftate of requifition. When indignation, on account of their oppreffive injuftice, ftirred up thefe dependencies to revolt, they never failed to difplay that ferocious cruelty which has marked democracy even more than any other fyftem of defpotifm. Lefbos, tired of the yoke of democratic oppreffion, took the opportunity of the Peloponnefian war, to affert

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its independence. The Athenians ſent a fleet and army againſt the iſland, and to beſiege Mytilenè, its capital. They compelled it to ſurrender. The general, Paches, was diſpoſed to treat them with humanity, but was obliged to wait for the orders of the national aſſembly before he could come to a final determination. The democrats doomed all the Mytilenian men to death, women and children to perpetual ſervitude. Theſe robbers, when the iſlanders reſiſted their depredations, added to their robbery murder. Scionè was the the next victim of democratical injuſtice and cruelty. Comprehended within the fraternal embrace of conquering democracy, Scionè had become a dependency of Athens. As all ſtates depending upon democratical deſpots will do, when they have an opportunity, the Scioneans revolted, and vindicated their freedom. The Athenians conquered them; and as before at Mytilenè, enſlaved the women and children, and murdered the men. Theſe

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barbarities the Athenians pretended to palliate, although they could not juſtify, by the conſideration that the ſufferers had been once in a ſtate of ſubjection, and had attempted to throw off the yoke. Their next enterprize was againſt Melos, a ſtate that had never been dependent on them, that never had interfered in the war againſt them, that had kept as completely aloof from the quarrels of their neighbours, as had the Dutch from the conteſt between the French democracy and the German empire, before the French had attacked their right of navigating the Scheld, and Britain before the French army had attacked her ally, and the French convention had publicly offered patronage to thoſe of her ſubjects who ſhould become rebels to her king and conſtitution. Before they proceeded to hoſtilities, the Athenians ſent ambaſſadors to the Melians to ſurrender. This conference, of which Mr. Mitford gives us the principal heads, and Dr. Gillies abridges the

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ſubſtance from the detail of Thucydides, is one of the moſt curious and intereſting pieces of ancient political hiſtory. It may in fact, juſtly be ſtiled the moral creed of conquering democrats. The Athenian deputy aſſerts, in the moſt unqualified manner, the right of the ſtrong to command the weak. There is not a ſingle word ſaid tending to prove either juſt right in the Athenians, or aggreſſion in the Melians. The Athenian ſtates the power of his country, and the miſeries the Melians would ſuffer if they attempted reſiſtance. A private robber, on Hounſlow-heath, would probably compreſs in language the arguments of thoſe public robbers, without deviating from the ſpirit of democracy, by uſing the words "Your money or blood." The Melians, daring to reſiſt the Athenians, were reduced, and put all to the ſword. Such is the ambition, the injuſtice, and barbarity of democracy.

About this time began to flouriſh, a man whoſe motley hiſtory is an excellent illuſtration of the operations of popular ſway.

Alcibiades was endowed with almoſt all thoſe perfections which render a man great, and deficient in almoſt all thoſe qualities which render a man good. His underſtanding was vigorous, profound, and rapidly quick in its efforts. He perceived at a glance, the nature of an object, however complicated; the means for attaining it, the circumſtances that might interfere with the application of thoſe means, and the moſt efficacious way of ſurmounting obſtacles. In his youth, he had that knowledge both of particular facts, and of general principles which is uſually even in able men, the acquirement of mature age. Thus he at once poſſeſſed the fervor of genius, and the comprehenſive coolneſs of experienced wiſdom. When a boy, he had been unfortunate in his tutors, who flattered

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his vanity, and promoted his love of pleafure. Socrates attempted his intellectual and moral education. In the former he fucceeded, by giving him every juft thought which an extraordinary mind could contain. In the fecond he was unfuccefsful, as he could not form him to virtuous fentiments and habits. Alcibiades was intemperate, even to profligacy, the flave of vanity and of ambition, regarding his country and the world in general, merely as made for the gratification of his love of pleafure, of power, and above all of fplendor and admiration.

Alcibiades was eager to engage the Athenians in projects which might difplay the wonderful extent, and force of his abilities. As he was fhewy, as well as really able; as he had every grace of countenance and figure, as well as talent of the underftanding; as he was eloquent as well as wife; as he could adapt his manners and converfation to every

deſcription of people; as he could join the mob in their buffoonery, as well as Socrates in the theory of his ſoundeſt philoſophy, he was a very diſtinguiſhed favourite. It was therefore not difficult for him to prevail on the people to give him the opportunity he wiſhed of ſignalizing himſelf. The Athenians, in Pericles's time, had formed an idea of conquering Sicily, Italy, and Africa. Pericles prevented thoſe extravagant fancies from ripening into any fixed deſign; a regular plan for the ſubjugation of Sicily was reſerved for Alcibiades. He ſaw that the conqueſt of that Iſland, would be an exploit, which would at once gratify his vanity and his ambition. He ſaw that though difficult, it would not be impracticable to the Athenian power, headed by his abilities, and directed by his military ſkill. His comprehenſive mind eaſily perceived that plans of diſtant conqueſt, would even, though ſucccesſful, be very dangerous to ſo ſmall a ſtate as Athens; that they could

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not ſpare either men or money for ſuch an object, without exhauſting their means of defence againſt their Grecian neighbours, and that therefore the attempt would be impolitical, even if ſucceſs were certain. The evil to the country, however, would not prevent great glory and power from accruing to him, from the proſperous iſſue of the enterprize, compared to that its miſchief to the country, was to an Alcibiades of little conſequence. He promoted the ſcheme with all his influence, and eaſily prevailed on the multitude to decree an expedition into Sicily. The reſolution being fixed, the Athenians ſtrained every nerve, and exhauſted every reſource in making preparations. Occupied almoſt entirely with the view of foreign conqueſt, they made little proviſion for their defence at home. A great armament was equipped, and the command was given to Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus. The favour of Alcibiades with the giddy populace, excited

great envy among inferior demagogues. Theſe ſaw that any attempt to attack him whilſt he was preſent would be ineffectual. His oratory and accompliſhments would, with the people, overturn any charge againſt him even if juſt. They therefore waited for his abſence, and aſſiſted in hurrying the expedition. Alcibiades had been reputed to be the author of a profanation of the religion of the country, in disfiguring the ſtatues of Mercury, one of the tutelary divinities of Athens. It had alſo been reported, that he and the companions of his debauches, had, in the wantonneſs of intoxication and impiety, burleſqued the Eleuſinian myſteries, the moſt ſacred of Athenian rites. Alcibiades, if not conſcious of his innocence, at leaſt confident of his influence with the populace, demanded a trial. His enemies worked on the impatient ambition of the people to defer it till his return, in order not to retard the ſailing of the armament. The beſt of the Athenian troops were

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embarked, the principal part of their treaſure was expended. Thus however imprudent the undertaking might originally be, the hope of the country now reſted on its ſucceſs. When once engaged in it, the promotion of that ſucceſs became not only a deſirable, but a neceſſary object. The iſſue evidently depended on Alcibiades. On their arrival in Sicily, although they had difficulties to ſurmount, the genius and activity of Alcibiades rendered them triumphant. His addreſs conciliated ſome ſtates, his military talents conquered others. Syracuſe, and the whole iſland, was in a fair way of yielding to his arms, or to his policy.

Meanwhile the demagogues at Athens ſtirred the people againſt him. The ſame frivolity which believed him innocent without a trial, believed him guilty without a hearing. He was accuſed in his abſence of the abovementioned acts of irreligion, and charged

with aſpiring at the ſupreme power, underwent the form of a trial, and was, there being no one to ſpeak for him, of courſe condemned. Although no criminal code, except that of England, was ever more accurate than the Athenian, yet from the radical defect of a democracy, trials at the inſtance of the people were mere colourings for the violence of themſelves and their demagogues. Alcibiades like Cymon, like Ariſtides, Miltiades, and Themiſtocles was doomed to puniſhment unheard. The conduct of the governing populace exhibited a complication of folly and injuſtice ſeldom equalled in the annals of ſingle deſpotiſm. Firſt, as to their folly: they were ſeduced and duped by Alcibiades to engage in a moſt extravagant and hurtful project. Having once begun the execution of it, their conſequence, as a ſtate, depended on its ſucceſs, that ſucceſs was to depend on Alcibiades. They were duped and ſeduced by other demagogues to deprive themſelves of

the only means that could produce the end, which their previous folly rendered neceſſary. So wiſe, and ſo able politicians are the multitude. Secondly, as to their injuſtice: when there was a ſufficient ground of enquiry, when the means of proof, or diſproof, were at hand, they preſumed Alcibiades to be innocent. When the high appointment conferred on him, had publickly manifeſted ſatisfaction with his conduct, and when the means of proof, or diſproof of allegations, reſpecting his actions, were withdrawn, they declared him guilty. So capable are the people of exerciſing the diſcrimination and impartiality of judges.

Alcibiades hearing of his ſentence, left the army and ſailed to Sparta. He inſtigated the Lacedemonians to take advantage of the abſence of the Athenian army in Sicily, and to attack Attica. He alſo perſuaded them to ſend aſſiſtance to the Sicilian capital, which

was now beſieged by his countrymen. Deprived of the ſuperintending genius and wiſdom of Alcibiades, on the one hand, and oppoſed by the Spartan auxiliaries, in addition to the native troops of Syracuſe, the Athenians were repeatedly defeated, and at laſt entirely deſtroyed: ſuch were the effects of the caprice, and imbecility of a governing mob; firſt in following the counſel of Alcibiades, and then in depriving themſelves of his abilities.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Diſtreſs of the Athenians—Recall of Alcibiades—Revolution—Counter-revolution—Second diſgrace of Alcibiades—Conqueſt of Athens—Internal proceedings—Treatment of Socrates—Foreign affairs.

FROM the deſtruction of the Sicilian armament, together with the preſſure of the Peloponneſian war, renewed with double vigour, the Athenians were in the greateſt diſtreſs. A powerful confederacy was formed againſt them at the inſtigation of Alcibiades. Narrow uninformed minds never fail to be inſolent in ſucceſs: democrats of all ages and countries, have treated their dependents with the imperiouſneſs of illiberality, poſſeſſing power. The Athenians had treated the allies, whom they fraternized, with the greateſt inſolence, oppreſſion, and rapacity. The rulers in a democracy are more numerous,

rous, more extravagant, and more capricious than bafhaws and janiffaries. Befides, the turbulence and infolence of democracies provoke their neighbours to more frequent wars, than fingle defpotifm. The moft unjuftifiable means are ufed for raifing money. The Athenians, as we have faid, practifed great extortions. Their allies juftifiably took the opportunity of their misfortunes, to throw off an intolerable yoke. The Athenians were repeatedly vanquifhed, and their affairs reduced to the moft defperate fituation. They at length began to reflect on their folly, and to propofe terms of reconciliation to Alcibiades. The profligacy of that motley character had obliged him to leave Sparta. Having raifed the indignation of that virtuous people by his vices, he refolved to hurt their intereft by his abilities. The Perfian monarch, mindful of the difafters which he and his predeceffors had fuffered from the Athenians, had ordered his vice-

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roys in leſſer Aſia to aſſiſt the Peloponneſians. Alcibiades betook himſelf to Tiſſaphernes, and by the verſatility of his genius and manners he gained the favour of that governor. He perſuaded him that it was the intereſt of the king to keep the balance of power nearly equal between the Athenians and Spartans, rather than by cruſhing the one to raiſe the other, to be formidable to himſelf. He prevailed on him to withhold part of the money that was intended to pay the Peloponneſian fleet, and to prevent the Phœnician ſhips from joining it. By theſe means the Athenians were enabled to regain their naval ſuperiority.——Ariſtotle obſerves, that mutability is one ſtriking feature in democracy. That great man ſaw in the hiſtory of the Grecian democracies, and inferred from the principles of human nature, what every man now ſees in the awful monuments of recent facts. The Athenians conceived notions of changing their democracy,

to which they very juſtly imputed all their misfortunes. To this they were farther impelled by Alcibiades, who made the overturning of the democracy an indiſpenſable condition of again taking the management of their affairs, and intereſting Tiſſaphernes in their favour. The government was accordingly changed, and veſted in the hands of four hundred perſons. Theſe being men taken from the mob, behaved with that violence and inſolence which characterizes low people raiſed above their former equals. The Athenians had not attended in their change to the real cauſe of the inefficacy of democracy to produce ſecurity and happineſs; the want of controuling orders. The four hundred were as uncontrouled as had been the people at large in the democracy. They gained no more by the change, than did the French by their change from the club and mob government in the time of Petion, Briſſot, and Condorcet, to that of the junto of

of Danton, Marat and Roberſpierre. The Athenians ſoon tired of their four hundred, and re-eſtabliſhed democracy. Alcibiades, the Barrere of the time in verſatility, though infinitely ſuperior in talents, and ſomewhat leſs profligate in conduct, took the lead in the re-eſtabliſhed democracy. He defeated the Peloponneſians in various engagements, and had almoſt reſtored the Athenians to their former ſuperiority. Here again the inconſiſtency of a mob government ſtrikingly appears. The Athenian populace, becauſe Alcibiades had often been ſucceſsful, had, with a wiſdom worthy of ſuch perſonages, concluded him to be invincible. He was once unſucceſsful; this, without any evidence, they imputed to treachery. He was again condemned unheard, and betook himſelf to baniſhment.——His ſucceſſors in the command, being leſs able, were alſo defeated. They were tried with the utmoſt irregularity and unfairneſs, condemned, and executed.

The all-ruling people compelled their court to give the fatal verdict. Such is the juftice of democratic tribunals. The folly and violence of the Athenians at laft brought the natural confequence, the ruin of the ftate. Having deprived themfelves of their ableft generals, they were defeated in a decifive battle. Athens was taken, difmantled, and made a dependency of Sparta. Thirty perfons were eftablifhed by Lyfander the Spartan general, to govern Athens with unlimited power.

Thefe tyrants committed every act of wickednefs with impunity. Alcibiades made fome efforts to relieve his country; but was murdered, at the inftigation of Lyfander, before they could be effectual.

The ability and virtue of Thrafybulus expelled the tyrants. Humbled however, difmantled, and exhaufted, Athens, for fome time

time after the expulſion of the tyrants, took little concern in the affairs of Greece. The effects of the democracy were therefore to be ſeen ſolely in her domeſtic proceedings. Of theſe we have a moſt ſtriking inſtance in the treatment of Socrates. It was ſaid by a French revolutioniſt, either in the national convention, or in one of their clubs, "that "true republicans ought not to bear even "the ariſtocracy of virtue." New perhaps as this might be, as a declaration, it certainly was neither new, nor uncommon as a principle. The proceedings of every democracy illuſtrate the danger of ſuperiority of virtue, as well as of talents, or any other excellence. Socrates had, during a long life, exerted a mind of the firſt ability in teaching men, that piety and virtue were the ſoundeſt wiſdom, and led to the moſt certain happineſs. Too ſincere to flatter the populace, he continued in a low ſituation, whilſt ſycophantic demagogues and ſophiſtical haranguers

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were raiſed to wealth and power. He never concealed his contempt for the levity, and deteſtation of the injuſtice of the populace, and his conviction of their unfitneſs to govern a ſtate. At the ſame time he endeavoured to promote their intereſt and happineſs. Thoſe whom he ſaw likely to be exalted by the people, he tried to enrich with that knowledge, and fortify with that firmneſs and virtue, which would make them beneficial managers of public affairs. Thoſe whom he ſaw aſpiring at a ſhare in the adminiſtration without the requiſite talents and knowledge, he adviſed to deſiſt. He exhorted men to keep within their own ſphere, and mind that buſineſs for which they were by nature and by habit fit. He was himſelf a ſtriking example of the virtuous precepts which he taught. His wiſdom and virtue expoſed him to the envy of the people. All who courted the favour of the mob attacked Socrates. Ariſtophanes held him up to ridicule.

The ſophiſts declaimed againſt him, and the demagogues accuſed him. Ariſtophanes poſſeſſed, without doubt, a very great degree of genius and of comic humour, but the direction of his powers rendered his performances very hurtful to the people for whom he wrote. The manners and ſentiments of democrats are coarſe and indelicate. Special circumſtances may temper in particular caſes this groſſneſs; but rudeneſs and vulgarity have ever been characteriſtics of democratic manners. Comic writers, whoſe object is to pleaſe, will never fail to fall in with the manners and notions of the times. The comedies of Ariſtophanes exhibit as ſtriking a ſpecimen of democratic taſte and predilection, as is any where to be ſeen in ancient writings. Nothing pleaſes the vulgar in general more than the abuſe of their betters. Never was the licentiouſneſs of comedy carried to ſuch pernicious lengths as by Ariſtophanes. Every thing great and reſpectable

in talents and in conduct was by him made the ſubject of ridicule. The poetry of Euripides, ſo replete with fine ſentiments of morality, and juſt reflexions on the actions of men, which ſtirs up the beſt paſſions of the heart, which exhibiting every excellence of dramatic compoſition, renders genius the efficacious miniſter of virtue; the extraordinary wiſdom and goodneſs of Socrates, uniformly exerted in the theory and practice of morality, were the principal ſubjects of Ariſtophanes's farcical attacks. There was a buffoonery and an obſcenity in the plays which delighted the Athenian lawgivers, that would in this country be diſreliſhed by the frequenters of Bartholomew fair. Whilſt this groſs indecency pleaſed the taſte of the populace, the abuſe of great characters gratified their malignity. The comedies of Ariſtophanes proceeded upon a levelling principle. They burleſqued every character which was great, wiſe, or good, that by ſubtracting the

greatneſs, wiſdom, and goodneſs, there might remain equality to the mob. Ariſtophanes's comedies were the comedies of democracy.

Inflamed by the comedian, by the ſophiſts, and demagogues, the envy and hatred of the Athenians againſt Socrates roſe to a great pitch. At laſt he was tried under a pretended charge for impiety. His accuſers were two of thoſe ſophiſtical lecturers, who earn their bread by gratifying the prejudices of the people and incenſing them againſt dignified characters. Principles of the higheſt uſe for reſtraining the wickedneſs of the times, were repreſented by thoſe lecturers as dangerous innovations. He was tried by a court, compoſed of the moſt furious and ignorant of the populace, previouſly inflamed by the declamations of his accuſers. Perjured witneſſes were brought to make depoſitions of which every man of ſenſe muſt have ſeen the inconſiſtency and abſurdity; in ſhort the trial was equally im-

partial as if a ſet of modern democrats, piping hot from the lecture room were to ſit in judgment on Mr. Burke. Before ſuch a court even Socrates could not eſcape condemnation. He was ſentenced to death, and ſuffered with a wiſdom, a magnanimity and reſignation that bore the moſt convincing teſtimony to the virtue and innocence of his life. Such was the conſequence of extraordinary virtue in a democracy.

For a conſiderable time after the death of Socrates little remarkable happened in the domeſtic hiſtory of the Athenians. The ſophiſts and demagogues flattered the people, the comedians and tragedians amuſed them, and they themſelves went on in their uſual idleneſs and diſſipation, but ſomewhat limited in their extravagance, becauſe their folly had diminiſhed their former reſources. Meanwhile a combination was formed by the Thebans and other Grecian ſtates, abetted by the

king of Perſia, to humble Sparta. Conon, an able Athenian admiral, having defeated the Spartans by the aſſiſtance of the Perſian fleet, obtained ſuch favour with Artaxerxes that he got money from that monarch, to enable the Athenians to rebuild their fortifications and to reſume their naval power. Returning proſperity brought to thoſe frivolous democrats, the return with increaſed ardour of the vices which their diſtreſſes had partially checked. They were more luxurious and profligate than ever. The riſing greatneſs of Epaminondas and the increaſing power of their neighbours the Thebans, through that great man, alarmed the Athenians, and kept their vices in check. Neceſſity compelled them to be prudent. In their public conduct they followed the advice of their ableſt men Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheus, and joined the Spartans to preſerve the balance of power then verging to the Theban ſcale.

Following the directions of their great men inftead of acting from their own views and notions, they were fuccefsful in preventing Sparta from becoming fubject to Thebes. The death of Epaminondas, which reduced Thebes to nearly her former fituation, and the humiliation of Sparta from the victories of that great man, raifed Athens, if not to her real former greatnefs, at leaft to a confiderable degree of comparative importance. Sparta, her old enemy had fallen to rife no more. Thebes, the recent fource of her apprehenfion, had her glory and greatnefs buried in the grave of Epaminondas. Athens recovered many of her maritime poffeffions, and returned to her old fyftem of fraternization. Succefs as ufual in frivolous minds, again produced infolence. Profperity increafed luxury; they fank deeper and deeper into vices, from which they never after emerged.

CHAP. VII.

Internal ſtate—treatment of allies—ſocial war—Philip—Demoſthenes—final reduction of Athens.

THEIR judiciary trials, as the Engliſh reader may ſee in the tranſlation of Anacharſis, volume ſecond, became merely channels, through which popular caprice flowed. Every day afforded inſtances of unjuſt ſentences, and unmerited acquittals. Thoſe real patriots, who ſpoke plain and bold truths, were impriſoned, or put to death, whilſt their demagogues, who flattered their vices and folly, though really bribed by their enemies, were held in the higheſt honour. Even private cauſes, in which the populace at large might not be ſuppoſed to be ſo much intereſted, were decided according to the whim of the people, or the popularity of the advo-

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cate who undertook the caufe; not by the juftice of the caufe. Like children fpoilt with too great indulgence, the individuals who compofed the Athenian populace were eternally quarrelling, fo that private litigation, or public accufations, made a great part of the domeftic bufinefs of thofe democrats.

Republicans have in general tyrannized more over their inferiors, than the friends of monarchy. The Athenian citizens, much as they talked of equality, had great numbers of perfons in the ftate of abject flavery. As this however was not a fituation peculiar to democracies, we fhall not enter into a hiftory or difcuffion of it, we only mention it to account for one feature in their national character, idlenefs. Their flaves laboured for them, and they themfelves chiefly attended to their general affemblies, to private quarrels, and public contefts, as matters for ferious occupation, to theatres, balls, and mufi-

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cal meetings for amuſement. Minding politics for which they were not fit, inſtead of crafts for which they were; the lower orders became miſerably poor. Thoſe who might have been uſeful members of ſociety, as taylors, or ſhoemakers, were mere burdens to the community, as lounging politicians. They were fed at the public expence, or to modernize the expreſſion, their politics brought them on the pariſh. Such indeed muſt always be the caſe, when perſons of no talents and no property take to politics, which are to them idleneſs, becauſe their efforts can do no good; inſtead of employing themſelves at ſome trade, by which they might gain an honeſt livelihood.

To gratify their love of amuſement, a fund was eſtabliſhed for their gratuitous admiſſion to the theatres. Were we to figure to ourſelves an idea of a committee of ways and means, gravely eſtabliſhing a fund for feeding

all of the lower ranks who were too lazy to work, and for the conſtant purchaſe, for the ſame perſonages, of tickets to the boxes in the play-houſe, and pit in the opera, we ſhould form an idea of ſome of the wiſe domeſtic regulations of democratical lawgivers.

Debauchery of every ſpecies was the natural concomitant of vulgar idleneſs, unprincipled corruption of poverty reſulting from vice. The populace could be bribed to enter into any meaſure however hurtful to their country. To mean ſenſual minds what is a country compared to preſent gratification! Sunk in idleneſs, amuſement and vice, the Athenians wanted nothing to complete their deſtruction but a foreign enemy of ambition, enterprize, and policy. This they ſoon found in Philip of Macedon. If they had acted with a deliberate deſign of humbling themſelves, and aggrandizing Philip, they could not have employed more efficacious means. They

were more than ever the tools of demagogues, and demagogues of a ſtill more pernicious character than even thoſe who led them before. Whilſt the able and wiſe Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus, endeavoured to reſtrain them within the boundaries of moderation and juſtice, there aroſe Chares, a fit perſon for counteracting the ſalutary meaſures of thoſe leaders. This fellow adviſed the people to ſupply their wants, and procure a continuation of the means of vicious gratification by plundering their allies. It is no difficult matter to perſuade thoſe who have reduced themſelves to poverty by idleneſs, debauchery, and worthleſſneſs, to become robbers. The Athenian populace harraſſed and oppreſſed their dependent allies, until their rapacity provoked thoſe ſtates to revolt from their oppreſſors. Thence aroſe what is called the Social war. Having provoked war by their inſolence and wickedneſs, they by their folly deprived themſelves of the perſons

moſt qualified to bring it to a ſucceſsful iſſue. Chares was entruſted with the chief direction of the war. By his temerity and folly, Chabrias, one excellent general was killed. By his villainy, acting on the weakneſs and wickedneſs of the populace, Iphicrates and Timotheus, the only great generals remaining were driven to baniſhment. Deprived of the aſſiſtance of able generals, the imbecility and wickedneſs of this minion of the mob, diſplayed themſelves without controul. The ſocial war ended diſgracefully for Athens. Diſgrace however was not its only conſequence; they had exhauſted their ſtrength and deprived themſelves of thoſe, whoſe ingenuity and wiſdom might have repaired their loſſes. Philip ſeeing the temporary weakneſs of the Athenian ſtate from the ſocial war, and the permanent imbecility which muſt mark councils and meaſures where the mob governs, began to turn his attention to the ſubjugation of Athens, and the reſt of Greece.

 Sparta

Sparta had been humbled by Epaminondas beyond the power of ever raiſing her head. Thebes had poſſeſſed only a temporary greatneſs, which expired with that great man. Athens had deprived herſelf of the means of profiting by the depreſſion of her rivals; had however her councils been guided by able and good men, ſhe might have ſucceſsfully maintained her independence; ſhe might have formed and directed a combination of the other ſtates. It would be exceeding the plan of this eſſay to detail the proceedings of Philip, any farther than they tend to illuſtrate the character of the Athenian democrats. Thoſe Engliſh readers who wiſh to have a complete view of his actions, conduct and character, will find it in the fourth volume of Dr. Gillies's hiſtory, and in the parallel between him and Frederick the great, by the ſame philoſophical hiſtorian. Philip firſt extended his power in countries not immediately connected with Greece, and at the ſame

time increaſed the means of farther extenſion. Meanwhile a war broke out in Greece; firſt between the Thebans and Phocians, concerning lands annexed to the temple of Delphi; which afterwards involved the greater part of Greece, and among others the Athenians. Philip taking advantage of theſe diſſenſions, marched towards the interior of Greece. Knowing that the Athenians were the moſt immediately intereſted to oppoſe his progreſs, and the ableſt if they exerted themſelves to do it effectually, he directed a great part of his policy to the prevention of thoſe exertions. He was aware that in a democracy, the governors are the tools of the demagogues. By flattery, by careſſes, and by bribery, he effectually procured the favour of thoſe leaders of the populace. One patriot however he could never corrupt; Demoſthenes exerted the whole force of his energetic eloquence to rouſe the Athenians to a ſenſe of their danger, from the encroachments

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of Philip. It is a very plain maxim in politics, that when any one ſtate manifeſts a diſpoſition to conquer other ſtates, it becomes the intereſt of neighbouring nations to interfere, and to ſtop an inundation which would eventually overwhelm themſelves. Thoſe who would adviſe the continuance of peace, when a ſtronger neighbour is attacking a weaker, are either deplorably ignorant of ſound policy, or deficient in patriotic intention. Such a one was not Demoſthenes.

Demoſthenes had from his early youth employed firſt-rate talents in the acquiſition of eloquence. His great mind ſaw, that the real excellence of public ſpeaking conſiſted in clearly ſtating facts, and forcibly adducing and impreſſing arguments, which would prompt men to beneficial conduct. Inſtead of devoting his attention, like inferior orators, to the leſſons of the flowery rhetoricians then ſo much in vogue, he much more wiſely

exercifed his diligence in ftudying hiftory, philofophy, and politics. His favourite author was Thucydides; that hiftorian, of whofe many excellencies the chief are authenticity of narrative, profoundnefs of reflexion, juftnefs and extent of views. On Thucydides's language, which was fomewhat harfh and dry, but forcible and impreffive, Demofthenes formed his ftyle. Devoid of meretricious ornaments, his language is merely a vehicle of thought and feeling. Like the drefs of the ancient Germans, it is not flowing, but clofe, and exhibiting gigantic ftrength. Every link of Demofthenes's orations is ftrong fenfe and juft obfervation; the whole is a chain of moft perfect reafoning. So clofely grooved are the arguments that there is not a fingle vacuity, a fingle cranny left to be filled with mere found. Though his great mind difdains rhetorical flourifhes, yet does he employ figures. But his figures are not ornamental, they are compendious

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inventions for diffufing light. The moral excellence of his fpeeches is equal to the intellectual; he exhibits the jufteft views of moral and political conduct, the trueft ftatement of the real interefts of his countrymen, and propofes the moft forcible motives to impel them to purfue their own happinefs.

His fagacious mind inftantaneoufly penetrated into the projects of Philip. With a vigilant eye he marks every ftep of his progrefs. He endeavours to roufe the people from the lethargy of indolence and diffipation in which their corrupting government had funk them, and to animate them to a fenfe of their true interefts. At the fame time that he fhews them the danger of fupinenefs and floth, he does not overwhelm them with defpair. It was their own conduct, he often urges to them, not Philip's power, which rendered him formidable. When the caufe fhould ceafe in their inac-

tivity, the effect would ceafe alfo, and Philip be forced to confine himfelf within his ancient dominions. He not only prompts to energetic meafures, but draws the plan, which would render them fuccefsful. He enters into accurate and complete details of refources, and the moft effectual mode of their difpofition. He is a ftatefman of the moft extenfive and perfect information, of the moft mafterly policy and confummate wifdom, fpeaking plain truths on moft important public bufinefs. In a government properly mixed and well balanced Demofthenes's counfels would have produced the moft falutary effects; but in the Athenian democracy his wife, his great, his patriotic, his virtuous efforts were counteracted by the nature of the government. The populace were the arbiters of peace and war. With them indolence and prefent pleafure were more prevalent than diftant advantage. The creatures of Philip, whofe propofitions gratified their

inactivity and pleaſurable indulgence, were much more favourably liſtened to than the patriotic Demoſthenes, who ſtrove to rouſe them to action. Among a people ſo intelligent as the Athenians, it was impoſſible that the eloquence of Demoſthenes could be entirely ineffectual. He did occaſionally rouſe them from their lethargy, but never to ſo great exertions as he declared neceſſary, and as the circumſtances required, in ſufficient time for being effectually ſucceſsful. On gaining ſome partial advantages, they returned to their indolence and licentiouſneſs. Philip amuſed them by embaſſies, ſeduced them by their demagogues, and continued his encroachments. When they ſhould have been ſending powerful armaments, they ſent ambaſſadors. Theſe, Demoſthenes excepted, Philip corrupted. The intereſts of the Athenians were betrayed. In vain Demoſthenes demonſtrated the views of Philip, and treachery of the demagogues. He could not ſtimu-

ſtimulate them to vigorous and perſevering efforts, until Philip's power became too formidable for reſiſtance. A combination of the ſtates of Greece was at length formed againſt Philip, but too late to be ſucceſsful. The allies were totally defeated at Coronea. The Athenians became a dependency of Macedon, and afforded a ſtriking leſſon, how unfit the tools of demagogues are for being the governors of a country. Had the Athenians poſſeſſed a mixed government, had men ruled them who had abilities to diſcover the deſigns of Philip, vigour and power to have controuled his creatures, and to have combatted him in the beginning of his encroachments, they would have preſerved their independence.

In the whole of the Athenian hiſtory we ſee, that their misfortunes were chiefly owing to the nature of their government, their ſucceſſes to a temporary deviation from that govern-

government. When for a time they invested men of talents and virtue with the supreme power, they seldom failed of success. This however was only occasional; they generally acted nominally for themselves, and really through the influence of demagogues, who flattered their vanity, and gratified their vices. In this conduct the Athenians were not worse than other democrats. The Athenians did not corrupt the democracy, the democracy corrupted the Athenians. In point of intellect, they were equal to any people that ever existed; but their government gave a pernicious direction to their mental powers. No nation ever existed, and if we may conclude from experience, no nation ever will exist, in which the mass of the people will be fit for governing.

Every man who is not an ideot, may be an useful member of society. Whoever is an useful, is a respectable member; but one can

only be uſeful, by ſteadily and habitually purſuing objects within the ſphere of his powers and knowledge. The mechanic, the journeyman, the labourer, are uſeful, nay reſpectable members of every well-conſtituted ſociety; but it is as mechanic, journeyman, and labourer that they can poſſeſs that uſefulneſs, and conſequently reſpectability. When therefore the carpenter, the ſhoemaker, the labourer, inſtead of faſhioning timber, leather, or earth, to beneficial purpoſes, takes to faſhioning the ſtate, he does a double miſchief, by neglecting that which he can do, and trying that which he cannot. This idleneſs makes him poor, and conſequently internally a burden to the community, to which his political projects, from his incapacity of forming or executing good ones, would be both internally and externally ruinous. Within their own ſphere, the lower orders are a great ſupport of ſociety; going beyond it, they bring ruin on themſelves and others.

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So it fared with the Athenians; and ſimilar cauſes will always produce ſimilar effects. Whoever with care and intelligence ſtudies the hiſtory of the Athenians, will be from that alone convinced of the inefficacy of democracy, to the production of general happineſs.

CHAP. VIII.

Government of Sparta—Of Thebes.

TO confider at full length the fingular government and inftitutions of the Spartans, would be foreign to our purpofe. Sparta, though nominally a republic, was really a mixed government, confifting of three eftates; two kings, a fenate, and a popular affembly. The kings prefided in the fenate, propofed the fubjects of deliberation, commanded the two principal armies, if there were two on foot; they were hereditary. The fenate confifted of thirty, including the two kings. The members were not, as at Athens, annually elected, their office lafted for life. On a vacancy, one of the citizens that had been moft diftinguifhed for virtue and

and ſervices was choſen, after a ſtrict ſcrutiny.

There were annually choſen five perſons, called Ephori, who poſſeſſed a cenſorial juriſdiction, great in its extent, but limited by the ſhortneſs of its duration. The popular aſſembly was convoked only on great occaſions. The character of the Spartans, which Lycurgus had been at ſuch pains to form, rendered that aſſembly much leſs tumultuous than meetings of the people in general are. As patriotiſm was a moſt diſtinguiſhing feature in the Spartan character, it manifeſted itſelf in reſpect and veneration for the kings and other conſtituted authorities. The voice of the ſenators, of the Ephori, and of the kings, was liſtened to with profound deference by the people, who knew that thoſe perſonages could judge and act better for them, than they for themſelves. One of the leſſons moſt forcibly inculcated was an abhorrence

horrence of innovation, and a reſpect for the conſtitution and the laws. A deep reverence for religion, accompanied this regard for the conſtitution. The ſame virtuous education taught them obedience to their magiſtrates, to their kings, and to their divinity. The effect of the counterpoiſe of eſtates, and of their ſtrenuous regard for their conſtitution, was internally that for upwards of four hundred years, not a ſingle ſedition took place in Sparta—externally that, with a ſmall territory, and a ſmall number of inhabitants, they poſſeſſed, except for a ſhort time, the lead in Greece. Whilſt Athens, from the badneſs of her government, and the fluctuation of her meaſures, was repeatedly reduced to the greateſt diſtreſs, Sparta continued generally triumphant, and always reſpectable. The civil inſtitutions of the Athenians were, no doubt, in many caſes much better, becauſe more generally practicable than thoſe of the Spartans. The juriſprudence of Solon,

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with few exceptions, might be the basis of the code of laws in any free country. That of Lycurgus was adapted to the Spartans only, and required habits of life, which to a modern would appear extravagant and absurd. In point of genius, the Athenians surpassed the Spartans. Both physical and moral causes rendered them infinitely superior. What then was the principal reason, that the Spartans were more steadily and permanently prosperous and happy than the Athenians? the form of their government. Their limited monarchy restrained the bad affections and directed the good, whilst the democratical government of the Athenians misled the good, and gratified the bad.

THEBES.

Ancient writers have given us few particulars concerning the government of Thebes.

The Thebans we principally know in their intercourſe, either friendly or hoſtile, with the Spartans and Athenians, except in the age of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. Even then we ſee only the democratical government in general, without being made acquainted with the detail of its component parts. The conſtitution of Thebes we know to have been democratical, by being informed, that the introduction of ariſtocracy by Phœbidas, the Spartan, was a change from the government of the people.

From the humiliation of Athens by Sparta, Thebes became the ſecond power in Greece. She headed a confederacy for checking the Spartan power; but in the war which aroſe from thence, ſhe performed no eminent exploit. The Thebans were, when compared to the Athenians, men of dull intellect; that together with the form of their government, prevented them often from ſignalizing themſelves;

ſelves; they could fight bravely, but wanted genius to direct their efforts. During a ſhort period, that want was ſupplied by the abilities of Pelopidas, and by the ſtill greater abilities of Epaminondas. Theſe two conſummate ſtateſmen and generals afforded a ſtriking illuſtration of the poſition which we have repeatedly advanced, that the ſucceſſes in democracies have been owing to a temporary deviation from the conſtitution. Phœbidas, with his Spartan garriſon, had with eaſe ſuppreſſed the democracy of Thebes. The democrats, having no leaders (a fine conſtitution truly, where governors require leaders) were unable to cope with the diſciplined valour of a limited and regular government. Individual genius gave what the form of polity denied. Pelopidas and Epaminondas headed the Theban refugees; and giving the democrats, who remained in the city, the wiſe and vigorous guidance and direction which democrats want, reſtored their city to its freedom. Their

ſervices and great abilities induced the Thebans to inveſt them with the ſupreme command. Epaminondas diſcomfited, at Leuctra, the Spartan hoſt that had never known defeat, advanced to the city of Sparta which had never ſeen a hoſtile army, humbled that power ſo long paramount in Greece, exalted a ſtate before inſignificant to the firſt degree of dignity, and ſhewed democracies that they muſt owe their proſperity not to their aggregate efforts, but to the wiſdom and exertions of a ſingle perſon. It was not the Thebans that relieved the Cadmæa, that were victorious at Leuctra, that beſieged Sparta, that gave law to Greece, it was Pelopidas and Epaminondas. The envy of democratical governments appeared in the attempted treatment of their victorious benefactor. The demagogues inſtituted an accuſation againſt Epaminondas, for having kept the command of the army longer than the people had decreed. They were literally

right in point of law. By a democracy the people are paramount; every act of disobedience to their orders is therefore a violation of the constitution. Epaminondas, in continuing to command and in beating the Spartans at Leuctra, departed from the spirit of the government. Had he acted really as a democrat, he would have resigned his command, and suffered his countrymen to be beaten. He however acted otherwise, and saved, and aggrandized his country. The Thebans, less expert than the Athenians at dooming their great men to destruction, because having few great men to doom they wanted practice, acquitted their preserver. When Pelopidas was killed in Thessaly, and Epaminondas at Mantinea, the greatness of the Thebans fell. After that, left to themselves to act really as democrats, they entered into an impolitical war with the Phocians, instead of opposing Philip. Their impolicy, added to that of the Athenians,

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in haſtening his ſucceſſes; their demagogues were bribed by him to ſecond his views. They ſaw their error when too late, entered into a combination with the Athenians, were defeated, and reduced to dependence. Afterwards, with the raſhneſs of an ignorant multitude, they revolted againſt Alexander, without any means of making their reſiſtance effectual. Their city was beſieged, taken, and deſtroyed. So periſhed their democracy.

The pernicious effects of democracy might be illuſtrated from the hiſtory of Argos, Achaia, and other ſmaller ſtates of Greece; but we ſhall proceed to ſtill more noted monuments, and conſider the conſequences of its too great prevalence in the moſt renowned ſtate of antiquity.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Rome—Romulus—Numa, necessity of religious rites—Servius Tullius, makes suffrage depend on property—Expulsion of the kings—Aristocracy—Tribunes established—Democratical power prevalent—Principal defects of the constitution at Rome.

WHEN a horde of shepherds under Romulus first raised on the Palatine a village destined to become mistress of the world, the political system was simple, but well adapted to so small a state, and to so uncivilized a people. Their leader or chief, was the sole magistrate or officer, either civil or military. The members of the commonwealth were distinguished into different classes or ranks, under the names of Patrician and Plebeian, Patron and Client. The patron was to protect, to give

counſel, and whether preſent or abſent, was to his clients what the father is to his family. The clients in return, were to contribute to the ſupport of their patron, to aid him in placing his children in marriage; and in the caſe of his being taken by an enemy, were to pay his ranſom; or of his being condemned in a fine, were to diſcharge it for him. Strong common ſenſe ſuggeſted to minds unſophiſticated by falſe philoſophy, the neceſſity of ſubordination, and a gradation of ranks. Different degrees of power are properly diſtinguiſhed by diverſity of external appearance. Romulus was accompanied by lictors, carrying before him the axe and the rods. The Senators were regiſtered, the people were diſtinguiſhed into Curiæ, or wards, from the part of the city which they occupied; Tribes from their deſcent, and Centuries from their property. Romulus and his ſenators were deſirous of infuſing into the people a ſpirit of religion, without which,

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no ſociety can long ſtand. The military character however of the prince, and the interference of views and intereſts, with thoſe of the neighbouring hordes, produced a ſeries of contentions, which occupied the greater part of his time.

Had Romulus left a ſon, it is probable he might have ſucceeded to the ſovereign authority. There being no one to inherit the kingly power, it became elective. The ſenate propoſed a ſucceſſor, and the people ratified their choice. That, as we ſee from Livy, became the eſtabliſhed mode of electing kings.

Numa, the ſucceſſor of Romulus, a man of profound reflexion, and enlightened by all the learning which his age and country afforded, ſaw that it was neceſſary to inculcate religion more forcibly than his predeceſſor had done. He was aware that the ſpirit of

religion muſt ſoon evapórate from the minds of the people, unleſs kept alive by external rites and ſenſible objects. He endeavoured to impreſs on them a profound reverence for the deities. He inſtituted, or at leaſt eſtabliſhed at Rome that ſyſtem of religious obſervances, which in after ages operated ſo powerfully in forming the characters and guiding the actions of the Romans.

The following reign, though chiefly diſtinguiſhed for military exploit and territorial acquiſition, was not without political progreſs. Alba being conquered, its inhabitants were incorporated with the Romans. Their inſtitutions ſomewhat more refined than thoſe of their conquerors, improved the Roman polity. The reigns of Ancus and Tarquinius Priſcus, though both of conſiderable uſe, afford little of important political reflection. The reign of Servius Tullius, was an epoch in the hiſtory of Roman polity. That great lawgiver

lawgiver ſaw that the indiſcriminate admiſſion of all citizens to an equal ſhare in the public deliberations, and election of the officers of ſtate, was very unwiſe. He knew that men acted chiefly from their intereſts, that men of property are more intereſted in the preſervation of the ſtate in which their property is, than men of no property. He therefore judged it right, that thoſe ſhould have ſuperior weight in the enactment of laws, and election of magiſtrates. He divided the people into ſix claſſes, each claſs conſiſting of unequal numbers of centuries, according to the property of thoſe who compoſed it, each century having one vote. The firſt, or richeſt claſs contained ninety-eight centuries; the others collectively ninety-five, ſo that the firſt claſs alone, if its centuries were unanimous, might out vote all the others. The wiſe Servius Tullius was no friend to univerſal ſuffrage. The inſolence of the latter Tarquin, indiſpoſed the people towards kingly govern-

government. The outrageous villainy of his ſon, blew up the flame which the father's tyranny had kindled. It burſt with fury on the royal family, and ſwept away not the king only, but royalty in the conflagration. From that time hatred of kings was a national characteriſtic of the citizens of Rome. Thus the tyranny of Tarquin was productive of infinitely worſe conſequences than the mere acts of oppreſſion which his countrymen experienced. It excited a diſlike of that government, which only when properly modified, could have preſerved the balance of the conſtitution. After the expulſion of the kings, the government became ariſtocratical. The nobles had the excluſive poſſeſſion of office without any third party to hold the balance between themſelves and the people. The conſuls, the ſole executive magiſtrates, being annually choſen, were the creatures of the nobles, by whoſe influence and from whoſe body they were choſen. The conduct

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of the patricians during the beginning of the commonwealth, exhibited a ſtriking leſſon of the inconſiſtency of a government without controul, with general happineſs. The nobles, though much more moderate in the exerciſe of their power, than the multitude at Athens, (as gentlemen have always been milder, and leſs imperiouſly inſolent in power, than the commonalty) yet ruled with conſiderable ſeverity. The people enraged at their actual oppreſſions, and inflamed by turbulent demagogues, ſeceded in a body from Rome. They continued at the ſacred hill for ſome months; during their ſeceſſion, Rome ſuffered a double inconvenience from the want of the uſual labourers to cultivate the grounds, and from the want of the uſual ſoldiers to defend it from the attacks of its neighbours. The patricians involved in difficulties from the abſence of the plebeians, opened a negociation. The plebeians ſeeing the compulſory advances of

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the nobles, reſolved to take advantage of them by extorting conceſſions. They demanded a magiſtrate, whoſe office it ſhould be to protect the people, and to prevent any proceedings injurious to their intereſts. The tribunitian power was eſtabliſhed, " the foun-
" dation, as the wiſe Ferguſſon ſays, of ſome
" good and much harm to the common-
" wealth. The tribunes were authoriſed,
" at their firſt inſtitution, to forbid, or to
" reſtrain, any meaſures which they thought
" hazardous, or injurious to the rights of
" their conſtituents, but not to propoſe any
" law, nor to move any poſitive reſolution.
" They were not entitled to exerciſe their
" powers beyond the walls of the city, or
" to abſent themſelves from it for a whole
" day, except in their attendance on the
" Latin allies, where the preſence of all
" the Roman magiſtrates was required. A
" ſingle tribune might ſtop the proceed-
" ings of his own body, and of the people

“ themſelves, as well as the proceedings of “ the ſenate, and patrician magiſtrates.” To enable them to perform the duties of their office with ſecurity to themſelves, their perſons were by the law rendered inviolable. The heavieſt imprecations were denounced againſt the man who ſhould violate the ſacred perſon of the tribune, and the ſevereſt puniſhments were appointed. This office, intended as a ſhield to the people, became a ſword againſt the nobles. Its eſtabliſhment may be conſidered as one of the moſt important epochs in the political hiſtory of Rome. As before that time the government was an uncontrouled ariſtocracy, the democratical part, after the inſtitution of tribunes, became by far too powerful. The pernicious effects of that prevalence, it is true, did not immediately, nor uniformly manifeſt themſelves. It was a latent diſtemper in the conſtitution, which occaſional diſorders never failed to ſhew. We before remarked, that whatever the go-

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vernment be, in times of difficulty and danger, it appears to be the order of Nature, that the populace ſhould ſubmit to their ſuperiors in wiſdom and ability. As Themiſtocles, during the danger of the Perſian invaſion, was, notwithſtanding the democracy of Athens, a temporary prince, ſo during the invaſion of the neighbouring tribes, the Romans unanimouſly inveſted Cincinnatus with the ſupreme power, and during the inroads of the Gauls, Camillus. The dictatorial office was the temporary ſubſtitute of a monarchy, but defective in its nature and juriſdiction, becauſe without controul. The ſituation of the Romans, and their character ariſing in a great degree from that ſituation, produced almoſt perpetual wars. During theſe wars, when dangerous, the people, liſtening to the dictates of reaſon and the laws of ſelf-preſervation, were generally obedient to the grandees; but whenever there was a ceſſation of hoſtilities, or wars were

either unimportant, or profperous, the malign influence of democratic power was fenfibly felt. Diffenfions and contefts marked the internal proceedings of Rome. The demands of the people rofe with the conceffions of the nobility. Patrician haughtinefs occafionally oppofed plebeian infolence; the haughtinefs was a temporary ftorm, the infolence a trade wind. The patricians were naturally attached to the Comitia Centuriata, or fuffrage by property, the plebeians to the Comitia Tributa, or fuffrage by number. The tribunes often procured the latter to be the general mode of election. As they derived their authority and confequence from the populace, their chief object was to pleafe their conftituents, the plebeians. No means tend more powerfully to conciliate the affection of the mob to their demagogues, than abufive invectives againft men of rank and property. In thefe the tribunes were not wanting; every fpeech, on whatever fub-

ject, was replete with abuſe of the nobles. Some of that body frequently joined the people and the tribunes; but it is a remarkable fact in the hiſtory of Rome, that every nobleman, who, departing from his own rank and dignity, cajoled and courted the people, and ſided with their demagogues, did it for ſome ſiniſter purpoſe. We ſee indeed in the hiſtory of Rome, that whatever man, not only of great rank, but of high talents, ſought the prevalence of the popular party, and affected an extraordinary zeal for the intereſts of the people, meant to raiſe himſelf by the depreſſion of the grandees, and of the people alſo. An ambitious man of abilities, who wiſhes to exalt himſelf by ſubverting the conſtitution of his country, will rather court the populace, who cannot judge of his views, than noblemen and gentlemen who can. He makes thoſe his tools, whom he can moſt eaſily delude.

The lines of demarkation between the power of the ſenate, and the power of the people, were never exactly aſcertained; but on the whole the power of the people greatly exceeded that of the ſenate. The tribunitian negative could reverſe any proceedings of the ſenate; the decrees of the people, headed by the tribunes, were ſupreme. The influence of the patricians, through the individual weight of the ſeveral nobles, frequently produced ſuffrage by property. But when war and danger were removed to a diſtance, and thus the people turned their attention almoſt ſolely to internal affairs, believing themſelves to have leſs occaſion for the guidance and aſſiſtance of the patricians, they ſlighted them, and recurred to ſuffrage by number. A very natural and ſhort tranſition from univerſal ſuffrage is equalization of property. Scarcely had the tribunes eſtabliſhed the Comitia Tributa, than deſigning demagogues began to

meditate an equal division of landed property, known by the name of the Agrarian law. That is a scheme that never fails to please the lower orders, for the obvious reason, that the acquisition of property without industry, would be much more compendious and easy than with labour. Whilst the tribunes were forming a project of this kind, Spurius Cassius, the consul, regardless of his rank and dignity, and of the injustice that would accrue to proprietors, proposed a division of lands among the indigent citizens. Cassius, like every grandee who will descend from his station to court the mob, was in high favour with that order of men. The RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE were the constant theme of his harangues. These *rights*, as he describes them, were *wrongs* to men of rank and property. An accidental scarcity of corn, he imputed to the rapacity or mismanagement of the nobles, and proposed a gratuitous distribution of the produce of the land

land to the poorer citizens, as well as divifion of the lands themfelves. He harangued and inflamed the people againft their fuperiors. The obvious inference from fuch a conduct, was that he intended, by means of the poorer citizens, to fubvert the conftitution, and rife on the ruins of his country. Caffius being with reafon fufpected of fuch defigns, was tried, convicted, and put to death.

The tribunes afterwards, at different times, moved the Agrarian law, and brought the patricians to a compromife by complying with fome other demand, in order to fecure their landed property. Soon after this, the people, wifhing to have an eftablifhed code of laws, procured the formation of that fyftem, fo celebrated by the name of the Twelve Tables. The tables or plates on which the laws were written, were firft ten; two were foon after added. The twelve tables conftituted, as far as we can judge, a funda-

mental code of Roman law, as the great charter does, of Englifh. As no complete copy of them has reached modern times, we cannot perfectly afcertain their value. "From "the fragments (fays Ferguffon) remaining "in authors that cite them, this code appears, in fome claufes, to have been a firft "draught of the regulations which are neceffary "in the eftablifhment of property, and in "making private parties anfwerable to public judicatures in all their difputes. The "property of land was eftablifhed by a fair "prefcription of two years, and that of other "effects by a prefcription of one year. Any "controverfy concerning the boundaries of "landed property, was to be determined by "arbiters or jury-men appointed by the magiftrate. Parties cited to a court of juftice, "were not at liberty to decline attendance. "Judgement, in capital cafes, was competent only to the affembly of the people "in their centuries; but this fupreme tri-

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" bunal might delegate its power by ſpecial " commiſſion. In conſidering this code the " following particulars are worthy of notice:

" The diſtinction of patrician and plebeian " was ſo great, that perſons of theſe different " orders were not permitted to intermarry.

" The father being conſidered as abſolute " maſter of his child, had a right even to " kill, or expoſe him to ſale.

" The intereſt of money was limited to " one per cent; but bankruptcy was treated " as a crime, and without any diſtinction of " fraud or misfortune, expoſed the inſolvent " debtor to the mercy of his creditors, who " might put him to death, diſſect, or quarter " him, and diſtribute his members among " them."

Ten commiſſioners, under the name of Decemvirs, had been appointed to compile and digeſt laws into a regular ſyſtem. They were veſted with a temporary ſovereignty, and poſſeſſed unlimited power, over the lives, liberty, and property of the Romans. Wiſhing to continue their power longer than their conſtituents intended, or choſe, they became hateful and terrible to their countrymen. As in the caſe of Tarquin, a particular outrage gave active force to the indignation which general oppreſſion had excited. The intended raviſher of Virginia, brought deſtruction on himſelf and his partners in uſurpation. Twice did the vindication of female honour overturn tyranny in Rome. The government returned to its former ſtate.

The plebeians now rapidly extended their authority. The aſſembly of the tribes was admitted to a legiſlative power, independent of the ſenate and of the aſſembly of the centuries.

turies. In the aſſembly of the tribes, there was univerſal ſuffrage; in that of the centuries, votes depended upon property. In fact at Rome, inſtead of three eſtates, of all which the concurrence ſhould be neceſſary to the enactment of laws, in which there ſhould be reciprocal check, and mutual ſupport, in which no one eſtate ſhould be independent of the other; there were two legiſlative aſſemblies totally uncontrouled by each other; the aſſembly of property, and the aſſembly of number. The decrees of the ſenate alſo, though they did not amount to laws, had a temporary authority. In the Roman conſtitution, there were two principal cauſes of confuſion and diſorder. The firſt was, that there were two legiſlative aſſemblies and a council of nobles, whoſe relative powers were neither balanced as to operation, nor aſcertained as to extent. The ſecond was, that the plebeians poſſeſſed too much power, an evil greatly increaſed by the privileges and

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prerogatives vefted in their peculiar magiftrates. The fecond defect was in a great degree the confequence of the firft. Where there is no controul of eftates, one neceffarily becomes prepollent. The fenate naturally favoured the affembly of centuries, the tribunes the affembly of tribes. Were we to form an idea of two diftinct legiflative bodies in Britain; the one compofed of the nobility and gentlemen of property; the other of the whole multitude, in which the inhabitants of Dyot Street fhould have an equal weight with their neighbours of Bedford Square; we fhould figure to ourfelves fomething like the comitia centuriata and comitia tributa at Rome. The nobles would no doubt prefer the preponderancy of the firft, the demagogues of the fecond.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Admiſſion of Plebeians to the conſular office—Prevalence of democracy—Effects of popular choice of the higheſt magiſtrates—Flaminius, the popular favorite, the cauſe of a dreadful diſaſter to his country—Wiſe conduct of Fabius, and folly of Minutius—The former degraded, the latter exalted by the people—Conſequences—Popular favourite, Terentius Varro, made conſul—His raſhneſs and folly cauſes the greateſt defeat the Romans ever ſuffered—Rome ſaved by the ariſtocracy.

HITHERTO the conſulate had been confined to patrician families. The tribunes moved a law to declare the eligibility of the plebeians to that office. About the ſame time Canuleius, one of the tribunes, moved an act to repeal the clauſe of the twelve tables, which prohibited the marriage of patricians and plebeians. The patricians, after amuſing the people with repeated delays, attempted to elude the more important object of popular demand, by agreeing to the leſs material. The motion of Canuleius was paſſed into a law. This did

did not ſatisfy the people. The patricians farther to elude their claims, reſted their oppoſition on the ground of religion. Many duties belonging to the prieſthood were to be performed by the conſul, and could not, it was ſaid, without profanation be committed to a plebeian. " Superſtition (ſays the philoſophical Ferguſſon) " for the moſt part, " being founded on cuſtom alone, no change " can be made in the cuſtom, without ap- " pearing to deſtroy the religion that is " founded upon it. This difficulty accord- " ingly put a ſtop, for a while, to the haſty " pace with which the plebeians advanced to " the conſulate: but this obſtruction was at " length removed; as many difficulties are " removed in human affairs, by a ſlight " evaſion, and by the mere change of a " name. The title of conſul, being changed " for that of military tribune, and no ſacer- " dotal function being included in the duties " of this office, plebeians, though not quali- " fied to be conſuls, were allowed to offer

" them-

"themſelves as candidates, and to be elected
"military tribunes with conſular power. In
"this manner the ſuppoſed profanation was
"avoided; and plebeians were allowed to be
"qualified for the higheſt office of the ſtate.
"The mere privilege, however, did not for
"a conſiderable time, enable any individual
"of that order, to attain to the honour of
"firſt magiſtrate of the commonwealth. The
"plebeians in a body had prevailed againſt
"the law which excluded them; but as ſe-
"parate candidates for office, ſtill yielded the
"preference to the patrician competitor; or,
"if a plebeian were likely to prevail at any
"particular election of military tribunes, the
"patricians had credit enough to have the
"nomination of conſuls revived in that in-
"ſtance, in order to diſappoint their anta-
"goniſts." The conſuls had hitherto pre-
ſided at the cenſus, or muſter and aſſeſſment
of the people. After the appointment of
military tribunes, that part of the conſular
office

office was intrufted to two officers eftablifhed for the purpofe, under the name of Cenfors. The power of thefe magiftrates lafted for five years. They afcertained at the beginning of their magiftracy the number of the Romans, and their property. They infpected the conduct and inveftigated the character of whatfoever citizens they judged proper; promoted and degraded according to the refult of the examination. The patricians ftipulated in granting the plebeians military tribunes, that the new created office of cenfor fhould be always held by one of their order. Some time afterwards it was refolved that none but thofe who had been confuls fhould be created cenfors. Great and unlimited as was the power annexed to this office; yet was there none of the conftituted authorities of which the exercife was more generally fatisfactory. "The "office (fays Ferguffon) of conful, in his "capacity of military leader, was naturally "the office of youth, or of vigorous man-

" hood; but that of cenſor, when disjoined " from it, fell as naturally into the hands of " perſons of great authority and experienced " age; to whom, in the ſatiety of brighter " honours, the people might ſafely entruſt " the eſtimate of their fortunes, and the " aſſignment of their rank. In ſuch hands " it continued, for a conſiderable period, to " be very faithfully diſcharged; and by con- " necting the dignities of citizen, and the " honours of the ſtate, with private as well " as public virtue, had the happieſt effects " on the manners of the people." The preſ- ſure of external affairs, particularly the wars with the Etrurian cantons, diverted the at- tention of the people in a great degree from internal politics. The invaſion of the Gauls, for ſome time produced perfect unanimity; but no ſooner were they freed from the terror of that deſtroying horde, than they returned to their diſſenſions and encroachments on the nobles. Vain is the idea that conceſſion will

ſatisfy a turbulent populace. Grants only ſerve to excite more imperious demands, becauſe they imply an acknowledgement of power. Demagogues are never wanting to repreſent hurtful innovation, as a reform of abuſe. The people are eaſily perſuaded of the truth of what coincides with their inclinations. The conſular dignity was re-eſtabliſhed; the plebeians again inſiſted that one might be eligible out of their body. To pave the way for this change, they procured the increaſe of the number of thoſe who ſhould miniſter at the ceremonies, and rites of religion; and that one half of thoſe miniſters ſhould be of plebeian extraction. Thus they removed the argument adduced by the patricians from religion, to impede their admiſſibility to the conſular power. As the buſineſs of the commonwealth became more extenſive and complicated, Prætorſhips and other magiſtracies branched out from the conſular office. Theſe alſo became, in the progreſs

grefs of plebeian incroachment, open to the commons. At the time that the Roman arms had fubjugated all Italy, except the northern part, which was occupied by the Gauls, the conftitution had become chiefly democratical. The popular affembly poffeffed the fupreme legiflative power. Delegates chofen by them were the judges in criminal trials. From the fentences of thofe judges, an appeal lay to the people at large.

The people conferred all the offices of ftate; fo that either immediately, or through the medium of their delegates, they poffeffed the whole of the legiflative, judicative, and executive power. The decrees of the fenate were of no force unlefs fanctioned, either directly or indirectly, by the people. A plebeian tribune could negative any refolution of the fenate, however falutary.

Various caufes contributed to temper the democratical nature of the conftitution. The

ſenate poſſeſſed the adminiſtration of the public money, and by that means had a powerful ſource of influence, increaſing with the growing proſperity of the ſtate. They had a number of commiſſions to give for the collection of the various taxes. They had the diſburſement of money for public works, and all the variety of public objects of expenditure. In theſe tranſactions, many individuals of the plebeians were engaged, either as contractors or creditors. Theſe had individually an intereſt in being on good terms with the ſenate. Their influence naturally engaged their connections, either from attachment, or from expectation in the ſame intereſt. Beſides, the plebeians in common with the other Romans, had a great ſenſe of religion, and a conſequent attachment to thoſe who were joined with them by the ſtrong tie of a community of religious rites. It has been generally found, from the experience of hiſtory, that thoſe who are im-

preſſed

preſſed with a deep ſenſe of their duty to the divinity, alſo entertain a reverential regard for the ſuperior orders among men. This was ſtrikingly manifeſt in the hiſtory of the Romans. The plebeians habitually, and when left to themſelves, entertained a great veneration for the noble families, the members of which, had at various periods rendered their country eminent ſervices. They were nationally of the moſt diſtinguiſhed patriotiſm, and on that account diſpoſed to reſpect thoſe whom they judged to be moſt qualified for doing good to the republic. Leſs quick and verſatile in their genius, but poſſeſſing, at leaſt exerting, more ſolid good ſenſe than the Athenians, they ſaw that the nobles were fitter for directing them, than they were themſelves. Thus religion, patriotiſm, and intereſt, guided by ſound reflection, prompted them to an habitual acquieſcence in the decrees of the ſenate. Although the conſtitution from tribunitian

efforts was become greatly democratical, yet the government long continued in its general courſe, tempered with ariſtocracy. The conſtitutions of Rome and of her rival Carthage, were nearly ſimilar, but the actual adminiſtration was very different. The Roman plebeians, whatever might be their own conſtitutional power, generally reſpected (eſpecially in times of war and danger) the authority of the ſenate. The Carthaginian plebeians diſregarded the authority of their ſenators, and acted from the impulſe of their own caprice. To this difference in the reſpect they paid to their nobles, more than to any other diverſity of national character, the wiſe Polybius imputes the ultimate prevalence of the Romans in that arduous conteſt. Whoever carefully ſtudies the Roman hiſtory, will ſee that reſpect for the ariſtocracy, being a general conſtituent in their national character, was one of the principal ſources of their general ſucceſs; that a temporary deviation from

from that principle was productive of temporary misfortunes. He will see that in the later periods of the republic, its total abandonment enabled ambitious men to enslave their country.

The difficulties and dangers of the first and second Punic war, engrossed the attention of the Roman people so much as to leave little room for Tribunitian intrigues. We shall enter no farther into the detail of those celebrated contests, than as they serve to illustrate the effects of popular power. The superiority of the Roman national character, the hardiness and courage of all ranks, the general submission of the plebeians to the guidance of their superiors in rank and wisdom, rendered the Romans after many vicissitudes, finally successful in the first Punic war. It was the difference in point of actual subordination and reverence for the nobility, in the lower ranks, much more than differ-

ence of capacity in the leaders, that decided the conteſt in favour of Rome. In the firſt Punic war, no Roman general, either in abilities or military ſkill, exceeded the renowned Hamilcar. In the ſecond, no Roman general equalled in genius, military and political talents, and one only nearly equalled his much more renowned ſon, Hannibal. The ſucceſs of the Romans againſt the Carthaginians, and after the firſt termination of that war, their conqueſt of the Italian Gauls elevated the ſpirit of the plebeians. They became leſs docile to the admonitions of the ſenators, and more ſelf-willed in their choice of the magiſtrates. We had occaſion to remark, in our ſtrictures upon the Athenians, that proſperity always ſhewed the bad tendency of a democracy much more than adverſity, or even danger; becauſe in adverſity, or in danger, the democracy ceaſes, and the lower orders, for ſelf-preſervation, ſeek the protection of the greateſt men.

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The extraordinary intellect, ſkill and vigour of Hannibal would, with equally good troops, equally well ſupplied, have been a match in the field of battle for any general that ever exiſted. Favourable circumſtances however afforded him advantages, which even his abilities could not have created. The people, elated by proſperity, had begun again to diſregard the advice and authority of the ſenate, in the exerciſe of that power, which was unfortunately lodged with them by the conſtitution. At the very firſt election after the arrival of Hannibal in Italy, they choſe as one of the conſuls Caius Flaminius, a man of obſcure extraction, raſh and head-ſtrong temper. By the turbulence of his character, his invectives againſt the ſenate, and his praiſes of the plebeians, he had become a diſtinguiſhed favourite among the lower orders. The ſenate, aware of the unfitneſs of ſuch a perſon to oppoſe a general, the fatal effects of whoſe abilities they had themſelves ex-

perienced in defeat, and their allies in deſtruction, uſed every effort to prevent the election of Flaminius. Their endeavours were fruitleſs. The people had the ſupreme power. They choſe to exert it; and the event ſhewed the unfitneſs of plebeians for appointing the men who are to act in difficult circumſtances. Naturally raſh and violent, Flaminius, from his triumph over the ſenate, became more preſumptuous. Fooliſhly confident of his own abilities, he longed for an opportunity of ſignalizing himſelf by overthrowing Hannibal. The penetrating mind of the Carthaginian inſtantly dived into the characters of thoſe who were ſent to oppoſe him. He endeavoured to irritate the conſul's temerity by laying waſte the country, and by apparently expoſing himſelf to his attacks. Flaminius was drawn into a defile, and periſhed with the greateſt part of his army. Such was the conſequence of the ſupreme elective power being veſted in

the people. Taught by recent calamity the people, after the defeat at Trafimenus, behaved themfelves to the fenate, with the refpect and fubmiffion which it is the duty and intereft of the lower ranks to pay to their fuperiors. Reduced to diftrefs by acting for themfelves, in a cafe beyond their capacity, they faw that their only means of extrication were through abler and wifer men. By the advice of the fenate, they invefted Fabius with dictatorial power. That wife general faw the impolicy of meeting fo confummate a commander at the head of a veteran army, encouraged by great and repeated victories in the field; he therefore formed a different plan of operations. This plan was to ftraiten Hannibal's quarters, to cut off his provifions, and by fo doing make his victorious army moulder away, without fighting, and thus gradually be confumed by want. As Hannibal excelled in cavalry, Fabius incamped on the higheft grounds, where the African horfe could

could give him no annoyance. The Carthaginian ſoon penetrated into the plan of Fabius; and perceiving his determination not to fight, repeatedly ſhifted his quarters, in hopes of drawing the Roman into a ſituation, in which a battle would be unavoidable. The cautious prudence of Fabius baffled the verſatile ingenuity of Hannibal. During the whole campaign he abſtained from fighting. The wary conduct of the dictator gave great offence, both to his own ſoldiers and the plebeians at home. Weak and ignorant people are ever ready to cenſure meaſures, which exceed the narrow limits of their information and capacity. The plebeians imputed to timidity, a conduct, which reſulted from wiſdom. Fabius being called to Rome, to the performance of civil duties of his office, left the command of the army with Minutius, general of the horſe, charging him not to fight in his abſence. Diſregarding the charge of his commander, he ſurprized a party

of Carthaginian foragers, and gained an advantage before Hannibal could bring the main body of his army to ſupport the detachment. The news of this ſucceſsful ſkirmiſh of Minutius, appeared to the people a certain proof of the miſmanagement of Fabius. The tribune Metellus enflamed their invectives againſt Fabius, and exalted the proweſs and conduct of Minutius. Fabius, with the firm magnanimity of conſcious ability, diſregarded the cavils of ignorance and of malice: he declared he would puniſh the lieutenant-general for diſobedience of orders. The tribunitian demagogues perſuaded the giddy populace to make the power of Minutius equal to that of Fabius. The event ſoon ſhewed the judgment of the populace in this particular inſtance: the whole of the proceeding illuſtrated their penetration into characters and conduct, and their conſequent capability of chuſing the fitteſt men for important offices. Minutius, elated with his

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new dignity, ſeparated his army from that of Fabius, and gave to Hannibal that opportunity which he had ſo long deſired. He deſcended into the plain, and was drawn into a ſnare by the Carthaginian. He was ſoon nearly ſurrounded, and on the point of ſuffering a ſignal defeat; when Fabius, who, foreſeeing the temerity of his colleague and its conſequences, had kept his troops in readineſs, marched to his aſſiſtance. With an activity and valour equal to his former caution, he repulſed the victorious Carthaginians, and covered the retreat of Minutius's army. Thus did the wiſdom and vigour of the man whom the people cenſured and degraded, preſerve from deſtruction the temerity and folly of the man whom they applauded and exalted. Minutius himſelf, taught his inferiority by experience, bore the juſt teſtimony to the merits of Fabius, by reſigning that equality of power, which the frivolity of the people had conferred on himſelf. On

the expiration of Fabius's command, the people chofe confuls who adopted his mode of proceeding. Thefe, during the continuance of their office, by caution prevented the farther progrefs of Hannibal. The populace foon forget even the warnings of experience. They refumed their complaints of dilatory operations. Demagogues, as ufual, ftimulated and increafed their diffatisfaction. Among thefe the moft forward was Terentius Varro. That perfon was of obfcure birth, and in other refpects of a character nearly fimilar to that of Flaminius. He declaimed in the meetings of the people, and boafted, that if he were at the head of the army, he would immediately free Italy from its invaders. Vain and confident boafting eafily paffes on the populace: they take a man's own word for his talents, efpecially if he interlard his egotifm with praifes of them, and profeffions of refpect for their opinions. The people exalted Terentius Varro to the poft

for which he declared himſelf fit, and made him their conſul. His patrician colleague was Æmilius Paulus, a man of great wiſdom and experience in war. Fabius, and other wiſe ſenators, entreated this great man to withſtand the head-ſtrong meaſures which they knew the raſhneſs and ignorance of the plebeian favourite would purſue. Æmilius adhered to their plan, and endeavoured to avoid an engagement. The precipitate folly of the plebeian conſul rendered the prudence of the patrician ineffectual. Theſe leaders commanded alternately. On Varro's day, he drew out his men againſt Hannibal in the plains of Cannæ. A bloody battle enſued, which ended in the death of Æmilius, and in the greateſt defeat recorded in Roman hiſtory. Fifty thouſand Romans periſhed on the ſpot, and among them the flower of their knights and nobility. Such were the direful effects of thoſe ranks poſſeſſing the power of chuſing to offices of the

the higheſt truſt, who are totally unfit to judge of the qualifications of candidates. The moſt direful diſaſters in the moſt diſaſtrous of all their wars aroſe from the ſupreme power of the people.

The dreadful defeat at Cannæ was followed by almoſt a general defection of the Italian ſtates. In their calamitous ſituation, which the poſſeſſion of power, without knowledge and wiſdom to exerciſe it properly, had cauſed, the people ſought relief from the counſels of the ſenate. In Fabius, the principal favourite of that body, they now placed their chief hope. On that illuſtrious patrician they relied for extrication from that dreadful ſtate into which their own favourite had plunged them. Common ſenſe and ſelf-preſervation teach and prompt plebeians in diſtreſs to be guided by a council of great men, and to rally round the ſtandard of a leader. In no ſituation did the vigour of the

the Roman character appear more conſpicuous, than under misfortune. After defeat, even after the defeat at Cannæ, they never once deigned to propoſe peace. They were aware, that ſolicitations of peace convey to an enemy an acknowledgement of weakneſs, and ſerve only to encourage him to perſevere in the conteſt, or to inſiſt on terms which would be diſgraceful to the applying nation. Their maxim was, never to mention peace but when deciſive victory enabled them to impoſe the conditions.

"Parcere ſubjectis et debellare ſuperbos."

"To ſpare the ſuppliant, and reduce the proud."

was the general principle which regulated their conduct. As national honour is cloſely connected with national intereſt, this rule was no leſs political than magnanimous, and was one great cauſe of the ſuperiority they obtained over other nations. Inſtead of waſting their time in idle unavailing propoſitions for

for peace, they unanimoufly exerted themfelves in zealous and energetic efforts for continuing the war. They fpared no labour, no contribution, which might tend to render it finally fuccefsful. The caution of Fabius, the enterprizing vigour of Marcellus, the able efforts of other leaders, the courage, patriotifm, and perfeverance of the people, their refpect for the opinion of the fenate, in the choice of the higher officers, and in the direction of their own conduct, gradually retrieved their affairs. Even the genius and military talents of Hannibal, after this gained no fignal advantage, over a nation of which the grandees were ftatefmen and generals, the people patriots and warriors, and guided by the advice of their fenate. Any one who carefully perufes the hiftory of the war of Hannibal, will fee, that whilft the Roman democracy acted for itfelf, that great general was victorious; but that his fuccefs ceafed, when democratic power yielded to ariftocra-

tic authority. Not the malignity of an opposing faction at home, by withholding supplies, firſt and chiefly checked his progreſs, but the temporary ceſſation of democratic proceedings among his enemies. When the cauſes I have mentioned had enabled Rome to recover from her loſſes, a genius aroſe ſuperior to any Roman who had been engaged in the war, and little inferior to Hannibal. By the force of his abilities, ſupported by the unanimity which now prevailed at Rome, the celebrated Scipio, at an early age, drove the Carthaginians from Spain, a great part of which they had poſſeſſed, and gave his country a manifeſt ſuperiority. Returning triumphant to Rome, he was choſen conſul, and appointed to command an army deſtined to make Africa the ſeat of war. The object of this invaſion was, to compel Hannibal to evacuate Italy, and return to defend his country. With eaſe he repeatedly defeated the armies

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haſtily raiſed by Carthage and her allies. No reſource was now left to the Carthaginians, but the recall of Hannibal. That great man's affairs had been on the decline ſince the deſtruction of his brother's army at Metaurus, in marching to join him in Italy. For ſome years he had acted on the defenſive; ſupplied with neither men nor money by his country, he could not prevent his army from inſenſibly mouldering away. Forced by the command of Carthage to return home, he reluctantly left Italy with the remains of his once triumphant army; arrived in Africa, was obliged to recruit his forces, with an undiſciplined militia. With ſuch troops, and only a few veterans, he was neceſſitated to combat the diſciplined victorious army of Scipio. What man could do, Hannibal did. At Zama he arranged his troops in ſo maſterly a diſpoſition as no man ever ſurpaſſed, not even he himſelf at Trebia, at Traſimenus, or at Cannæ. Ineffi-

cacious is arrangement without materials. Hannibal was completely defeated. At Rome ſuch a defeat, by impelling the people to be guided by the ſenate, would have been the cauſe of future victory. At Carthage, wherein the populace habitually diſregarded the ſenate, where the government was uniformly democratical in fact, as well as by law, ſuch a defeat was irretrievable. The Carthaginians were compelled to ſue for peace, and to receive it on ſuch terms as the victorious Romans choſe to offer. So cloſed this famous war.

CHAP. XI.

Foreign conquests—Internal affairs—Tiberius Gracchus—Agrarian law—Caius—Universal suffrage intimately connected with distributions of private property.

AFTER the termination of the second Punic war, the Romans engaged in a contest with Philip, king of Macedon; and after conquering him, with Antiochus, king of Syria, in which they were equally successful. At home they were chiefly employed in repairing the losses and devastation which Italy had undergone from being so long the seat of war, and in reducing to submission those Gauls who had joined Hannibal. The people still continued, with a few temporary deviations, to pay a proper deference to the opinion and authority of their superiors. A measure, however, which took

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place about twenty years after the Carthaginian war, was of a contrary defcription, and tends ftrongly to mark the danger in a democracy of poffeffing extraordinary talents and virtues, and that character and influence, which refults from the performance by fuch, of fignal fervices. The plebeians became jealous of the weight which Scipio had acquired, by having freed his country from the moft formidable foe, with whom it had ever contended. Inflamed by their demagogues, they excited a clamour, that he, together with his brother, under whom he had acted as lieutenant-general in the war againft Antiochus, had fecreted part of the treafure received from that prince. They commenced a profecution againft him without any evidence to fubftantiate their charge. Confcious of his innocence, but difdaining to juftify himfelf to an ungrateful rabble, he retired into voluntary exile. Such in a democracy was the return made to the faviour

of his country. Rome continued increaſing in empire. The next great war was with Macedonia. The people, though frequently contentious in the management of internal affairs, in the direction of external, ſuffered themſelves to be guided by the advice of the ſenate. In wars of importance and difficulty, they gave the command to men of high character and authority in the ſenate, not, as in the beginning of the Punic war, to their own favourites and demagogues. The war againſt Macedonia was entruſted to Æmilius Paulus, the ſon of him who had fallen at Cannæ, owing to the folly of the popular favourite. The magnanimous Æmilius did not riſe to the conſular dignity by flattering the populace. He was really an ariſtocrat; and though able and willing to promote the advantage of the people, yet regarded their opinions but little on matters of policy and of war, becauſe he knew they had neither information nor ability to think

or reaſon juſtly on ſuch ſubjects. Knowing the petulant freedom with which the lower orders preſume to cenſure the meaſures and actions of men entruſted with the higheſt offices of the ſtate, he expreſſed, in a ſpeech to the people, his real eſtimation of cenſures paſſed by thoſe who had neither information nor capacity. "Let ſuch, he ſaid, as think "themſelves qualified to adviſe the general, "now accompany me into Macedonia. "They ſhall have a paſſage on board my "ſhip; and in the field, be welcome to a "place in my tent, and at my table; but "if they now decline this offer, let them "not afterwards pretend to judge of what "they neither ſee nor underſtand." Æmilius expreſſed that opinion of the ſentiments of the populace, which every great man muſt really entertain. No man of real abilities, if he make uſe of reflexion, will ever lay much ſtreſs on the praiſe or diſpraiſe of thoſe who approve or condemn, without knowing

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and underſtanding the grounds of approbation and cenſure. It is true many men of very great talents, pretend a profound reſpect for the opinion of the vulgar, on political affairs. A man of firſt rate parts may have conſulted a cobler; but ſtill is as much convinced as Æmilius Paulus, that the cobler ought not to go beyond his laſt. Thoſe of the populace, who are gratified and flattered by the courtſhip and attention of great men, may be aſſured that the great men who cajole them, conſider them not as aſſociates, but as tools.

The Macedonians defended themſelves againſt the Roman arms, with a vigour not unworthy of thoſe anceſtors who had humbled Greece, and conquered Perſia, under Philip and Alexander. At length, however, the firmneſs of the Macedonian phalanx, gave way to the verſatile enterprize of the Roman legion, headed by Æmilius Paulus; Macedonia was reduced to be a Roman Province.

The reduction of Macedonia, joined to the humiliation of Carthage and Syria, produced a very great change in the Roman manners. The people having no very powerful rival to fear, became elated and insolent. Their conduct began now more uniformly to shew the mischievous tendency of a constitution, by which they possessed supreme power. From the accumulation of treasure, which tributary or conquered countries yielded, they were freed from taxes. Such an exemption naturally made them forget that they were subjects. Become sovereigns of other countries, they manifested a disposition to be sovereigns at home; in fact, as well as by law.

One rival still remained, though humbled, not crushed. The Carthaginians still possessed ample resources, fast increasing, and excited the jealousy of the Romans. A quarrel

which arofe between them and the Roman ally, Maffiniffa, king of Numidia, afforded a pretext (not a juft ground) to the Romans of commencing hoftilities, fhould they find it expedient. The expediency of war became then a queftion; Cato at the head of one party, impreffed with the riches and power of Carthage, contended that Rome never could be fafe, whilft that city remained, and therefore Carthage muft be deftroyed. Scipio Nafica, more enlarged in political views, faw that the people were becoming obftinate and difobedient to the fenate. Though he looked on Carthage as too weak to conquer Rome, yet he thought it too ftrong to be defpifed. He wifhed the fear of that rival to reftrain the infolence of the multitude. It belongs not to this effay to detail the proceedings of the Romans againft Carthage. We fhall only in general obferve, that they were iniquitous in the higheft degree; that Carthage made a vigorous defence for feveral years, and was

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at laſt taken and deſtroyed by Scipio Emilianus. This celebrated man, the ſon of Paulus Æmilius by birth, and the grandſon of Scipio Africanus by adoption, extended afterwards the Roman empire in Spain, and conquered one of the moſt warlike ſtates of that country. Other conqueſts were carrying on in other parts. The Romans were now ſovereigns of the ſouth of Europe, and north of Africa. They were already the moſt powerful ſtate in the known world. Their power conſiſted not merely in the numbers, whom they commanded, nor in the fertility and richneſs of the countries, which they had ſubdued, but in the vigour of their character. Their extent of empire aroſe almoſt ſolely from moral cauſes. The Latin reader who peruſes the hiſtory of the animated, penetrating, forcible, and impreſſive Livy, the Grecian reader who peruſes the accurate and comprehenſive Polybius, the Engliſh reader who peruſes the diſcriminating, the profound,

found, philosophical Fergusson, will see Roman politics minutely and completely detailed, and by the last generalized with an ability, which only a mind of the greatest force and of the most continued exertion, could exhibit. From any of these historians it may be clearly seen, that it was the aristocracy actually existing, not the democracy preponderant by the constitution, which rendered Rome so generally successful. The nobles gave that direction to the native vigour of the Roman character, which rendered it triumphant over all opposition. The abandonment of power and submission to the authority of either one great man, or a council of great men, preserved and extended the prosperity of the people. The exceptions confirm the rule. The Romans were generally prosperous, occasionally unsuccessful; because they were generally guided by wise men, and occasionally judged and acted for themselves. The right object of every constitution is to

secure

ſecure the welfare and proſperity of the community. Talents, induſtry, and enterprize, tend to the proſperity of the poſſeſſors. One of the ſtrongeſt objections againſt democracy is, that it cannot ſtand the trial of proſperity. That which all individuals, and all ſocieties deſire, and which the moſt eminent qualities of the human character produce, becomes in a democracy ruinous, ſo have we ſeen in Athens, ſo ſhall we ſee in Rome, and in every other democracy of magnitude and continuance. Had a Hannibal always continued to hover over the Romans, their democracy might have produced no dreadful convulſions. But now no eminent leader remained to employ them abroad, and divert their attention from internal politics. No rival remained to reſtrain the inſolence of the populace, poſſeſſed of power with believed ſecurity of enjoyment. The people had, from the tribute of conquered countries, no taxes to pay. Such quantities of corn were

exacted

exacted from ſubdued nations, or ſent by dependent allies, that gratuitous diſtributions among the poorer orders were very frequent. The loweſt of the populace could ſubſiſt with little induſtry. Exemption from the neceſſity of bodily labour, in minds either by power or by habits unfitted for intellectual exertions and rational enjoyments, never fails to produce vice and corruption. Idleneſs in ſuch, naturally cauſes debauchery. The frequent acceſſions to the number of votes, from the emancipation of ſlaves debaſed the commons as a body, and rendered them, as extention of ſuffrage to men of no rank or property muſt always do, more eaſily influenced by factious and deſigning men. "Theſe "new voters increaſed (ſays Ferguſſon) by "their numbers and their vices, the weight "of that dreg, which, in great and proſpe- "rous cities, ever ſinks, by the tendency "of vice and miſconduct, to the loweſt con- "dition. They became a part of that fac-

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" tion who are ever actuated by envy to their " ſuperiors, by mercenary views, or by ab- " ject fear; who are ever ready to eſpouſe " the cauſe of any leader, againſt the re- " ſtraints of public order; diſpoſed to vilify " the more reſpectable ranks of men; and " by their indifference on the ſubjects of " juſtice or honour; to fruſtrate every prin- " ciple that may be employed for the govern- " ment of mankind, beſides fear and com- " pulſion." Such citizens as Dr. Ferguſſon here deſcribes, were, as he afterwards ob- ſerves, far from being the majority at Rome, yet were in numbers ſufficient to contaminate the whole body of the people. A low worth- leſs deſcription of voters, muſt not only be bad as far as their own numbers extend, but muſt naturally infect others before of a higher deſcription; with whom they would then aſſociate. Were ſuffrage to be ſo extended as to admit every inhabitant of St. Giles to vote for the county members, not only theſe new

new voters would themſelves be corrupt and worthleſs, but many of the preſent free-holders would be hurt by aſſociating with ſuch company. Extenſion of ſuffrage to the loweſt orders, every real patriot then muſt reprobate as the ſource of political corruption, and moral depravity.

In every great and proſperous ſtate, great diverſities of property muſt take place. Induſtry, enterpriſe, ſobriety, ſagacity, and prudence, muſt in the natural courſe of things, produce property. Whilſt there are inequalities, intellectual and moral, in the human mind, if its faculties and habits are ſuffered to exert themſelves, there muſt be diverſities of riches. Cauſes, if ſuffered to operate, muſt produce correſponding effects. There can be no equalization of property, but by reducing all men to an equally low ſtandard of intellect and morals. The qualities from which property reſults, are thoſe

which render the poſſeſſors moſt beneficial to the community. It is therefore the intereſt of every community, to encourage in its members, thoſe exertions from which wealth proceeds. As no motives operate more powerfully on the human mind, than love for children, and a deſire for their welfare and happineſs, it is the intereſt of a ſtate, that the property of parents ſhould deſcend to their offspring. A parent is much more ſtrenuous in the exertion of uſeful qualities, from knowing that his children will reap the fruits of his labour. Property accumulates in families, and is one chief ſource of diſtinction. From it alſo ariſes other ſources of eminence. The man of property can afford to give his children liberal education: that advantage naturally elevates their ſentiments, enlarges their views, and ſo qualifies them for higher offices than the poor and ignorant are fitted to fill. From the natural conſtitution of the human mind, inferiors envy their ſuperiors.

Col-

Collateral circumſtances increaſe, diminiſh, or diverſify the operations of their envy. They repine more at the partial ſuperiority of thoſe in ſome reſpects their equals. At Rome, whilſt the commons were debaſed from the cauſes which we have mentioned, the nobles by their application to the affairs of ſtate, by their education, by their perſonal talents, and hereditary virtues, had acquired extenſive property. The commons repined at this ſuperiority of riches, without conſidering that it reſulted from the progreſſive operation of moral cauſes. They were the more enraged, becauſe the democratical conſtitution of their country had rendered them equal in power to thoſe, to whom nature and education had rendered them unequal, in every other conſtituent of excellence. The common people were filled with indignation at the extent of the eſtates, and riches of the nobles; and deſired to reduce them to their own level. Where the people poſſeſs ſupreme power,

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and conſequently the commons a majority of votes, there ſeldom are wanting incendiaries to inflame them againſt the nobility. The Roman commons found a leader of ſedition in Tiberius Gracchus. Gracchus was ſprung from a family originally plebeian, but which the merits and ſervices of his father had ennobled. By the mother's ſide, he was the grandſon of Scipio the conqueror of Hannibal. His ſiſter was married to the younger Scipio, the deſtroyer of Carthage. Thus either by deſcent or affinity, he was connected with the firſt families of Rome. His parts were lively, and his temper ardent. At an early age he was diſtinguiſhed for his eloquence; that equivocal talent of which the utility or hurtfulneſs to its poſſeſſor, and thoſe within the ſphere of his influence, depends on its union, with ſound underſtanding and virtuous principles. In either the one, or the other, or both of theſe qualities, Tiberius in his conduct ſhewed himſelf deficient.

ficient. Of his eloquence, and of the application of it, we have a very able and ſuccinct deſcription in the dialogue concerning famous orators by the firſt orator of his time, whoſe own orations were generally directed to the moſt beneficial purpoſes. " I wiſh (ſays Cicero, ſpeaking of Tiberius Gracchus, and Caius Carbo his friend and cotemporary) " Tiberius Gracchus and Caius Carbo, had poſ-
" ſeſſed equal talents and purity of intention, in
" their political proceedings, as they did orato-
" rial powers, no one would have exceeded
" them in glory. But the former of them, for
" a ſeditious and inflammatory conduct in his
" tribuneſhip, an office on which he entered
" enraged againſt every reſpectable man for
" his diſapprobation of the diſgraceful treaty
" with the Numantines, was put to death by
" an aſſociation of the friends of his country.
" The latter avoided the puniſhment due to
" him for inflaming the people, by a volun-
" tary death." In this paſſage we have both

 Cicero's

Cicero's opinion of the eloquence of Tiberius, and his account of the caufes of its direction to pernicious purpofes. Gracchus in his youth had excited the fanguine hopes of his friends, that he would rife to the higheft offices of ftate, and fill them in a manner fitting his ftation in life, and worthy of his anceftors. In his early youth he ferved under Scipio at the fiege of Carthage, and equalled any of his rank and age, in courage and in conduct. The defire of diftinction appears to have been his ruling principle; in that fituation it led to meritorious actions. The love of diftinction however, though very ufeful as a fecondary and fubordinate principle, is very dangerous as a primary. It too frequently leads its votaries to confider lefs, truth and falfehood, right and wrong, than the opinion of thofe with whom they affociate. From this caufe, it often happens that men of rank and talents herd with low people, among whom they will be diftinguifhed, rather than with

other

other men of rank, with whom they will be on a footing of equality. Impelled by this principle, the eſquire in private life will ſometimes aſſociate with his huntſman, whipper-in, and footmen, inſtead of gentlemen. Impelled by this principle, the nobleman or gentleman in public life, ſeeks the clubs of tradeſmen and mechanics, in preference to the company of his equals. As diſtinction is comparative, even although his talents and acquirements be ſuch as to procure reſpectability among the firſt ranks, he prefers being higheſt among the low, to being high among the high. Such was the caſe with Tiberius Gracchus. He might have been eminent even among Roman ſenators, but as there were ſome men ſtill greater, he could not be the firſt. Special circumſtances, modify, diminiſh, or encreaſe this principle of emulation, and direct the objects for which it is to operate. Diſappointment of expected honour, and diſapprobation of his conduct in a

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political negociation incenſed Tiberius againſt the nobility, and drove him to ſeek from the multitude that eminence, which he was now precluded from attaining among thoſe of his own rank. Soon after his return from Carthage, he was appointed pay-maſter of the forces ſerving under Caius Mancinus at Numantia. Mancinus, with his army, was defeated, and ſurrounded by the Numantines; to ſave himſelf from being cut to pieces he ſued for a ceſſation of arms. The Numantines, who remembered with gratitude and admiration the father of Tiberius, refuſed to negociate with any but the ſon. Tiberius, pleaſed with this mark of diſtinction conferred on him by the enemy, outſtepped the limits of his office, and concluded a peace. As pay-maſter of the forces, it was no part of his office either to form or execute reſolutions of peace or war. The peace, even if it had been concluded by an officer properly authorized, was, according

to the ſentiments of the Romans ſanctioned by the ſoundeſt policy, diſgraceful. It was a peace framed when decided ſuperiority did not enable them to dictate the terms. It was to remove a temporary evil, from which vigour and perſeverance would have ſoon permanently extricated them, a ſacrifice of national honour. So mean, ſo precipitate a peace could not pleaſe the magnanimity of a Roman ſenate. The ſenators refuſed to ratify articles, which they deemed baſe and ſcandalous to Romans. The people, on the contrary, approved of the conduct of Gracchus. Their views were too narrow to ſee the fatal effects of humiliation and deſpondence. By the peace many of their relations and friends returned ſafe, who might have fallen had they, with the uſual bravery of Roman ſoldiers, endeavoured to force their way through the enemy. This ſafety, though diſgraceful, becauſe with ſwords in their hands they had made no effort, many

of

of the people thought preferable to the danger which they might have incurred by trying to fight their way. Gracchus they therefore took under their protection. Incenſed againſt the ſenate, and gratified by the attachment of the people, he from that time made it his chief ſtudy to thwart the one, and pleaſe the other. He knew that the plebeians conſtantly repined at the riches and great eſtates of the nobles. He concluded he could not more effectually gratify the poor, than by procuring a diſtribution among them of the property of the rich. A complete equalization he ſaw would be altogether impracticable at firſt. He began with propoſing to limit only, the eſtates of the great, not to divide them altogether. He undertook to revive the Agrarian law, which a ſeditious tribune had procured to be enacted near three centuries before the time of Gracchus, but which had fallen into the diſuſe which its abſurdity and in-

injuſtice deſerved. By this law, no Roman was to poſſeſs more than a limited portion of land, which, reduced to Engliſh meaſure, would be about three hundred acres, a hundred of the larger cattle, and five hundred of the leſſer. Tiberius being now elected tribune moved, in a general aſſembly, the renewal of this law; and propoſed to divide the ſurplus of the great eſtates among the people. Were univerſal ſuffrage (which Heaven forbid) ever to be eſtabliſhed in this country, were a convention of the multitude to have the uncontrouled power of enacting laws, it would not be a difficult matter for one of the demagogues to convince ſuch an aſſembly, of the expediency of reducing the property of the rich, and making a diſtribution among the poor.

The motion of Tiberius was heard by the populace with great applauſe. The ſpeech by which he ſupported his motion is worthy

thy of attention, as it contains the principal confiderations ufually advanced by levellers to explode the inequalities of mankind.

"The favage beafts (he faid) in Italy, "in that land, which they who monopolize "its produce call happy, have their dens, "their places of repofe, and refuge. But "thofe who bore arms, and expofed their "lives for the fafety of their country, enjoy "nothing in it but the air and the light. "They have no houfes or fettlements of "which the poffeffion is fecure and perma-"nent; they are conftrained to wander from "place to place, with their wives and chil-"dren, becaufe they have not property to "fix them in an abode. Your commanders "(he faid) are guilty of a ridiculous error, "when, at the head of their armies, they "exhort you, my poor fellow-citizens, to "fight for your temples and altars. Among "fo many Romans none is poffeffed of either

" altar or monument, none has a houſe of " his own, nor ſeats of his anceſtors to de- " fend. You have fought, and many of " your friends have been ſlain, not to main- " tain your own property, for theſe engroſ- " ſers have left you no property to main- " tain. You labour to ſupport the luxury " and wealth of other men. You are ſtiled " members of the firſt nation in the world, " and lords of the univerſe, but have not a " foot of ground on which to reſt." An harangue of this nature, ſpoken to a tumultuous populace (for it is the multitude which he addreſſed as ſoldiers, becauſe every Roman was obliged to be a ſoldier, if his country wanted his ſervices) naturally inflamed their minds. They were eagerly deſirous of having the bill paſſed into a law. So daring an attack upon property, not the ſenate only, but even one of the tribunes ſtrenuouſly oppoſed. Marcus Octavius made a beneficial uſe of a pernicious office, and interpoſed

terpoſed his negative. Tiberius, enraged at this patriotic oppoſition of his colleague, became the more obſtinate in his reſolution, and more violent in his proceedings. He propoſed, that the great landholders ſhould abſolutely cede the exceſs of their poſſeſſions beyond his levelling ſtandard. The lower people aſſembled from all quarters to vote for the paſſing of ſo agreeable a law. Tiberius, to remove the obſtacle of his colleague's negative, found means to have him moſt unconſtitutionally deprived of his office. The popular aſſembly paſſed the bill into a law. As the ſupreme power was veſted in the people, the ſenate could not prevent them from ſanctioning any favourite motion, however hurtful to the ſtate.

Had Rome been a mixed government, had the ſenate poſſeſſed a legiſlative power equal to that of the people, had there been a ſupreme magiſtrate, with a voice in the legiſlation, which,

which, in any conteſt between the ſenate and the aſſembly of the commons, he would uſe againſt that party which was in the wrong, the bill of Tiberius would have been thrown out, and the flame would have been allayed without any ſerious miſchief. The ſupreme magiſtrate would have ſeen, that the proceedings of the commons were violent and pernicious, and that it was his duty to himſelf and the country, to throw his weight into the ſcale of the ſenate. At Rome there was no ſuch ſalutary controul. The conſtitution being in ſo great a degree democratical, the ſenate could not reſiſt decrees, however deſtructive, which the popular aſſembly choſe to paſs. They were obliged to aſſociate as individuals againſt the deſtroyer of property, and conſequently of rational liberty. Scipio Naſica headed the aſſociation for defending liberty and property, and reſcuing the country from the diſtraction, anarchy, and injuſtice, which the pro-

proceedings of Tiberius threatened. Their ufual refource in times of emergency, the creation of a dictator, was then unattainable with fafety to the ftate. The conful who had the nomination of that high magiftrate, was known to be favourable to the views of Tiberius. Tiberius prepared by force to oppofe the affociation of men of property and patriotifm. A fcuffle enfued, in which Tiberius fell. Rome was, for the prefent, faved from anarchy and confufion by an affociation of defenders of liberty and property, againft innovators and levellers.

Salutary as was this meafure of the grandees, it excited great rage among the lower orders. Thofe who have either done, or defigned mifchief, are difpleafed with the punifhment of paft, and prevention of future evil. An affociation againft levellers could not expect to be popular among levellers themfelves. "The fubverfion (fays Fer-

Ferguſſon) " of government, that was likely
" to have followed the policy of Gracchus,
" becauſe it did not take place, was over-
" looked; and the reſtitution of order, ef-
" fected by the ſenate, appeared to be a
" tyranny eſtabliſhed in blood." The ſena-
tors inſtead of proceeding vigorouſly to oppoſe
the execution of the iniquitous Agrarian law,
very impolitically ſteered a middle courſe,
and made ſome conceſſions to the popular
faction. They permitted Fulvius Flaccus,
and Papirius Carbo to be choſen commiſſion-
ers, to put the law in execution, and even
conſented that Scipio Naſica, the preſerver
and ornament of his country, ſhould be re-
moved from Rome. This temporizing con-
duct in a great degree, undid what their
vigour had before done. Papirius Carbo
being choſen tribune, fomented the animoſity
of the people againſt the ſenate. Scipio Afri-
canus now returned triumphant from Spain,
uſed the influence which his abilities and

ſervices had procured him, in oppoſing the dangerous innovations of the popular leaders. That great man was inſulted and threatened by the populace; and the day after he had made a ſpeech in the ſenate for ſuch firm and vigorous meaſures as the emergency required, was found dead in his bed. The ſuſpicions were ſtrong againſt the demagogues. They had influence to prevent an enquiry. So enraged was the populace at the magnanimous conduct of Scipio, that his body was refuſed the honours of a public funeral. Such is democratic gratitude towards the greateſt benefactors. Inſolent and violent themſelves, and ſtimulated by the factious harangues and motions of their tribunes, the people became outrageous. They groſſly inſulted the worthieſt and moſt eminent of the ſenators. At the inſtigation of their tribune Labeo, who for his infamous conduct had been degraded by Metellus the cenſor, a mob had almoſt put to immediate death

death that nobleman, the eldeſt and moſt venerable ſenator of the time, and inveſted with one of the higheſt offices of the ſtate. He was with difficulty reſcued from their hands. As the people were now paramount in fact as well as by law, no enquiry was made concerning this outrageous act. Such was the ſtate of affairs at Rome, when there appeared a perſon of ſuperior talents to the other demagogues.

Caius Gracchus being twenty years of age at the death of his brother Tiberius, retired from the public view. It was for ſome time uncertain, whether he conſidered Tiberius's conduct as a model, or as a warning. Though he ſpent ſome years in retirement, yet was he preparing himſelf for public buſineſs. When he made his appearance, he gave ſpecimens of ſtill brighter parts, and a more ardent temper than even his brother. He was not long in ſhewing that, as well as

Tiberius, he was deficient in ſound judgement, without which ingenuity is a curſe, not a bleſſing to the poſſeſſor. About this time the Italian ſtates began to conceive views of being admitted to the privileges of Roman citizens, and to vote in the Roman aſſemblies. The democratic faction favoured this extenſion of ſuffrage, knowing well that the greater the number of voters, the greater would be their power. The ariſtocratic party ſaw that the voters, without the addition of more, were already too numerous for the peace and order of the ſtate. On this occaſion Gracchus ſhewed what plan and politics he was going to embrace. He undertook the cauſe of the Italian ſtates, and made a very ſpecious harangue in their favour. The friends, however, of the eſtabliſhed order of things prevailed. The democratic party the following year ſucceeded in elevating a moſt ſtrenuous demagogue, Fulvius Flaccus, to the conſular power. Though born a nobleman, and

ſprung from a family which had performed great ſervices to the ſtate, Flaccus had deſcended to be a ſubordinate leader of the loweſt and moſt factious of the populace. He had been the humble imitator and agent of Tiberius Gracchus. Raiſed now to the firſt office of the ſtate, he began the functions of his magiſtracy by factious laws. He propoſed a bill for extending to the Italian ſtates the right of ſuffrage, and admiſſibility to the higher offices. The more exalted the rank, and the greater the influence of thoſe who propoſe dangerous innovations in a ſtate, the more neceſſary it is for virtuous and patriotic men to oppoſe them ſtrenuouſly. The ſenate, men of property, and real love for their country, combined in oppoſing Flaccus's motion; they ſucceeded in preventing its paſſing into a law. Thwarted in this meaſure, he endeavoured by means of his conſular power to remove the obſtacles which had retarded the full execution of the Agrarian act.

act. Whilſt he was making motions agreeable to the levelling intentions of the people, the ſenate found an opportunity of employing him in a war which now commenced with a tribe of the Gauls. Gracchus was choſen queſtor for Sardinia. The ſenate had hopes of reſtoring order to the ſtate during the abſence of theſe incendiaries. Gracchus was continued in the queſtorſhip. Suſpecting that the intention of the continuation was to keep him at a diſtance from popular aſſemblies, he quitted his ſtation and returned without leave. He was called to account by the cenſors for deſerting his duty. When democracy is prevalent, unavailing is either law or juſtice againſt the favourite of the populace. "However willing (ſays Ferguſſon) the cen-"ſors may have been to remove this peſt "from the commonwealth, they were too "weak to attempt any cenſure in this ſtate "of his cauſe, and in the preſent humour of "the people." Gracchus eſcaped without animad-

animadverſion. He was ſoon after choſen tribune, and in that office he propoſed various hurtful acts. The oppoſition of the ſenate had prevented the Agrarian law from being ſteadily executed. Gracchus moved a renewal and confirmation of it, with this addition, that the lands ſhould be annually diſtributed among the poor. He endeavoured by every means to diminiſh the reſpect which was entertained towards the ſenate. In ſhort, he attempted to reduce all the members of the community to the equality which democrats profeſs to adore. A true democratical leader wiſhes the people to reign, that through them he may reign himſelf.

In matters not connected with government, Gracchus propoſed and executed ſeveral uſeful works, ſuch as bridges, highways, and other public improvements in Italy. In every part of his conduct that regarded the conſtitution, he was turbulent, ſeditious, and

dangerous. Being re-elected tribune the following year contrary to the law, he proceeded in his attempts to make the conftitution, as it already was nearly, completely democratical. He obtained an act for depriving the fenate of the fhare they ftill retained in the judicative part of the government; and ordaining that the judges fhould be chofen from the equeftrian rank. The moft dangerous project which he formed, or indeed any Roman demagogue had hitherto formed, except the Agrarian law, and which Fulvius had unfuccefsfully attempted, was the admiffion of the Italian ftates to vote in the Roman affemblies. Againft fo dangerous an innovation, which would have leffened the refpectability, and increafed the corruption of the voters, in proportion to the increafe of the numbers, not the fenators only, but moft of the plebeians, of any property, confequence, or character, made a manly and vigorous ftand. After a warm conteft, the

motion was again negatived. Gracchus baffled in this project, propofed other laws tending to pleafe the very loweft of the plebeians. On his motion public granaries were erected, and a law was made that corn fhould be iffued from thence, confiderably under prime coft. "This act (fays Ferguffon) "gave a check to induftry, which is the beft "guardian of manners in populous cities, or "wherever multitudes of men are crowded "together." Nothing indeed tends more powerfully to advance the defigns of an ambitious demagogue, than the prevalence of idlenefs among the populace. Idlenefs produces in vulgar minds, diffipation, the confequence of both is poverty; and of poverty refulting from fuch caufes, corruption, and profligacy. Such perfons are of all others the fitteft for being tools to a demagogue, and for being employed in any flagitious project he can conceive.

One of Gracchus's laws, though intended to pleaſe and gratify the multitude, gave no diſſatisfaction to the ſenate. It was decreed that colonies ſhould be ſettled in different parts of Italy, and that the city of Carthage ſhould be rebuilt for the reception of ſix thouſand Romans. The ſenate readily agreed to a meaſure which was likely to rid the city of the moſt tumultuous citizens. It alſo afforded an opportunity of removing the popular leaders, by employing them to ſettle the new colonies. Fulvius and Gracchus were appointed commiſſioners for eſtabliſhing a colony at Carthage. Whilſt Gracchus was in Africa, the ariſtocratic party gained conſiderable ſtrength in Rome, and carried the election of Opimius, a very able and ſtrenuous friend of the nobles, to the conſulſhip. Gracchus on his return had the audacity to offer himſelf a third time for the tribuneſhip. His ſuit, equally preſumptuous

as illegal, was rejected. Ever ſince the motions of Tiberius Gracchus, and the prevalence in moſt caſes of the democratical party, the aſſembly of tribes had more frequently determined legiſlative queſtions, than the aſſembly of centuries. The force which the ſenate and its adherents acquired during the abſence of the demagogues, enabled the centuries to regain a part of their conſtitutional conſequence. Legiſlation began again to be attached to property, rank, and ability, more than to mere number. The reſtoration of the pre-eminence of rank and property is a death-blow to levelling demagogues. Fulvius and Gracchus, ſeeing things were returning to the natural channel, became deſperate, and prepared for force. They ſaw that their dreams of univerſal ſuffrage and equalization of poſſeſſions, were no longer likely to be realized without violence and inſurrection. To that they had recourſe. They attempted to ſeize the Capitol with an

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armed body of deſperadoes, but were fruſtrated by the vigilance of the friends of their country, headed by the conſul. One of the attendants of the conſul, juſtly reproached Gracchus with ſedition and rebellion; and was murdered by a follower of the demagogues. The country was declared by the magiſtrates to be in a ſtate of war. They cited the two leaders to anſwer for their conduct before a general aſſembly of the people. Fulvius and Gracchus refuſed to appear, and with a numerous party in arms took a ſtrong poſt on the Aventine hill. The friends of their country proceeded to hoſtilities againſt thoſe rebels. Caius and Flaccus with many of their adherents were killed.

The proceedings of the democratical leaders at Rome, ſtrikingly manifeſt the cloſe connection between profuſe extenſion of ſuffrage, and diſtribution of private property.

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The extenſion and the encroachment went ſo much hand in hand, that we may fairly infer, that had the propoſers been able to bring the former to univerſal ſuffrage, they would have done it with a view of bringing the latter to univerſal equality.

Had Rome been a government of three eſtates, the daring attempts of Fulvius and Gracchus would have been much ſooner and more eaſily repreſſed. The vigilance of the executive government would have detected in a leſs advanced ſtage, proceedings ſo dangerous to the community. The ſenate and the reſpectable part of the popular aſſembly would have concurred in making regulations according to the novelty and exigency of the caſe, for *preventing the ſeditious meetings*, at which a Fulvius or a Gracchus inflamed the populace to diſcontent and inſurrection.

Fulvius

Fulvius and Gracchus were two moſt violent democrats; in a government only where democracy had too much weight, could they have dared even to propoſe the greater number of their political meaſures, but eſpecially thoſe confounders of all order, and ſubverters of all juſtice, *univerſal ſuffrage and confiſcation of property*. A mixed monarchy would not only have prevented the efforts of thoſe leaders of ſedition from long diſturbing the public tranquillity, but even from involving their deluded followers in utter ruin. The wonted hearers of their harangues would have been prevented from liſtening to them, by the wiſdom and activity of a well-balanced government, before ſedition ripened into rebellion, and debarred from thoſe incendiaries, might have been changed into good and uſeful members of ſociety. After the ſuppreſſion of the Gracchi, the

the ſenate and magiſtrates recovered their former authority. The people taught by recent experience the danger of violent oppoſition to the ſenate, allowed queſtions of legiſlation to originate in that wiſe body, and to be afterwards determined by the aſſembly of property, not the aſſembly of number. Juſt notions of ſubordination reſumed their place, and expelled the viſionary and miſchievous fancies of univerſal equality. Popular power ſubmitted to ſenatorial authority. Order and tranquillity ſucceeded confuſion and tumult.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Marius—Saturninus and Glaucia, pernicious meaſures, baniſhment of the good Metellus—Druſes's reform bill excites inteſtine war—Sylla—Salpicius—defeat of the demagogues—revival of the faction under Cinna—death of Marius—final overthrow of his followers—Sylla's dictatorſhip—reſignation.

THE cauſe of the diſorders ſtill remained, though at preſent ſuſpended in its operation. Where democracy is the prevailing principle, demagogues will never long be wanting to miſlead the multitude. A perſonage now began to appear on the popular ſide of much ſuperior intellect and vigour of mind to the Gracchi, and equal to any man who had as yet exiſted in Rome; this was the celebrated Marius.

Marius was a man of obſcure birth and uncouth manners, but of the greateſt courage, military

military experience, and conduct. He was endued with very great talents, which, notwithſtanding a moſt booriſh addreſs and ungraceful deportment, he could direct with the greateſt art to the attainment of any object he choſe to purſue. Great men have ſometimes the prejudices of the weak and fooliſh. A narrow and mean education gave to Marius that hatred of the nobility, which low perſons ſo naturally imbibe againſt rank and dignity. Ambition alſo, a predominant principle in the character of Marius, added to his hatred of the nobles, reſentment, becauſe they thwarted him in his purſuit of power. He received the firſt rudiments of his military education at the ſiege of Numantia, under that great maſter Africanus, where the penetration of Scipio anticipated the future eminence of his pupil. Soon after the death of the younger Gracchus, Marius was choſen tribune. In that office he gave unequivocal proofs of wiſdom and intrepidity,

but did not manifeſt that democratical ſpirit which he afterwards diſplayed. The laws which he propoſed were calculated for the advantage of the ſtate in general, not for the gratification of a particular claſs. It is not improbable, that policy prevented him from making a violent attack upon the nobility. The ſenate, ſince the death of Caius, poſſeſſed great authority, in which the people had a temporary diſpoſition to acquieſce. Marius, for the preſent, reſted his hopes of aggrandiſement on his military exertions. The war againſt Jugurtha afforded him the firſt opportunity of greatly diſtinguiſhing himſelf. When that adventurer had riſen by the murder of his couſins to the throne of his uncle, the Romans attacked him as the uſurper of a kingdom under their protection. By his artifices and the remiſſneſs of the generals ſent againſt him, a remiſſneſs ſuppoſed to be owing to corruption, he for ſome years made a ſucceſsful ſtand. He

even visited Rome, with an ostensible view of submitting entirely to the Romans, but really expecting to find the rest of the senators equally open to bribery as the consul. The murder of another cousin, which he caused to be committed, compelled him to leave Rome. On his return to Africa, he defeated the Roman general Albinus. Metellus, a nobleman of high character, was chosen consul, and sent to Numidia. He entirely defeated Jugurtha, and reduced him to great difficulties. Under Metellus, Marius served with great reputation as a lieutenant-general. He obtained leave to go to Rome, to stand for the consulship. Popular dissensions were beginning to revive. The tribunes, especially a very zealous de-demagogue, Memmius, had persuaded the people, that the whole body of the nobility was equally chargeable with corruption, as those who had commanded against Jugurtha. Arrived in Rome, Marius inveighed against

the nobility in that ſpeech, of which Salluſt gives us ſo maſterly an account. He was choſen conſul in ſpite of the oppoſition of the nobles, and appointed to command the army in Numidia. His vigour and ability would have made him ſucceſsful in a much more difficult war than this now was. Jugurtha was again defeated, and ſought refuge with his father-in-law, Bocchus, who delivered him up to Sylla the queſtor of Marius. Marius returned triumphant to Rome. He was next employed as general againſt northern hordes, which had migrated from the ſhores of the Baltic, and the faſtneſſes of Germany, to the more genial climes of ſouthern Europe. Theſe barbarous nations had approached Italy ſome years before the conqueſt of Jugurtha. Carbo, then conſul, was ordered with an army to watch their motions, but raſhly encountering their force, was with his troops overwhelmed by their numbers on the northern frontier of Italy. Inſtead of marching

marching into that country after their victory, they turned aside towards Gaul and Spain. On their return from Spain, they again hovered over Italy, and caused great alarm at Rome. Marius was esteemed the fittest general to cope with so formidable an enemy. He was sent into Gaul to protect the Roman province, and prevent the Cimbri and Teutones from invading Italy. Surprising a numerous army of them near the Rhone, he cut them to pieces, and thereby added greatly to his military fame. Another mass of the barbarians, however, penetrated into Italy, near the Adriatic. In his fifth successive consulship, he, together with his colleague, Catulus, totally destroyed these northern invaders. Returning to Rome, he was adored by the multitude almost as a god. He now sued for the sixth consulship, and was equally eager to have Metellus excluded, as himself elected. By his influence with the people, and that of demagogues his tools, and above all by bribery, now so easy, as suffrage was

ſo general, he ſucceeded in both. The turbulence of democracy had been reſtrained by the puniſhment of the Gracchi, and by the fear of the Cimbrian invaſion. The fate of the Gracchi was beginning to be forgotten, and fears of the barbarians were entirely removed. The people returned to their democratic violence with redoubled fury. The tribune Saturninus, and the prætor Glaucia, were the oſtenſible leaders of the multitude, but were really the agents of Marius only. Saturninus courted the populace by propoſing new diſtributions of landed property; that the money taken in war, ſhould be employed in purchaſing lands for the ſoldiers of Marius, and the poorer citizens; and that corn, bought at the public expence, ſhould be given gratis to the multitude. This ſupply of their wants without their own exertions, however pernicious, was pleaſing to the populace. Extenſion of ſuffrage, the uſual either forerunner, or follower of encroachments

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on property, though moſt generally the former, did not fail to be a favourite meaſure of the demagogues. Meetings were continually held of the moſt ignorant, worthleſs, and deſperate of the populace. The demagogues painted in ſtrong colours imaginary grievances, and inflamed the miſguided multitude againſt the ſenate, the men of property and reſpectability. In a mixed government it would have been poſſible to have prevented ſuch ſeditious meetings, and puniſhed ſuch incendiaries, by legal means without any violence; but in a government where democracy was prevalent, force was the only way to reſtrain the exceſſes of the multitude, inflamed by wicked and deſigning leaders. Unwilling to proceed to violence, the ſenate was obliged to yield for the time, to popular phrenſy. So great was the favour of Marius and his tools with the people, that he and his faction were become maſters of Rome. The power of the ſenate was virtually ſuppreſſed.

TANJORE MAHARAJA SERFOJI'S SARASWATI MAHAL

With the confequence of rank and dignity, fell as ufual the confequence of property. The affembly of centuries was obliged to give up entirely the legiflative power to the affembly of the tribes. In a democracy, fooner or later *univerfal fuffrage* takes place and manifefts its direful effects. Soon would confufion and anarchy prevail in any country, if ignorance and meannefs were to have equal weight as rank and ability: if a chimney-fweeper were to have an equal fhare in the legiflation with a Duke of Bedford or a Fox. The reduction of both to his own low level would be his firft object. The power of the fenate was entirely fuppreffed. A law was paffed obliging that body to confirm every act of the tribes, which was in fact an annihilation of the fenatorian power: a ftate of things equally pernicious, as if the London Correfponding Society had attained the fupreme power, and compelled parliament to fanction any law which they chofe

to direct. To the haranguing lecturers of that ſociety, would then be owing all our political meaſures, as according to Pope's *P. P. clerk of this pariſh*, the proceedings of the laſt years of Queen Anne, were owing to Robert Jenkins, farrier; Amos Turner, collar-maker; George Pilcocks, late exciſeman; Thomas White, wheel-wright; and above all P. P. himſelf; perſonages equally fitted for political direction as thoſe lecturers. Heaven be praiſed, no Correſponding Society, no Aſſembly of Tribes rules here! Happy had it been for Rome if the populace had not ruled there. Every ſenator was required under pain of degradation, to take an oath to abide by the regulations in queſtion. Marius pretended to object to this oath, and other ſenators followed the example he profeſſed to ſhew. Metellus, the moſt venerable member of the ſenate, and the moſt ſtrenuous opponent of democratic violence and ambitious demagogues, declared he would never take

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ſuch an oath. Marius, notwithſtanding his declaration, actually ſwore. The following day his tool Saturninus, procured in the aſſembly of the tribes the baniſhment of Metellus. This was the object that Marius had principally in view, becauſe the abilities and virtues of Metellus were great obſtacles to the execution of his deſigns of becoming abſolute. In a democracy, as we have ſeen in the caſe of Piſiſtratus, thoſe who aſpire at tyranny, endeavour to remove men of rank and talents from the councils of the ſtate. Glaucia and Saturninus, encouraged by their ſucceſs, proceeded to ſuch violence as to rouſe the ſenators, and all the citizens of rank and property to aſſociate againſt thoſe daring innovators. Bloodſhed enſued. The democratical leaders, after murdering a nobleman propoſed for the conſulate, with their adherents ſeized the Capitol. They were beſieged by the friends of their country, taken, and put to the ſword.

It was owing to the prevalence of democracy, that political contefts at Rome were attended with murders. Had there been a government of effectual controul, fuch daring mifcreants as Saturninus and Glaucia would have, by the regular courfe of law, received the punifhment due to their treafons. In the rebellions of the Gracchi, and in that of Saturninus and Glaucia, it is evident, that from democracy came the difeafe, from ariftocracy the cure.

Marius kept aloof from the latter part of the proceedings of his friends, but was ftrongly fufpected of wifhing well to their caufe. Knowing the fufpicion, he chofe to abfent himfelf from Rome. He vifited Afia, and tried to ftir up a war between Rome and Mithridates.

The fenate having now no formidable opponent, regained its importance. Some fa-

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lutary laws were made to reſtrain popular violence and tribunitian intrigues. The tranquillity of the ſtate, ariſing from the prevalence of the nobles, was only of ſhort duration. "While (ſays Ferguſſon) the ſource "was open, any mere temporary ſtagnation "could only tend to increaſe the force with "which it occaſionally burſt over every impediment of law or good order, that was "placed in its way." Scarcely had the regulations of the ſenate and men of property, been made for reſtoring order to the ſtate, when they were diſturbed by the projects of Marcus Livius Druſus, tribune of the people. Druſus at firſt profeſſed to act in concert with the ſenate, and propoſed to reſtore to that body the judicative power, of which they had been deprived by the law of Gracchus. A clauſe, however, for admitting three hundred knights at once into the ſenate, which he tacked to his bill, ſhewed that his real object was to debaſe that illuſtrious body.

His

His following proceedings more unequivocally ſhewed his real deſigns. He propoſed that all the diſtributions of land intended by Gracchus in favour of indigent citizens ſhould be carried into execution. He alſo revived the project of Gracchus for beſtowing univerſal ſuffrage on the inhabitants of Italy. The men of rank, property and patriotiſm joined in oppoſing ſo dangerous an innovation. The propoſed *Reform Bill* of Druſus was rejected with deſerved indignation. Rejection, however, did not undo all the evil which the motion cauſed. Buoyed up with hopes that the influence of Druſus in the popular aſſembly would procure them that ſuffrage which had ſo long been their favourite object, the Italians were greatly incenſed at their diſappointment. They formed *conventions* to deviſe meaſures for *extorting by force* from the legiſlature what it would not voluntarily grant. They ſtill pretended that they meant only to uſe

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peaceable means for the attainment of their object. Their preparation however of arms, troops, and military ſtores ſhewed that they did not intend a peaceable procedure. This was confirmed by their ſubſequent conduct, as they broke out into actual rebellion. It is probable, that had the Romans with ready vigilance obſerved their proceedings from the time that they began to aſſemble in conventions, diſſolved thoſe aſſemblies by force, and ſeverely puniſhed the ring-leaders, the rebellion might have been prevented; but in fact, this rebellion turned out to be one of the moſt dangerous wars that ever attacked Rome. It would be by no means candid to conclude that Druſus, who was not in other reſpects a deſperate character, really wiſhed affairs to come to ſuch extremities. However that may be, it is certain, that his motion produced thoſe pernicious convulſions. Such conſequences reſulting from propoſitions of extenſion of ſuffrage,

ought to be a warning to popular leaders, if they do not really deſign miſchief, to beware of making ſuch inflammatory motions as tend to produce inſurrection.

The war which enſued between Rome and the Italian provinces was ſtiled the War of the Allies. It called forth great military exertions, and cauſed much bloodſhed on both ſides. Among the Roman leaders who diſtinguiſhed themſelves the moſt eminent were Marius and Sylla. Of theſe two, Marius was hitherto the higher in reputation, Sylla in that war the ſuperior in actual performance. He was riſing faſt to that military glory, which Marius had formerly acquired. Jealouſy of the increaſing fame of Sylla blew into a flame a reſentment, which from a combination of cauſes had long poſſeſſed the breaſt of Marius. Sylla was ſprung from a patrician family. In his early age he devoted himſelf to the lite-

literature which had for ſome time begun to ſpread among the Romans. Addicted greatly to pleaſure, he did not conceal a genius deſtined to give him aſcendency over men. Though habitually voluptuous, he never ſuffered his pleaſures to obſtruct the purſuit of thoſe great objects which his mind could conceive and deviſe the moſt efficacious means for attaining. He began his military career by ſerving as queſtor under Marius in the Jugurthine war, ſhewed great courage and conduct in this ſubordinate capacity, conciliated the affection and eſteem of the ſoldiers, and gained the reſpect and confidence of the general. When Jugurtha fled for refuge to his father in-law Bocchus, a negotiation was opened between Marius and that prince, concerning the Numidian. Sylla was employed by the Roman general to conduct the negotiation, and by his policy and addreſs prevailed on Bocchus to deliver Jugurtha into his hands. He gave up the Numidian to

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his general, but among the ſoldiers, and at Rome, took to himſelf the merit of the capture of Jugurtha. He had a ring made for himſelf repreſenting Bocchus putting Jugurtha into his poſſeſſion. His conduct appeared to Marius arrogant, and firſt ſowed the ſeeds of that hatred, which ripened into fruits ſo fatal to the commonwealth. Sylla, acting as lieutenant-general under Catulus Marius's colleague in the war againſt the Cimbri, greatly raiſed his military character and influence with the ſoldiers. That farther incenſed Marius, ſtill however he did not interfere much in public affairs, but after the concluſion of the Cimbrian war devoted himſelf chiefly to his pleaſures. In fact, the talents of Sylla required ſome great object to rouſe them to exertion, and at the period from the end of the Cimbrian irruption to the beginning of the revolt of the Italian provinces, there was no war of conſiderable importance. At home he attached himſelf to

the party of the nobility and even married the daughter of Metellus, but was not peculiarly active in oppoſing popular violence. He ſeems to have reſerved himſelf until his oppoſition could be effectual. In the war with the Italian rebels he ſhewed his military talents to be equal to thoſe of Marius, even when he was in the vigour of his age. The termination of that conteſt was not altogether ſo ſucceſsful as the Romans expected. The approach of a foreign war headed by the ability and power of the formidable Mithridates, induced them to compromiſe the diſpute with thoſe of the revolted Italians who had been leaſt warm in the cauſe, and to grant to them with certain limitations, the ſuffrage which they required. Thoſe however who had been the principal authors of the revolt were excluded from the benefit of this compromiſe. Mithridates king of Pontus, the moſt powerful monarch of the eaſt, had invaded the territories of Ariobarzanes and Nicomedes kings of

of Cappadocia and Bithynia, and expelled the kings from their dominions. Remonſtrances were made by the ſenate in favour of their allies, but in vain. Mithridates moreover ordered all the Roman citizens found in Aſia to be put to death. A general maſſacre took place accordingly. The Romans prepared for war, choſe Sylla one of the conſuls, and appointed him to command the army deſtined againſt Mithridates. Whilſt Sylla was getting ready for his expedition, a more dangerous diſturbance aroſe from the popular party, than any which had yet taken place in Rome. Not only the ſenate, but the men of property and conſequence of the people, regarded Sylla as the fitteſt perſon for conducting the war which was now commencing. The late extenſion of ſuffrage had however given a great acceſſion of power to the demagogues, becauſe it was now very eaſy for any ſeditious haranguer to procure a majority in an aſſembly in which the loweſt and moſt worthleſs of

the populace were ſuffered to vote. Sulpicius, more daring and profligate than even Saturninus had been, was now tribune. Seeing the authority which the late extenſions of ſuffrage gave to popular leaders, he endeavoured if poſſible to procure univerſal ſuffrage. He undid the limitations under which the Italians had been permitted to vote, and filled up the rolls of the people in whatever way ſuited his own views. At the head of his rabble he did whatever he pleaſed. He cauſed many reſpectable citizens, who endeavoured to reſiſt his violence, to be put to death. Sylla himſelf, the chief magiſtrate of his country, was obliged to withdraw privately from the capital, and ſeek ſhelter in his army. Marius, who had kept on the reſerve whilſt there was a doubt of Sulpicius's ſucceſs, now that he believed his victory over the men of rank and property indiſputable, put himſelf at the head of the populace. It had long been his object to have the command againſt Mithridates, a

command

command for which his age and infirmities rendered him totally unfit. In an aſſembly conſiſting ſo much of ſuch voters as were now admitted it was eaſy for a favourite of the mob to obtain whatever decree he choſe. An act was procured appointing Marius to ſuperſede Sylla in the command. Every thing at Rome was managed by Sulpicius and Marius, at the head of the dregs of the populace. If the government of Rome had been properly mixed the evils that enſued would have been prevented. The controul-ing orders would either have reſtrained Sul-picius in the beginning of his career, or brought him and Marius to condign puniſh-ment when their ſedition ripened into trea-ſon, when they actually levied war againſt the chief magiſtrate and the ſtate. The demagogue would have been hanged, the ſenator beheaded in the due courſe of law, and the ſtate reſtored to tranquillity. But the democracy did not admit of legal redreſs.

 Thoſe

Thoſe wicked men had acted agreeably to the forms of the government. By the conſtitution the ſupreme power was veſted in the people; and as they had procured a majority of votes their proceedings had been nominally legal. They might have completely eſtabliſhed their own uſurpation without departing from the letter of the law. To have attempted to uſe literally legal means in oppoſing them would have been ineffectual. Sylla by the neceſſity of the times, was compelled to deviate from eſtabliſhed law, and to oppoſe force by force. He marched to Rome at the head of his army. Marius oppoſed him with his adherents. A bloody conflict enſued; Sulpicius among many others was killed; Marius with difficulty eſcaped, and took himſelf to baniſhment. Sylla did not fail to gratify his own private reſentment as well as puniſh the public enemies, now that he had the ſupreme power in his hands. His general

regulations however tended to prevent the recurrence of popular violence, by removing the causes. He restored the senate to its former power, and replaced the legislative authority in the hands of the assembly of the centuries, the majority of property, instead of that of the tribes, the majority of number.

Having restored the commonwealth to tranquillity, Sylla set out upon his expedition against Mithridates. By a series of victories, gained with a very inferior army, and in very unfavourable circumstances, he in two years compelled Mithridates to evacuate his conquests, to indemnify the Roman allies for their losses, and the Romans for the expence of the war. Whilst this great man was engaged in repressing and reducing the foreign enemies of his country, its internal, the democratic party, again recovered its strength at Rome. Cinna, his successor in the consulship, revived the popular pretensions to uni-

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verſal ſuffrage and diviſions of property. The ſenate and the principal men among the people, headed by Octavius the other conſul, joined in oppoſing theſe dangerous propoſitions; obliged Cinna to leave Rome, and choſe another conſul in his place. The war ſtill in ſome degree ſubſiſted between Rome and the moſt obſtinate of the Italian ſtates. Several armies were on foot in Italy. The refractory Italians were well affected to the democratic party at Rome. Cinna betook himſelf to an army under Appius Claudius, and had the addreſs to gain it over to his intereſt. He was joined by Sertorius, a man of great talents and military ſkill, who, though driven by diſappointments and reſentments into the democratic party, poſſeſſed many virtues, and endeavoured to moderate the violence of his aſſociates. Marius hearing in Africa, where he was in baniſhment, that the democratic faction was again in force, haſtened to Italy to join Cinna. The pru-

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dence and moderation of Sertorius objected to the admiffion of a man of Marius's known character into the camp. He was over-ruled by Carbo and Cinna, and Marius fuffered to put himfelf at the head of the army. On hearing that Marius was with the army, many of thofe foldiers and officers who had formerly ferved under him, left the oppofite party, and flocked to his ftandard. At the head of numerous forces, he with Carbo, Cinna, and Sertorius, marched to Rome. Metellus and Octavius, generals of the party of the fenate, endeavouring to oppofe him, were abandoned by their troops. Marius entered Rome; caufed thofe of the friends of order, who did not fave themfelves by flight, to be put to death without a trial, and confifcated their property. His moft atrocious cruelties were againft the greateft and moft refpectable characters of the fenate. He fuffered his foldiers to gratify their bad paffions as well as himfelf. The city was a

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difmal fcene of robbery, murder, and every fpecies of enormity. Sertorius was very averfe to thefe horrid crimes, but was unable to prevent them. Marius made himfelf conful, and fuffered his banditti to continue their rapine and maffacres. Rome, when taken by the Gauls, had not been fuch a fcene of woe as when poffeffed by the democratic faction, and the democratic leader Marius. Marius in ufurping the fupreme power, did no more than every democratical leader would do, if he had the fame abilities and the fame opportunities. His tyranny however was fortunately not of very long continuance: death put a final ftop to his barbarities. If Rome had been a government of king, lords, and commons, Marius would either not have formed fuch defigns, or if he had, would have been arrefted in his courfe, by the vigilance of government and the wifdom of the national council, long before his projects had produced fo direful effects. He was to-

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tally unreſtrained by principle, and would have been a bad man under any government, but that his wickedneſs produced bloodſhed and devaſtation in his country, aroſe from the prevalence of democracy.

On the death of Marius, the democratic partizans, headed by Cinna, uſurped the government. Meanwhile Sylla returned to Italy, to avenge the injuries of his plundered and murdered friends, and of his enſlaved country. The democratic leaders had numerous forces, and together with the Italian ſtates, promiſed a formidable oppoſition. Italy was now the ſcene of a bloody civil war, in which the abilities of Sylla were daily becoming more and more ſuccefsful. The war was carried on for two years, and might have laſted longer, if the Marian faction had been more under the direction of Sertorius, a general little inferior to Sylla. Sertorius withdrew into Spain. Sylla having defeated the

other

other Marian leaders, ſuccefsfully marched to Rome; vanquiſhed the remains of the Marian armies near Rome, and entirely cruſhed the party. At the head of his victorious army, now maſter of the ſtate, Sylla proceeded to very great cruelty, cauſed the priſoners to be put to death in cold blood, ordered the adherents of Marius that remained in the city, and every individual obnoxious to himſelf, to be maſſacred and his property to be confiſcated; ſuffered his officers and ſoldiers to gratify their rapacity and reſentments by robbery and murder; and while thoſe horrid ſcenes were acting by his permiſſion, or command, amuſed himſelf in mirth and diſſipation. Having extirpated the Marian party, he cauſed himſelf to be elected perpetual dictator. He diſpoſed of the confiſcated lands among his ſoldiers, and thus made them intereſted in the government which he ſhould eſtabliſh. His political regulations were in general well fitted to the

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prevention of the recurrence of thoſe evils which the ſtate had ſuffered from the prevalence of democracy, and from tribunitian uſurpations. He replaced the legiſlative power in the aſſembly of property, and reſtored the judicative to the ſenate. He deprived the tribunes of their pretended right of haranguing the people, and made ſeveral very ſalutary additions to the criminal law. On the whole his inſtitutions were friendly to the order, tranquillity, and happineſs of the ſtate. Having eſtabliſhed the government, he to the ſurpriſe of all the world, reſigned his abſolute power. Sylla's chief principles of action appear to have been on the one hand violent reſentment; on the other, zeal for the intereſt of his country. His reſentment, no doubt, prompted him to exceſſive cruelties. It might be alledged in extenuation of ſome of the barbarities, that they were inflicted on perſons who had been inſtrumental in the greateſt villainy to their country and cruelty to his friends.

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His enemies ſtruck the firſt blow; it was owing to his fortune and ſtrength that his were the hardeſt, and if he did not forbear when he had them down, his conduct though not juſtifiable, was certainly not unnatural when he had been ſo provoked. But whatever abhorrence his conduct towards the conquered Marians may deſerve, its turpitude or enormity does not leſſen the merit of his inſtitutions, or the glory of his reſignation. The democratic party began hoſtilities, therefore were accountable for the conſequences. Sylla was either cruel from natural diſpoſition, enraged from provocation, or ſevere from a ſenſe of the injuries of his country. If he was naturally cruel, the aggreſſion of the democrats gave him an opportunity of gratifying his cruelty; if enraged, injuries from the democrats excited his reſentment; if impreſſed with a feeling of wrongs done to his country, the democrats were the authors of the injuries. Whether therefore we conſider the

conduct

conduct of Sylla as deteſtable, as excuſeable, or as neceſſary, it was owing to democratic violence; the maſſacres of Sylla proceeded from the prevalence of democracy.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Lepidus revives popular diſturbances—Cruſhed—Pompey ſent to Spain againſt Sertorius—Lucullus ſent againſt Mithridates—Conquers him and Tigranes—Spartacus—Cruſhed by Craſſus—Pompey by Tribunitian intrigues inveſted with an unlimited power, deſtroys the pirates—At the inſtance of a tribune ſupported by Cicero ſuperſedes Lucullus in the command, entirely ſubdues the Aſiatic princes.

AN attentive and impartial reader of the Roman hiſtory, from the firſt appearance of Tiberius Gracchus, to the civil war of Marius and Sylla, muſt be convinced that the alarming diſſenſions, and terrible convulſions, which characterized that period, were owing to the democracy. We are now entering upon the laſt act of the Roman republic and faſt approaching to the cataſtrophe. The democratic faction, though prevented during Sylla's dictatorſhip from raiſing its head at Rome, was far from being cruſhed. It ſtill remained in great

though hidden force. When Sylla's resignation dispelled its fears, it again openly made its appearance. Lepidus being made consul put himself at the head of the reanimated remains of the popular party. He owed the consular dignity to the influence of a young man destined to act a distinguished part in the closing scene of Roman liberty. Cn. Pompey had when very young, by a graceful appearance, dignified manners, and military enterprize, attained great distinction. When twenty-three years of age, though only a knight, and invested with no public character, he had raised a body of troops for Sylla. With these he attacked and defeated Brutus a Marian general at the head of much more numerous forces. His successful courage and activity were so agreeable to Sylla that he hailed the victorious youth Imperator, a title usually bestowed on commanders in chief only, after a signal victory. He ordered him also to be called Pompey the

Great, a firname which afterwards adhered to him, and feems to have added to his idea of his own perfonal importance. In the fequel of the civil war he was by his valour and enterprize repeatedly ufeful to Sylla. The defire of diftinction early fhewed itfelf to be Pompey's ruling paffion; through the whole of his life it was not difficult for thofe to lead him, who made him believe that he led them. Lepidus though a man of no great parts, by pretending to be the creature of Pompey had induced him to employ his popularity in favouring his election. The penetrating Sylla eafily comprehended a character which impofed on the fpecious Pompey. He difapproved highly of Lepidus's election, and blamed Pompey for interefting himfelf in his favour. He had by this time alfo, it would appear, formed a juft idea of Pompey's own character, which fuccefsful exertion in his caufe had before painted to him in too favourable colours. The event

fhewed

ſhewed the right judgment of Sylla, and the wrong judgment of Pompey concerning Lepidus. Lepidus propoſed to repeal all the ordinances of Sylla, to reſtore the tribunitian power to its former dangerous height, and to eſtabliſh *univerſal* ſuffrage through Italy. The ſenate oppoſed his motions, and ſucceeded in having them rejected by the people. Diſappointed, he levied war againſt his country, and advanced to Rome. His ability however was not equal to his wicked intentions. He was defeated, and driven to baniſhment, in which he died.

Sertorius had retired to Spain with ſome of the remains of the Marian faction, and collected a conſiderable body of Spaniards againſt the Romans. Now that Sylla was dead, he was at this time the ableſt Roman who had as yet appeared at the head of an army. Metellus had been ſent againſt him by Sylla; but only to manifeſt his own

inferiority. Pompey was ſent to reinforce and aſſiſt Metellus. His eagerneſs to diſtinguiſh himſelf, led him to attack Sertorius without the aſſiſtance of the other general. He was on the point of receiving, in a defeat, a fatal proof of his inferiority to Sertorius, when Metellus coming up, covered his retreat. With unequal troops, the great abilities of Sertorius prevented them both, as long as he lived, from gaining any advantage. At length his talents and high military character excited the envy of Perperna, his lieutenant general; at whoſe inſtigation he was aſſaſſinated. Perperna, now at the head of the Sertorian troops, proved an eaſy conqueſt to Metellus and Pompey. He was himſelf ſlain, and his forces diſperſed.

Meanwhile the democratical power was faſt riſing to its former greatneſs, and the tribunes to their pernicious authority. The great original defect in the Roman conſtitu-

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tion, the want of a juſt balance, notwithſtanding the regulations of Sylla, ſtill remained. A mixed well-poiſed government could have ſaved Rome from the turbulent anarchy of democracy or the paralyzing horrors of deſpotiſm. Republics have, in general, been eager to extend their territories. This is manifeſt from the hiſtory of Athens, of Carthage, and of Rome. Far however, is conqueſt and extenſion of dominion from being a criterion of the internal welfare of a ſtate. The body may diſplay feats of ſtrength and activity when an inward diſtemper is preying on the vitals. Mithridates had renewed the war. Lucullus, an able and ſkilful general, who had been a great favourite of Sylla, and was highly reſpected by the ſenate, was ſent againſt the king of Pontus. By ſucceſſive victories, he deſtroyed Mithridates's beſt troops, diſpoſſeſſed him of his principal cities, and the greater part of his dominions. Mithridates

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ſought refuge with his ſon-in-law Tigranes, king of Armenia, now the moſt powerful prince of the Eaſt. The Armenian monarch afforded his friend protection, and went to war with the Romans. Lucullus defeated Tigranes, took his capital, and would have finiſhed the war by the ſubjugation of all his territories, if democratic caprice had not ſuperſeded him in his command, and appointed a favourite general to reap the fruit of his labours.

During this war, a dangerous diſturbance broke out in Italy, from an inſurrection of the ſlaves. As ſlavery was a ſtate, which prevailed under all forms of government in ancient times, we have ſaid little of the Athenian ſlaves, and hitherto nothing of the Roman. It does not appear, that the treatment of ſlaves either in theſe ſtates, or in any other democracies, was diſtinguiſhed either by mildneſs or ſeverity from that under

other forms of government: it does not therefore tend to illuſtrate the effects of democracy. There was at Rome one peculiarity in the uſe made of ſome of their ſlaves. A certain deſcription of them was employed in fighting, as a ſhow to amuſe the people. Theſe were called Gladiators or Sword-players. The conqueror either ſpared or ſlew his antagoniſt, according to the ſignal given by the ſpectators: "*Verſo pollice vulgi* (ſays the ſatiriſt) "*Quemlibet occidunt popu-*" *lariter*;" if the populace turned their thumbs, the victorious combatant muſt kill the foe to pleaſe them." The Romans took as much delight in theſe bloody combats as the Spaniards do in bull-fights, and ſome of our countrymen do in cock-fighting, bear-baiting, and boxing matches. Thoſe gladiators were incloſed in ſchools, in which they practiſed the various movements of attack and defence, and were in point of exerciſe and diet, like modern prize-fighters previous to

a pitched battle, in training for their public exhibitions. From one of theſe ſchools, Spartacus, a gladiator, of great ſtrength and courage, eſcaped with near a hundred of his followers. Betaking themſelves to the woods and mountains, they plundered the adjacent country. Numbers of ſlaves, deſerters, and other malefactors, flocked to the ſtandard of Spartacus. The Roman government at firſt deſpiſed this inſurrection; the event ſhewed that it is very unwiſe in rulers, to diſregard even the buddings of rebellion. Spartacus eaſily defeated ſmaller bodies ſent againſt him, and even vanquiſhed two conſuls with their combined forces. After this inteſtine commotion had raged for three years, Marcus Craſſus, who had diſtinguiſhed himſelf under Sylla, was appointed to command againſt the inſurgents. He ſoon re-eſtabliſhed the ſuperiority of the Roman troops; engaged Spartacus, who after a gallant reſiſtance, was killed and moſt of his followers cut to pieces.

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The remains of the vanquiſhed inſurgents fled for refuge to the mountains, and were there met by Pompey, returning from Spain with a victorious army. He eaſily cruſhed the fugitives. The vanity of Pompey led him to aſſume the merit of having finiſhed a war, in the cloſe of which, he had accidentally met with a few runaways without any leader. "I have (ſaid he in a letter to the ſenate) "cut up the root of that war, "and exterminated the very laſt of thoſe "robbers." Craſſus was highly offended at Pompey for arrogating to himſelf a glory which really belonged to him. He however ſacrificed his reſentment to his ambition, and joined with Pompey, to procure the conſulſhip for both. Though profeſſedly of the ariſtocratic party, they both courted the people. Craſſus, who was the richeſt man of his time, gave entertainments to the whole multitude; and three months proviſion of corn. Oſtentatious vanity, much more than de-

deſigning ambition, was the main ſpring of Pompey's actions. Power he ſeemed to conſider only as the means of gratifying his love of diſtinction. By the fame of his exploits, and the plauſibility of his deportment, he was highly agreeable to the people. After there was no general to oppoſe him, he had overrun Spain; the multitude, who meaſure ability by ſucceſs, without conſidering eaſe or difficulty, believed him to be one of the greateſt commanders Rome had ever produced. To pleaſe the commons farther, he procured the reſtoration to their favourite magiſtrates, of that dangerous power which Sylla had confined within uſeful limits. He alſo procured the judicial power to be taken from the ſenate, and given again to the knights, agreeable to Caius Gracchus's laws. The ſenate ſaw the dangerous tendency of Pompey's popular meaſures, but was not able to prevent their ſucceſs. The people and their demagogues adored Pompey, and longed for

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an opportunity, now that his consulship was expired, of bestowing on him some very high appointment.

About this time the sea was very much infested with pirates; the numbers of those increased as the profits of their depredations became greater. They sailed in formidable squadrons; not only captured trading ships, but entered harbours, plundered the coasts and maritime towns, took numbers of citizens whom they forced to pay ransom, sold for slaves, or put to death. They appeared even at the mouth of the Tiber, plundered Ostia, the Gravesend of Rome, and by interrupting the corn trade, reduced the city to great straits. The distresses caused by the pirates, afforded to Pompey an occasion for procuring through tribunitian intrigues, an extraordinary power. Gabinius a tribune, a creature of Pompey, proposed that in order to put a stop to the piracies, some man of

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confular rank and high character, fhould be invefted with abfolute power, by fea and land. Pompey was immediately underftood to be the perfon intended. The multitude, who are eafily duped, highly approved of this commiffion, being beftowed on Pompey. In the fenate the motion was ftrenuoufly oppofed. Pompey himfelf abounded in diffimulation, and dealt much in artifices, which he reckoned very refined, and which every perfon of common penetration muft fee through. He affected to difapprove of Gabinius's motion, enumerated the labours he had already undergone, hoped he might be left to his repofe, and declared there were many fitter for fuch an office than himfelf. In fhort, he ufed all the common place cant which is employed by thofe who pretend to diflike a pleafure, an honour, or an advantage, after which they are eagerly afpiring. Thofe hackneyed arts paffed upon the people as the greateft difintereftednefs; fo com-

competent judges are they of conduct and character. Gabinius professing to believe the sincerity of Pompey's declarations, pretended to be in a great rage, and accused him of want of patriotism, in preferring his own repose to the good of his country. Pompey, he said, must be compelled to take the command. Catulus, a senator of very great wisdom and virtue, delivered his opinion most explicitly and firmly, on the inexpediency and folly of vesting such a power in any one citizen. He shewed that the ordinary magistrates, if ever fit for their office, would, when furnished with a proper force, be perfectly adequate to the suppression of the pirates: and that supposing Pompey, individually, ever so moderate and patriotic, such a commission would establish a bad precedent, which might be followed in cases of a contrary description. The sound arguments of Catulus were convincing to the senate, but weighed little with the people. Pompey

was inveſted with the power propoſed. In the execution of his commiſſion, as in all his military operations, he diſplayed great valour and activity; qualities which, though they do not alone conſtitute the excellence of a general, are neceſſary to render talents and ſkill effectual. Pompey in a ſhort time, having the whole naval force of Rome at his command, cleared the Mediterranean from pirates.

Diſcontents had for ſome time crept into the army of Lucullus, which prevented him from puſhing the ſucceſſes which his conduct had obtained. The ſoldiers conceived that he expoſed them to danger and difficulties, in order to increaſe his own treaſure.

Pompey had long been deſirous of obtaining the ſupreme command in Aſia. Agents from him were fomenting diſcontent in the camp of Lucullus; whilſt the tribunes at Rome,

Rome, ſtirred up the diſpleaſure of the people. Mithridates learning the diſſatisfaction of the army, had, during the abſence of Lucullus in Armenia, defeated one of his lieutenants with a conſiderable body of forces. The vigour of the general, had it been permitted to exert itſelf, would have ſoon retrieved the Roman affairs. At the inſtance of Pompey's creatures the tribunes, Lucullus was recalled. The populace had now completely recovered their ſupremacy, and reſumed that inſolence, turbulence, and violence, which had marked their conduct during the time of the Gracchi, Saturninus, Sulpicius, and Marius. It was no ſmall reaſon for their wiſhing to diſgrace Lucullus, that he was an enemy to democratic exceſſes, and highly admired by the ſenate. Manilius, one of the tribunes, who had diſtinguiſhed himſelf by motions for extending ſuffrage, and become odious to the ſenate, propoſed a law which he knew would gratify the people,

and their favourite Pompey. This was to inveſt him with the command in Aſia. A man of the firſt ability and moſt benevolent diſpoſitions, who was generally attached to the ariſtocratic party, in this motion ſeconded the democrat. Tullius Cicero had before this time eſtabliſhed his character as the greateſt orator who had ever appeared in Rome. With talents equalled by one only of his age, with unqueſtionable rectitude of intention, it was Cicero's fate, from vanity, feebleneſs, and irreſolution of heart, to be frequently the tool of men much his inferiors in ability, in promoting hurtful purpoſes. There is no certain dependence on the conduct of a man, however well diſpoſed, whoſe ruling paſſion is vanity; or who does not poſſeſs firmneſs, as well as wiſdom and benevolence. Though of the party of the ſenate, Cicero coveted the applauſe of the people, and knew there could not be a more effectual way to increaſe their eſteem and admi-

admiration, than a panegyric on Pompey. He accordingly made a very ſplendid oration, the ſcope of which was to prove Pompey to be the ableſt and moſt fortunate general who ever exiſted; and in every reſpect the only perſonage qualified for commanding againſt Mithridates. This panegyric in point of brilliant eloquence, was perhaps not ſurpaſſed even by the famous invective of five hours, which a modern orator of the moſt ſplendid talents pronounced in the Houſe of Commons. Were we to judge of Pompey's talents and character, through the medium of Cicero's eloquence, we ſhould imagine his victories in Spain, when there was no general to oppoſe him; his cruſhing of the fugitives after the victory of Craſſus had deprived them of their leader, and rendered them incapable of reſiſtance; his diſperſion of the pirates, with the whole navy of Rome under his command, were proofs of un-

equalled military talents. Hortenſius and Catulus, the moſt eminent men of the ariſtocratic party, zealouſly oppoſed ſo great an elevation of Pompey. Their oppoſition was ineffectual. By the unanimous voice of the plebeians, Pompey ſuperſeded Lucullus in the command, with unlimited power. Pompey poſſeſſed good qualities, which rendered ſuch power leſs dangerous in his hands, than it would have been in thoſe of many others. He was moderate, temperate, and humane, neither avaricious nor oppreſſive. His great authority was never intentionally hurtful, although it became eventually deſtructive to his country, by rendering him an efficacious tool of the moſt wicked deſigns, in the hands of a much more able man.

It was not difficult for Pompey to bring to a victorious concluſion, a war with an enemy whom his predeceſſor had ſo greatly reduced.

reduced. He entirely conquered Mithridates and Tigranes, ſubdued Syria, and rendered Judea and ſeveral other countries tributary to Rome.

CHAP. XIV.

Julius Cæſar—Conſpiracy of Cataline—Deſcriptions of conſpirators againſt eſtabliſhments—Cataline's aſſociates conſiſt of a correſponding ſociety, and a ſecret committee—Plot diſcovered—Cæſar's conſulſhip, and democratic innovations—Clodius—Baniſhment of Cicero—Violence of the people—temporary calm—recall of Cicero—renewal of democratical outrages—Cæſar's victories in Gaul—Death of Craſſus—of Julia—Dangerous deſigns of Cæſar—Folly of the people, and wickedneſs of their demagogues—Pompey joins the friends of their country—Civil wars—Democracy terminated in ſingle deſpotiſm.

A Perſonage was in Rome, taking the lead in the popular party, whoſe extraordinary talents fitted him for being a leading member in the ſenate, or in any aſſembly of the firſt rank and ability, which the world has ſeen. Julius Cæſar was ſprung from a noble family, but was firſt by affinity, and afterwards by inclination and ambition, attached to the popular party. He was nephew to the wife of Marius, and had married the daughter of Cinna. The Roman law allowing to a huſband an arbitrary power of divorce, Sylla commanded Cæſar to repudiate his wife,

becaufe fhe was Cinna's daughter. Cæfar refufed; he with difficulty, by the interceffion of friends, efcaped profcription. Sylla, whilft he pardoned him, manifefted the penetration of his own character in the judgement he gave of the youth, not eighteen years of age; "My friends, faid he, I fee "in this young man many Mariufes." Cæfar, during the dictatorfhip, retired into Afia, and devoted himfelf to improving his extraordinary talents by literature. During that time, he incidentally exhibited fpecimens of the boldnefs and felf-poffeffing decifion which marked his future character. Captured by pirates, inftead of foliciting their mercy, or courting their favour, he affumed an imperious tone, and by his magnanimous policy, awed thofe defperadoes into the moft fubmiffive reverence, and was releafed on his own terms. Returning to Rome, he diftinguifhed himfelf for his eloquence. Whilft he was fo eminent for oratorial abilities, and for talents in general, he was no lefs remar-

kable for extravagance and profligacy. He was not twenty-five years of age, when he had ſpent an ample fortune, and become deeply involved in debt. His vices were accompanied by an apparent openneſs and affability, by winning manners, which tended to render them more dangerous. His ſeeming good nature, his frank, obliging and unaſſuming deportment, rendered him highly agreeable to the people, on whom ſuch manners in their ſuperiors paſs for unequivocal proofs of benevolent diſpoſitions. To ſome of the young nobility, he alſo rendered himſelf very pleaſing by initiating them in debauchery, and by ridiculing the auſterity of the older and moſt reſpectable ſenators. He made his friends, like himſelf, ſtrenuous partizans of the democratic faction; he encouraged every motion made by tribunes, or other ſeditious citizens, to degrade the ſenate, and to diſturb the tranquillity of the ſtate. Cicero, and ſome others of the moſt ſagacious of the ſenators, diſcerned in

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the conduct and character of Cæſar influenced by his deſperate circumſtances, a deſire of univerſal change in the ſtate, in order to extricate himſelf from his difficulties, and to gratify his boundleſs ambition. To this motive, they imputed his oppoſition to the ariſtocracy, and his profeſſed zeal for what he called *the rights of the people*. The ſenators in general, who had not the penetration to dive into the more hidden parts of his character, deteſted the notorious part, his debauchery and profligacy. Cæſar ſaw, that through the people only, he could riſe to the eſtabliſhed offices, and much more to that power which he appears to have early coveted. He perceived that he could not more effectually pay his court to the people, than by profeſſing warmly to embrace the intereſts of their favourites. He appeared to be a zealous partizan of Pompey, and next to the tribunes Gabinius and Manilius, and to Cicero was the moſt inſtrumental in having

extraordinary appointments conferred on that general. Several reaſons determined Cæſar to appear ſtrenuous in ſupport of Pompey. Pompey was at that time the principal favourite with the people; conſequently Cæſar, by appearing his partizan, gratified the democrats. By the extraordinary powers intruſted to that general, a precedent was eſtabliſhed of which Cæſar might afterwards avail himſelf. Pompey was the man of firſt conſideration in the ſtate, and Cæſar had hitherto attained diſtinction far ſhort of his abilities. He muſt have ſeen through Pompey's real character, and that it would not be difficult for a man of talents, by profeſſing to act a ſubordinate part, to make him a tool.

The democratic party, now that *ſuffrage* was *univerſal*, comprehended the moſt worthleſs men of the ſtate. Every perſon oppreſſed with debt, who wiſhed to defraud his creditors, every one who had ſuffered puniſhment,

ment, or expected to suffer punishment for his crimes, every one who wished to be free from the restraint of the laws, ranged himself under the standard of the demagogues. Whoever had suffered punishment for sedition, or any other violence tending to disturb the state, was represented by the demagogues as a martyr, to oppression and injustice. Cicero, now consul, patriotically exerted his great abilities in defending Caius Rabirius against a charge brought by the democratic party, of having thirty-five years before killed the tribune Saturninus. Beside the distance of time, and the fact being that Rabirius did not kill Saturninus; that tribune was in a state of rebellion, and had taken arms against his country. He was killed in resisting the armed force of his country, headed by the supreme magistrates. Whatever individual therefore happened to kill him, was doing his duty. Cicero succeeded in the defence of Rabirius: the accusation therefore served

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only to ſhew the democratic faction to be friendly to inſurgents and inſurrections, which was well known before.

During this conſulſhip the abilities of Cicero diſcovered and defeated a moſt dangerous conſpiracy, formed by *a club or ſociety* branching from the democrats. Cataline, a nobleman by birth, but of a moſt abandoned character, with a banditti of deſperadoes, conceived a deſign of ſetting fire to the city, of murdering the ſupreme magiſtrate, and principal ſenators, and of ſeizing the government. Of the members who compoſed this conſpiracy we have a very ſtriking deſcription from Salluſt, which beſide being hiſtorically true reſpecting thoſe individuals, is philoſophically juſt as characterizing the claſs of perſons, who are in any country moſt apt to enter into combinations againſt the ſtate. The aſſociates of Cataline were profligate ſpendthrifts, bankrupts by their vices in for-

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tune and in credit, who would go any lengths to be free of the incumbrances which prevented the certain continuance of wicked gratifications, and to acquire a fund for future depravity. To theſe were added perſons whoſe inability or miſconduct had prevented them from riſing ſo high in their profeſſions, or in the ſtate, as their own conceit fancied they deſerved; in ſhort, all who from ruined circumſtances, abandoned characters, or diſappointed ambition, were diſſatisfied with their own individual ſituations, and wiſhed for a general change, which they imagined might make them better, but knew could not make them worſe. Several women originally of rank and fortune, but who by their vices had reduced themſelves to poverty and contempt, favoured Cataline's deſign; thieves, robbers, murderers, and all thoſe villains who ſubſiſt by violence and plunder, approved of Cataline's ſcheme, ſo favourable to their habitual rapine. It is not to be imagined that the principal

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conſpirators would entruſt the whole of their deſign to all whom they wiſhed to make inſtrumental in its execution. They ſet out with profeſſing *plans of reform*, agreeable to the notions which ſeditious haranguers had taken ſuch pains to impreſs on the people. In the common cant of mal-contents they repreſented regular government as an encroachment on the *rights of man*, and their own deſigns of rebellion, maſſacre, and plunder, as plans for reſtoring their countrymen to their *inherent privileges*. It is therefore probable, that ſome of the populace from general ignorance, or particular miſconception, might favour Cataline, without having themſelves bad intentions. The conſpiracy continued for two years before it came to its full height. The plot thickened, and every thing was preparing for making the cataſtrophe moſt terribly tragical. Agents were employed in various parts of the country to excite diſcontent, to miſlead the ignorant, and collect the worthleſs into a participation

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of the plot. A *correſpondence* was eſtabliſhed between the diſaffected of the country and country towns, and thoſe of the city, for the purpoſe of *co-operation*. Individuals and committees were appointed to *provide arms*. Cataline and a junto of the ringleaders of this *correſponding ſociety* formed themſelves into a *ſecret* committee for arranging the plan of rebellion and bloodſhed. Their firſt intended victims were the moſt reſpectable ſenators and magiſtrates, and above all Cicero. That patriotic and wiſe ſervant of his country, was beyond all others hated and deteſted by the conſpirators, and all their connections. From the head of the plot to the loweſt ſecond-hand retailer of impotent ſcurrility, all according to the meaſure of their abilities, abuſed Cicero. It is altogether in the natural courſe of things, for thoſe who mean miſchief to their country, to abominate the ableſt and moſt indefatigable labourers for its preſervation and welfare. The penetration of Cicero

had before his conſulſhip diſcovered their general deſigns. It was during his magiſtracy that his vigilance and indefatigable induſtry made him perfectly acquainted with the detail of the means. Accident aſſiſted in ſome degree in furniſhing him with diſcoveries, which his ſagacity traced to their ſource. Curius, one of the junto of ringleaders, who beſide his profligacy, was weak and vain, had long had an intrigue with Fulvia, a woman of ſome rank, who had reduced herſelf to the ſtate of being a courtezan. On her he ſquandered what of his fortune remained from a ſeries of debaucheries. Unable any longer to ſupply the extravagance in which women of that ſtamp delight, he tried to amuſe her with promiſes. He attempted to enhance to her the importance of her conqueſt by boaſting of the confidence repoſed in him. As a proof of it he diſcovered the plot; at the ſame time he tried to feed her with the hopes of ſharing in the treaſures which he fancied he ſhould

have in his power. Fulvia either relying little on the promifes of a lover ruined by extravagance, or entertaining a bad opinion of an undertaking trufted to fo garrulous and weak a perfon as Curius, conceived it would be more profitable to unfold the whole affair. She did fo in fuch a way as to reach the ears of Cicero. The wifeft and beft men muft often in inveftigating fecret and *affociated* villainy, make ufe of worthlefs inftruments. The fureft guides to the difcovery of plots muft be accomplices. Cicero fent for Fulvia, and afterwards for Curius; and prevailed on him to difcover all he knew of the confpiracy. Informed who the confpirators were, he detached others from the affociation. With a patriotic policy, which no real lover of his country could blame, he directed thofe perfons ftill to attend as accomplices at the *clubs* of the confpirators, and inform him of their motions. He then laid his difcoveries before the fenate, but for a very obvious reafon did not

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mention his authors, becaufe that would have clofed the fource of future information. The majority of the fenate repofing the *utmoft confidence* in the integrity and wifdom of Cicero, and knowing that whatever he either told or concealed, he did it from the moft prudent and patriotic confiderations, required him not, to prove his allegations, or to produce witneffes. They ordained by a public decree, that the confuls fhould take care, *leaft the ftate received any detriment*; a form ufed in times of emergency, invefting the fupreme magiftrates with a power of difpenfing with the laws. It proceeded on this principle, that as all laws ought to be intended to prevent evil, and to do good to the community; when cafes occur in which their ufual courfe could not produce good or hinder evil, for the very fame reafon for which they ought generally to operate, they behove them to be fufpended. It was the democracy which hindered the fufpenfion from proceeding as in mixed governments, on extraordinary cafes,

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from the legiſlature. The emergencies which required the interruption of the laws aroſe from democratic violence. Now that ſuffrage was ſo extended, the majority of the people ſtimulated by their demagogues, was not unfavourable to inſurrections. From their aſſemblies therefore, no effectual meaſures could be expected for ſuppreſſing the conſpiracy. If Rome had been a mixed and well-balanced government, the legiſlature would have been diſpoſed, and able, to frame temporary acts, according to the exigency of the caſe. At Rome, to ſupply the defects of the democracy, and to remedy the evils which it cauſed, the ſenate was obliged to exert a diſcretionary power. Cataline finding the plot diſcovered, and being ſeverely attacked by the glowing eloquence of Cicero, left the city and betook himſelf to his correſponding accomplices in the country, and country towns. The vigilance of Cicero ſoon after made him maſter of letters from the conſpirators in the city, and of other proofs

which unfolded every particular of their individual and general deſigns. He arreſted Lentulus, a worthleſs and abandoned man, who had been degraded from the ſenatorian dignity for miſconduct; Cethegus, a moſt diſſolute audacious miſcreant, who had been ſometime before tribune, and a favourite demagogue; alſo the reſt of the ſecret committee who remained in the city. A debate took place in the ſenate concerning the diſpoſal of the conſpirators. Moſt of the ſenators argued, that as there could be no doubt of their guilty intentions they ſhould be put ſummarily to death. Cæſar on the contrary ſaid, that whatever might be their wickedneſs, the law had not annexed the puniſhment of death to ſuch proceedings, and that therefore they ought not to be capitally puniſhed. The virtuous and patriotic Cato conſidered leſs the letter of the law than general equity and expediency. It was juſt, he ſaid, that thoſe who were deviſing the murder of the ſupreme magiſtrate,

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and of all good men, and the ſubverſion of the ſtate, ſhould be puniſhed by death for thoſe wicked and traitorous compaſſings; and that it was expedient that thoſe who ſhewed a deſign to do the greateſt miſchief to their country, ſhould be for ever deprived of the power. Cicero took the ſame ſide with Cato. The majority of the ſenate concurred. The conſpirators were put to death without a formal trial. This was certainly a deviation from the uſual courſe of law, but a deviation, from the irregularity and violence of the democracy abſolutely neceſſary. So unfavourable is democracy to tranquillity and order, that almoſt every ſtep which the ſenate at any time took for reſtoring public peace was literally a deviation from the conſtitution. Cataline hearing of the defeat of his party in the city, tried with a band of deſperadoes to make his eſcape into Gaul; but was intercepted by the conſul's lieutenant. Forced to fight he fell in the battle, and freed his country from

a deſperate enemy, whoſe ability was fortunately not equal to the wickedneſs of his intentions.

Many ſuſpected Cæſar of a participation in Cataline's conſpiracy. That ſuſpicion ſeems to have ariſen from conſidering his heart only, without taking his head into the account. A man of his underſtanding muſt have perceived that the members of the conſpiracy were not ſuch as render ſucceſs likely, and that even if they had ſucceeded, the return of Pompey from the Eaſt with a numerous army of veterans, would have ſoon diſpoſſeſſed them of their power. The great talents of Cæſar formed a much more efficacious plan for attaining ſovereignty. Elected prætor, he employed his official power as well as perſonal influence, in gratifying the populace, attacking the ſenate, and diſturbing the public peace. He found an active tool in Metellus the tribune. Theſe two repreſented the conſpirators as martyrs of

ariſtocratic injuſtice. The ſaviours of their country from one plot might be obnoxious to a man who had formed another much more dangerous. Not his profligacy, ruined circumſtances, and exceſſive ambition only, rendered Cæſar ſo bad a member of the community. He was of the ſect of Epicureans, who made gratification of paſſion the meaſure of happineſs, who denied the providence of the Deity, and diſbelieved a future ſtate. Irreligion, immorality, and democratic turbulence, have generally gone together. The ſame perſons who have diſavowed obedience to the Divinity, the obligations of morality, and the ſanctions of moral law, have been equally averſe to the reſtraints of political order. On the other hand, the champions of political order, the defenders of their country againſt the attacks of democratic violence, and ambitious villainy, have been the friends of piety and virtue. Cato and Cicero with ſome verbal differences in the modification of their tenets,

concurred in being the ſtrenuous ſupporters of theoretical and practical morality and religion. The iniquitous conduct of Cæſar in his prætorſhip compelled the ſenatorian party to attempt his ſuſpenſion. Cæſar ſaw they were likely to ſucceed, and as his affairs were not yet ripe for force, he made a maſterly retreat, and by a voluntary reſignation anticipated their wiſhes. This apparent moderation procured his reinſtatement. During the remainder of the year he was more cautious. At the expiration of that office he procured the lucrative appointment of Propraætor, or governor general of Luſitania. In his government he conducted himſelf very ably, and made uſe of this his firſt opportunity of attaching ſoldiers to his intereſts. He enriched both his army and himſelf. Returning to Rome he declared himſelf a candidate for the conſulſhip.

Pompey was now arrived from the Eaſt. His approach with a great army cauſed apprehenſions at Rome, which he diſpelled by diſmiſſing his troops. He eſteemed himſelf ſecure of the higheſt place in the opinions of his countrymen without being backed by force. The people meaſuring his ability by the quantity of ground he had gone over, without conſidering the eaſe of his courſe, admired him as the greateſt man that Rome had ever produced. His deportment towards them at once courteous and dignified, added affection and reſpect to admiration. His demeanour was not ſo agreeable to the ſenate: there was a parade of condeſcenſion in his behaviour to the nobles, which from an equal is the moſt abſurd inſolence. A jealouſy ſubſiſted between Craſſus and Pompey. They were both of higher conſequence than Cæſar had as yet attained. He ſaw they would be convenient ladders by which he might mount towards the pinnacle which he wiſhed to reach.

He profeſſed to be attached to both, attempted to reconcile them, and ſucceeded. Theſe three entered into a combination for managing every thing in the ſtate through their joint influence: this they knew would not be difficult to effect, as through themſelves or their creatures they had the whole of the democracy at their command. The principal men now at Rome, who took an active ſhare in public affairs, were, for the ſenatorian party, Cato, a man of conſiderable abilities, and of ſtill greater virtue; but of too inflexible a character for producing in ſuch times, and under ſuch a conſtitution, the beneficial effects to his country, and to mankind, which his benevolence intended; Cicero of very great genius, learning, and accompliſhments, of the moſt honeſt intentions, but of a timid feeble temper, and puerile vanity; for the democratic faction, Craſſus noted for his riches, and deſiring power merely to gratify avarice; Pompey eminent for military cha-

racter and perſonal conſideration, valuing power only as a ſource of diſtinction, with amiable qualities but without ſteady principles: Cæſar ſurpaſſing all men of his time in the endowments of his intellect, in the force and verſatility of his character, coveting boundleſs power for the ſake of uncontrouled action, and fitted for making the paſſions of others inſtruments for the moſt extenſive gratification of his own, and for making their ſtrength through their weakneſs, miniſter to his wiſhes. If Cæſar's choice of ends had been equally virtuous as his invention of means was fertile, his ſelections ſkilful, and his application vigorous, perhaps no character would have approached nearer to conſummate perfection. Even profligate and unprincipled as he was, if he had been the ſubject of a properly mixed government, his abilities would have been reſtrained from ſo pernicious a direction. The government would be in the hands of perſons not only able like Cato and

Cicero to ſee the wickedneſs of ſuch deſigns, but inveſted with ſufficient power to render them ineffectual. Too able for gratuitous wickedneſs, his very ambition might have rendered him uſeful to ſuch a country, becauſe in good governments no extent of ability can inſure the long continuance of power without beneficial direction. As at Rome the democrats were prepollent, they were to Cæſar the moſt efficacious inſtruments. They were bowls to which he could eaſily give the bias he choſe. He began his conſulſhip with an Agrarian motion. The profeſſed object of his bill was to divide a conſiderable portion of the demeſne lands in Italy among the poorer citizens, to relieve their diſtreſſes. The real object was to ſecure the favour of the people, and to attach by their intereſt as well as by affection, numbers of them to himſelf. To make Craſſus and Pompey favourable to this bill, he propoſed alſo to them that their creatures and retainers ſhould be included in this

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diſtribution of the public property. He pretended to court the conſent of the ſenate, knowing that that body would ſee the tendency of the bill, and oppoſe it, and that his profeſſed reſpect for their opinion, would make their oppoſition more odious to the people. By applying to the vanity of Cicero, Cæſar for a ſhort time hood-winked his underſtanding, and made him friendly to the bill. Cicero flattered himſelf with the hopes of directing Pompey and Cæſar, and through them Craſſus, and making the ability and influence of that triumvirate miniſter to the good of the country. The film however ſoon broke, and he perceived their ſeveral deſigns in the true light. The vehement expreſſions of ſome ſenators in oppoſing the bill, gave Cæſar a handle for pretending to apprehend force. Of this he made a moſt artful uſe. He profeſſed to apply to Pompey as his patron and protector, and ſaid to him, " Will you ſupport us if we are attacked." " If any one," (replied he,

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gratified by the application) "ſhall lift up a "ſword againſt you, I ſhall lift up both ſword "and ſhield." Craſſus made a ſimilar declaration. Theſe proteſtations made Craſſus and Pompey odious to the ſenate. Thus did the ability of Cæſar render his aſſociates as hateful as himſelf to the ſenate, whilſt he, by his exertions as the mover and ſupporter of the bill, was the chief favourite with the people. After much zealous oppoſition from the friends of the country, the democratic bill paſſed into a law, including a clauſe obliging every ſenator to ſwear to its rigid obſervance, under the pains of baniſhment or death. Cæſar during the reſt of his conſulſhip governed without oppoſition, and made many ſalutary regulations concerning things that did not interfere with the wiſhes of the people, or his own power. The ability of Cæſar might have rendered him a ſubject of extraordinary utility under a mixed monarchy, becauſe his ambition would have been reſtrained from doing great

great evils, and gratified by doing great good. He might alſo have made a moſt excellent king, becauſe then his greatneſs and his country's good would have coincided. Democracy rendered talents and qualities of unequalled ſtrength not a bleſſing but a curſe to mankind. His affairs were not yet ripe for his throwing off the maſk. He had not yet an army at his command to bear down oppoſition to his deſigns. To the attainment of ſo neceſſary an inſtrument he made uſe of the fond folly of the populace, and the ruling paſſions of his aſſociates. By aſſiſting in procuring them the command of armies, he got what he wanted for himſelf. Craſſus got the province of Syria, that he might increaſe his riches; Pompey obtained the government of Spain, which he could rule by his lieutenants, and remain at Rome in the eminence he coveted; Cæſar procured Gaul, a country moſtly unconquered, full of brave men, againſt whom he could habituate his ſoldiers to difficult wars, and ſo

render them the most efficacious instruments of his own designs. Thus did he contribute to the elevation of his associates, that he might so elevate himself and crush their power. To attach Pompey still more closely to his interests, he gave him Julia his beautiful daughter in marriage. Cæsar's next object was to remove the principal senators from Rome. He found an active tool in Clodius. This person was exactly fitted for subordinate villainy, and as Fielding humorously observes in his account of a *corresponding society*, of which *Jonathan Wild* was chairman; "He (Fireblood, one of "the secret committee of those democrats) was "a second-rate rascal, and fit for being the tool "of a first-rate." In the course of a very debauched youth Clodius had been tried for an adultery, which involved in it the profanation of religious rites. Cicero was the principal evidence against him, and had besides often animadverted with great severity on his general profligacy. Raised to the tribuneship he resolved

to ruin Cicero. He attempted to perſuade the people, that thoſe who had been put to death on the charge of conſpiring with Cataline had been unjuſtly treated. He moved a law concerning ſummary proceedings, with a retroſpective clauſe, which ſhould involve Cicero. Directed by Cæſar, ſeconded by Craſſus, and not oppoſed by Pompey, he carried the law in the aſſembly of the people. Lucullus, and the principal ſenators in vain interpoſed in favour of the good man. Cicero was obliged to fly for refuge to Pompey, who though indebted to him for much of his power, deſerted him in his diſtreſs. Sentence of outlawry was paſſed by the people on the ſaviour of their country. His houſe was deſtroyed, and his fortune confiſcated. His feeble wailings in his letters to his friends abate much of the intereſt which his ſufferings would otherwiſe have excited. He had the head of a ſage with the heart of a woman.

Clodius alſo procured the abſence of Cato from Rome, by compelling him to accept of the diſtant province of Cyprus. Freed from the watchful oppoſition of Cicero and Cato, Clodius and his rabble went on with unreſtrained violence. Cæſar having Clodius, and other agents of the ſame ſort, to keep the populace in his intereſt, went to his province. His actions there, not peculiarly relating to our ſubject, we ſhall not detail, but content ourſelves with obſerving in general, that though before little converſant with arms having been moſt of his time in the city, he equalled any general who in any age ever exiſted. His were not the ordinary acquirements of mere technical ſkill, fitted to act in cuſtomary combinations, his mind could vary with the caſe. Every individual victory, and the general ſeries of his ſucceſs, may be eaſily traced to the unremitting action of the boldeſt heart and ableſt head. The Roman diſcipline was well calculated to make men of ordinary talents uſeful generals; Cæſar if he

he had not found an excellent ſyſtem of war would have invented one himſelf. In the field, in the cabinet, in every intercourſe with men, he moulded them as he pleaſed. Whilſt employed in the conqueſt of Gaul, he directed the democrats at Rome as much as if he had been preſent; advancing in the attainment of his object, and receding in particular points, where he ſaw a temporary retreat was the way to permanent victory. Clodius was ſo elevated by his ſucceſs againſt Cicero, that he proceeded even to attack Pompey, and propoſed an enquiry into his conduct in his Aſiatic command; enraged at this attempt Pompey ſet about undoing what Clodius had with his connivance done, and propoſed the recall of Cicero, intending to protect that orator, and to pitch his eloquence againſt the audacity of Clodius. The democrats took different ſides in this conteſt. The partizans of Pompey and of Clodius frequently fought in the ſtreets. Rome was a ſcene of that

confufion and of bloodfhed, which have never failed to mark democracies. Pompey explained to Cæfar the reafons of his conduct, with which Cæfar profeffed to be fatisfied. Cicero was recalled and received with great affection by all ranks at Rome, including even thofe who had banifhed him. Clodius found means, he being the moft defperate and worthlefs of the demagogues, to preponderate in the democratic party. Craffus, Pompey, and Cæfar, had an interview on the confines of Cæfar's province, in which it was agreed that their commands fhould be prolonged, and that Pompey and Craffus fhould be confuls for the enfuing year. As Cicero was now returned, Cæfar affected to confider him as his friend, and difavowed all fhare in Clodius's attack upon him. Cicero, either through vanity or timidity, profeffed to court the triumvirate. Finding thereby that his influence decreafed in the fenate, he for fome time retired into the country, and did not interfere in public affairs.

Clodius perſevered in his outrageous conduct, and was attended in public by bands of the loweſt and moſt worthleſs deſperadoes. During ſome years the popular aſſemblies were the ſcenes of daily maſſacres, and every kind of diſorder. Meanwhile Craſſus ſet out for his government in Syria. Bent upon riches he plundered the temple of Jeruſalem, and unprovoked made war on the Parthians. Being ignorant of the country, and their mode of fighting, he was ſurrounded and cut to pieces. At Rome, Milo, a bold active man, exerted himſelf on the ſide of the ſenate, and in oppoſition to Clodius. The democratic diſturbances continued with increaſing violence.

" The ſtreets," (ſays Cicero, deſcribing ſome of the democratic outrages cauſed by the haranguing demagogue Clodius, the *lecturer* of thoſe days) " the common ſewers, the " river, were filled with dead bodies, and all

" the pavements ſtained with blood." It was propoſed in the ſenate to appoint a dictator, whoſe unlimited power might puniſh the haranguing miſcreants, the inſtigators of ſuch crimes. Arbitrary power lodged in the hands of an individual of known moderation, would have been certainly preferable to this turbulent bloody democracy. Pompey was the perſon thought of for a dictator. From the time of Sylla the dictatorſhip had been an object of averſion and terror: a ſenator therefore propoſed that Pompey ſhould be made ſole conſul, becauſe the conſulſhip implied accountableneſs. Elevated to a ſovereign authority Pompey ceaſed to be a factious leader, and acted for the intereſt of the ſtate. His diſpoſition led him to moderation. It was the turbulence and diſorders of the democracy which either induced or compelled him to be the leader of a faction. A perſonal enmity aroſe from the political conteſts between Clodius and Milo, which ended in the death of the demagogue.

demagogue. Milo one day going to Lanuvium, a town in the neighbourhood of which he was chief magiſtrate, was met by Clodius, returning from his country-ſeat to Rome. Their attendants quarrelled, a ſcuffle enſued, in which Clodius and Milo took the part of their reſpective ſervants. Clodius was killed. It appears that Milo's ſervants were the aggreſſors, ſo that however well the demagogue might deſerve death, it was not in that way. His friends proſecuted Milo. The populace was ſo outrageous on account of the loſs of their favourite haranguer, that it was neceſſary for Pompey to order an armed guard round the court that tried him, to prevent their being diſturbed by the mob. Cicero undertook to plead the cauſe of Milo. Naturally timid, he was over-awed by the ſight of the troops, although he had reaſon to believe they were to protect not to diſturb him. He made a very feeble defence, inſtead of the oration that he had compoſed for the purpoſe, which

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MAHARAJA SERFOJI'S SARASWATI

probably no difcourfe on a judicial queftion ever furpaffed. Milo was condemned to banifhment.

Cæfar had now fubdued Gaul, augmented his army, gained the enthufiaftic affection of his troops, and by various agents directed the popular faction at Rome. From the view of his power, and knowledge of his character, the fenate was much alarmed. Cato ftrenuoufly exhorted Pompey to roufe himfelf and guard againft Cæfar. Pompey long confidered Cæfar as acting a fubordinate part to himfelf; but at length began to fee his real defigns. His wife Julia was now dead, fo that the domeftic tye of their connection was broken. He had however been inftrumental in the prolongation of Cæfar's command, and could not agree to his recall until the term was expired. Meanwhile Cæfar fent Mark Anthony, a profligate debauchee, but of great courage and ability, to affift in promoting his defigns

deſigns at Rome. That his efforts might be the more effectual, he furniſhed him with an immenſe ſum of money, derived from the plunder of Gaul, with directions to diſtribute it among the populace, and their haranguers. He inferred from their principles, and knew from their practice, that the aurum palpabile (or as a modern democratical haranguer, on what he is pleaſed to call claſſical hiſtory, learnedly phraſes it HAURUM PALPABILUM, thereby ſhewing his capability of deriving from the true ſource the knowledge he profeſſes to communicate,) had a very powerful effect with the demagogues. Anthony gained over Curio, an extravagant young man of a ruined fortune, who was then tribune. A decree was paſſed in the ſenate for recalling Cæſar. Curio interpoſed the tribunitian negative. Parties ran very high. The beſt, the moſt patriotic, and the moſt opulent men, took the ſide of the ſenate. The dregs of the people, the abandoned, the ruined, the criminal, favoured the

the interefts of Cæfar. That able politician pretended he would be fatisfied with a fmaller province, with a view no doubt, by this affumed moderation of making the refufal, which he knew he would receive from the fenate, appear the more reafonable to his partizans; and above all to his foldiers. The fenate juftly efteeming it derogatory to the dignity of a government to negotiate with its fervant, refufed to liften to his propofal, and compelled Anthony and Curio to fly from Rome. On their arrival in Cæfar's camp they inflamed the foldiers againft the fenate, as the enemies of the people and of their general. The troops declared they would follow Cæfar wherever he chofe to lead. Affured of the fupport of the army, Cæfar threw off the mafk, and advanced to Italy to employ againft his country that force, which but for the folly and wickednefs of the democrats and their leaders, he would not have poffeffed. Still however in the ufual cant of

democratical

democratical leaders, he proteſted that his only object was to vindicate the rights of the people. His approach cauſed great conſternation at Rome. Pompey had truſted to his perſonal authority, without having power at hand to ſupport the cauſe of his country, which he had at laſt undertaken. His troops were in Spain, and he was unable from the want of them to make reſiſtance in Italy. The ſenate deemed it expedient to leave for a time their country, which they were unable to defend. They fled to Greece. Cæſar advanced and took poſſeſſion of Rome, with the acclamations of the populace, who did not perceive immediately that they had got a maſter in their profeſſed defender. From Rome he made propoſals of peace, which he knew would not be accepted, and gained over by his pacific profeſſions, the moſt undiſcerning of his opponents. He proceeded next to Spain with wonderful diſpatch, "The Alps "and Pyreneans ſank before him!" In Spain

Pompey

Pompey ought to have met him, but continued to delegate to his lieutenants the command of his veterans, whilst he himself went in quest of new troops. Cæsar warring with soldiers superior in numbers, and equal in discipline to his own, in a country which he knew but little, and of which the opposite leaders had from a long residence and exact knowledge, drew his adversaries into a defile, and obliged them to surrender themselves at discretion. Having thus conquered Pompey's troops, he proceeded next against Pompey himself. Pompey had got together a considerable army in Greece, and was able to make a formidable stand. After a series of military operations, which would alone have established his military character, Cæsar brought his adversary to a battle in the plains of Pharsalia. Pompey's numbers were much more than double Cæsar's, and the greater part of his troops was now habituated to war, so that on the whole his army was equal to that of his enemy.

This battle was to determine whether Pompey's military character was chiefly owing to ability or to fortunate accidents, by ſhewing how he could acquit himſelf when he had to contend with great talents. Cæſar formed his plan ſo ably that nothing but firſt-rate ability could have prevented his ſucceſs. With that it appeared he had not to contend. He gained a victory which decided the fate of Europe. "Pharſalia gave him Rome." Pompey fled to Egypt, where he was treacherouſly murdered. The misfortunes which darkened the cloſe of a once bright life, aroſe from his early poſſeſſing a perſonal conſequence, much ſuperior to what his talents were in trying circumſtances found able to maintain.

Cæſar went to Alexandria in purſuit of Pompey, ſettled that kingdom according to his pleaſure, and purſued the remains of the ſenatorian party whitherſoever they went. The

virtuous patriotiſm of Cato, the brave efforts of the young Pompeys, made a gallant but ineffectual reſiſtance. Nothing could long ſtand before his courage, activity, and over-powering genius. Having reduced his enemies in every quarter of the globe, he returned to Rome, and made himſelf perpetual dictator, and thus cloſed in deſpotiſm the Roman democracy.

Cæſar's fall from the hands of men, who from different motives conſpired againſt him, excited freſh conteſts. The ariſtocratical party revived, but was finally ſuppreſſed by Octavius and Anthony. The following civil war was a diſpute between two leaders, which ſhould be abſolute maſter. On the conqueſt of Anthony by Octavius Rome became an imperial deſpotiſm.

Thus have we ſeen that the prevalence of democracy was the principal cauſe of the

misfortunes

misfortunes of Rome, and that the wiſdom and patriotiſm of the ſenate frequently made the evils ceaſe to flow, but as they could not dry up the ſource the ceſſation was only temporary. Democracy cheriſhed the vicious, overcame the virtuous, perverted the able, to ruin their country. From democracy the Romans had almoſt fallen under the hand of Hannibal; from democracy were the Gracchi, the authors of violence and inſurrection, Saturninus and Sulpicius of maſſacres, Marius of civil war; from democracy ſprung the conſpiracy of Cataline, the combination of the triumvirate, the murders of Clodius, the fruſtration of Cicero's ingenuity, benevolence, and patriotiſm; the inefficacy of Cato's virtues, and the perverſion of Cæſar's unequalled intellect. From democracy exalting Cæſar ſprung permanent deſpotiſm, and the atrocious wickedneſs of ſucceeding emperors. Domitian, Caligula, and Nero, were the lineal deſcendants of democracy.

cracy. Whoever with impartiality and common obſervation ſtudies the hiſtory of the greateſt nation which the ancient world ever ſaw, will perceive that to ariſtocratic authority and exertions it owed its riſe, to prepollent democracy it owed its fall; will in the detail of democratic operations ſee diſorder, convulſion, confiſcation, rapine, maſſacres, and every ſpecies of injuſtice, oppreſſion, and cruelty, and in the general reſult, will behold the conſummation of human miſery.

CHAP. XV.

English democracy—British constitution—Conclusion.

THUS have we traced democracy through the hiſtory of the moſt diſtinguiſhed ancient governments: it would be eaſy to ſhew from modern hiſtory alſo, that the effects which ſhe has produced have been equally ſubverſive of ſocial order and deſtructive of happineſs. Wherever ſhe has appeared in countries of any magnitude, confuſion, immorality, impiety, confiſcation and proſcription, rapine and bloodſhed, have attended her ſteps. To enter into the detail of modern democratical governments and their conſequences, would exceed the plan of the preſent Eſſay, but may poſſibly be the ſubject of

of future confideration. I cannot however conclude the prefent difcuffion without making a few general obfervations on Englifh democracy.

Happily for this country the good fenfe of its inhabitants has generally prevented democracy from being much or long prepollent. Short as the periods have been during which it prevailed in England, yet were they fufficiently marked with atrocious wickednefs and difmal events, even if we had no other fource of knowledge to manifeft its nature and tendency. The firft attempt to excite a democratical fpirit recorded in Englifh hiftory, originated from John Ball, a feditious lecturer. This fellow, near the clofe of the fourteenth century, went about the country inculcating on the loweft vulgar, the principles of univerfal equality, telling them that fubmiffion to the king and houfes of parliament, to all civil and ecclefiaftical power and authority,

was

was a violation of the RIGHTS OF MAN. John made many converts among the moſt ignorant of the populace. Had the government been ſufficiently vigilant to ſtop John's lectures when their rebellious tendency firſt appeared, it would have probably prevented the principles from being reduced to the *intended practice*. Not being repreſſed they broke out in riot and inſurrection. Democrats are fond of every adjunct or appendage in dreſs, manners, and names, which may exhibit their vulgarity. The ringleaders of John's diſciples aſſumed (as our great hiſtorian informs us) the feigned names of Wat Tyler, Jack Straw, Hob Carter, Tom Miller, &c. &c. in order to denote the meanneſs of their origin and ſituation. Theſe democrats, or, as they called themſelves, *reformers*, murdered the primate, the chancellor, the high treaſurer, and all other perſons of rank and diſtinction that fell in their way. They even endeavoured to make the king their

 priſoner.

SERFOJI'S SARASWATI MAHAL

prifoner. The lord mayor, a fpirited active man, knowing it was the duty of a municipal magiftrate to aid the civil power, killed Wat Tyler, and repreffed the infurrection. The nobility, gentry, and all men of virtue and property flocked to London, and affociated themfelves againft thofe daring innovators and levellers. By their loyalty, courage, and activity, they foon entirely fuppreffed the democrats. The firft democratical rebellion in England we fee was owing to a *feditious lecturer*.

The infurrection of Cade, the bricklayer, in the reign of Henry the Sixth, and that of Ket the tanner a century afterwards, arifing from temporary or local caufes, not a general fpirit of democracy, were eafily and fpeedily quelled. Thefe were only topical fores, not democratical poifon, infecting the whole mafs.

Until laft century democracy had not raifed her head fo high as to endanger the exiftence

of

of civil ſociety. The progreſs of democracy from its firſt origin in the harangues of puritanical preachers in the reign of James the Firſt, to its maturity in the ſubverſion of the conſtitution of church and ſtate, in the murder of a mild and benevolent king, in the confiſcation of property, in the complicated tyranny of a bloody uſurper, every Briton knows. As the facts are notorious we ſhall confine ourſelves to the principles. From conſidering the puritanical harangues, the popular diſcontents riſing to violence and inſurrection, the attack of the biſhops, the rebellion, the regicide, and the whole ſeries of that mournful hiſtory, we ſee a cloſe connection between hatred to eccleſiaſtical eſtabliſhments, to civil ſubordination, and to monarchical government. According to the degree in which enmity to the hierarchy ſubſiſted in thoſe who rebelled againſt the monarch, did their hatred rage againſt the nobles and the king. The Preſbyterians, very different in principles, know-

ledge, and conduct, from that reſpectable body which now compoſes the eccleſiaſtical eſtabliſhment of the northern diſtrict of our country, were inimical to the hierarchical gradations of the church, but yet admitted of ſome ſubordination. Theſe, although they wiſhed democracy in the ſtate to be prevalent, did not deſire it to be unmixed. They approved of having a king, but wiſhed to have his authority dependent on themſelves. In the language of Shakeſpear's Jack Cade, they would ſuffer a king, but they muſt be protectors over him. From the preſbyterians branched the Independents, who rejected all clerical eſtabliſhments, all ſubordination, eccleſiaſtical, civil and political. The perfection of ſociety, according to them, conſiſted in every man following his own will in ſuppreſſing all magiſtracy, gentry, clergy, nobility, and monarchy. In the midſt of this general equalization of rank and property, they found a proviſo for a particular exception as to the latter

in

in favour of themſelves. The democrats conſiſted of two deſcriptions apparently oppoſite, but really coincident, the fanatics, and the deiſts. The former profeſſed to believe in the Supreme Being, and in the chriſtian religion, and pretended to ſpecial gifts, illuminations, and privileges, from the Divinity, but had the moſt abſurd, unjuſt, and pernicious notions of the Almighty, and of the conduct pleaſing in his ſight. The latter, like the infidels of modern times, diſbelieved in revelation and providence. The fanatical independents in their addreſſes to the Divinity, inſtead of the humility, contrition, and reverential awe which reaſon dictates and our church preſcribes, uſed a moſt ſhocking and blaſphemous familiarity, which ſhewed that they had a very inadequate ſenſe of the greatneſs and awefulneſs of that Being whom they pretended to ſupplicate and adore. In compaſſing the moſt atrocious wickedneſs in their robberies, ſacrilege, murders, and regicide, they were ſo daringly, ſo

blaſphemouſly

blaſphemouſly impious, as to pretend the ſanction of the Almighty's command. Thus while they pretended to extraordinary piety, they ſhewed that they were totally unimpreſſed by a true ſenſe of religion, and that the gratification of their own wicked paſſions was the ſole motive of their conduct. The Deiſts, who had profeſſedly as little religion as the fanatics really had, concurred in their crimes. On the one hand Ireton, Harriſon, and Cromwel, the heads of a ſect who profeſſed uncommon holineſs without any real religion, on the other Sidney, the head of a party who profeſſed no religion, combined in levelling all diſtinctions of rank and property, and in murdering the king. Thus we ſee in England, that the ſame men who were the bloody enemies of nobles, of biſhops, and kings, were impious and blaſphemous to the Supreme Being. Thoſe who were inimical to the ſubordination of regular ſociety, yielded not obedience to the divine will. Democracy the ſcourge of man is the deſpiſer of God.

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A government ſo abſurd in principles, ſo pernicious in effects, remained not long in Britain. The ſound ſenſe of our anceſtors taught by experience, returned to monarchy. Our conſtitution, for a century aſcertained and confirmed, is of all political ſyſtems recorded in hiſtory, the moſt perfectly fitted for the attainment and preſervation of individual and national happineſs. Our juriſprudence has a moſt exact coincidence with natural ethics. It allows every action, every exertion of freedom, which morality ſanctions. Its reſtraints are commenſurate with the reſtraints of conſcience. We may ſpeak, write, do whatever we pleaſe, if we abſtain from injury. Our polity ſecures to our law the full operation and effect. The judicial examiners of our conduct are men taken from ourſelves, and having the moſt powerful motives to juſtice, as on the purity of their judgments depends their own ſecurity.

Our lawgivers can make no laws which do not equally bind themſelves as the reſt of the community. Our PARLIAMENT has an IDENTITY of INTERESTS with US; that being the caſe, it matters little to individuals whether they have a vote or not in the election of its members. My rights, who have no vote, are as well ſecured as thoſe of any elector in the kingdom. No man can be deprived of his liberty, property, or life, but for his own act of private or public injury. Every one of common underſtanding, induſtry and conduct, may generally earn a comfortable independent livelihood, and is in caſe of unavoidable misfortune, relieved from want. Individual diſtreſs is removed by general proſperity, and general liberality reſulting from excellence of political ſyſtem.

To ſecure the enjoyment of our happineſs undiſturbed by domeſtic and foreign enemies,

ſome of our property is applied. The legiſla-ture finds it neceſſary to expend a part to preſerve the whole. Its wiſdom and humanity apportion impoſts to the ability of the contributer, from the average property of its members, paying itſelf a very large ſhare.

Our CHURCH is equally removed from fanaticiſm and infidelity; pious without enthuſiaſm, liberal without laxity; by precept and example inculcating virtue and religion. The political principles it teaches are thoſe of our civil polity. It grants indulgence to Nonconformiſts, in every opinion not productive of vices and impiety, or ſubverſive of our happy eſtabliſhment.

Our KING has an IDENTITY of INTEREST with the ſeveral orders, civil and eccleſiaſtical, and with the people at large. The friends and enemies of the people, the eſtabliſhment, and the ſovereign are the ſame.

Every true PATRIOT is a lover of the CONSTITUTION and of the KING.

Under ſuch a ſyſtem, and the characters which it produces, we of this country enjoy, and have long enjoyed, a happineſs unequalled in the annals of hiſtory. Malignants may try to make the weak and ignorant fancy otherwiſe, but it muſt be either ignorance of fact or incapacity of reaſoning, that can produce aſſent to ſuch notions. The more a man is converſant with the hiſtory of mankind, and their comparative ſtate in different ſituations, the more clearly will he ſee, that none in the various conſtituents of HAPPINESS equal, or ever equalled the SUBJECTS of the BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

FINIS.